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ABSTRACT 
This research identified the two principal reasons for unsustainable forest 
management in Sierra Leone as inadequate forest policies and policy implementation. 
There has been a consistent disparity between the government's stated forest policies, 
published in 1912, 1946 and 1988 with goals of protection and sustainable 
management, and its actual policies which since 1922 have mainly promoted 
unsustainable exploitation. Reliance on out-of-date policies created ambiguity that 
allowed the government to pursue this hidden agenda. Changes in policy were 
analysed with a balance of policy pressures model that assessed changes in the 
influence of major policy actors and stresses on them. The dominant actors since 
1912 have been the Executive and the Bureaucracy, subject to pressures from the 
British government (until Independence in 1961) and timber traders. Stated policy 
changed in 1912 and 1946 in response to their concern about the threat posed by 
deforestation to timber supplies. But actual policy was soon relaxed, to increase self-
sufficiency and contribute to the allied war effort (1939-1945), and benefit the 
country's Business Elite, particularly after 1969 when patronage and corruption 
proliferated. Stated policy changed in 1988 under pressure from foreign donor 
organisations concerned about environmental impacts of forest depletion. But local 
NOOs and other protectionist groups were still too weak to force a change in actual 
policy. 
Poor forest policy implementation by the state's Forestry Division between 1961 and 
1984 was explained by institutional constraints, shown by an organisation theory 
model to involve poor organisational strength, an organisational structure with a 
clear chain of command but long reporting lines, a high level of discretion allowed to 
senior staff, and external conditioning of policy down the chain of command. The 
new structure introduced in 1984 to facilitate more decentralised forest management 
made lines of communication more indirect and continuing use of old reporting lines 
led to confusion and dual allegiance. A questionnaire and interview survey of 
Forestry Division staff found that poor staff compliance with policy is influenced by 
lack of freedom to express opinions, dilapidated working conditions, limited 
equipment, low salaries, lack of opportunities for training and promotion, and lack of 
participation in policy formulation. The government's inability to control peripheral 
areas has been further limited since 1991 by a rebel insurgency which forced forestry 
staff to withdraw from most forested areas. While still politically weak, NOOs have 
complemented the role of the government by undertaking their own afforestation 
projects. A survey of NOO staff showed that their morale, effectiveness and resource 
availability were all much higher than that of the Forestry Division. 
The results of this first comprehensive forest policy analysis for Sierra Leone raise 
queries about assumptions by environmentalist groups that management of tropical 
forests generally will become more sustainable simply if governments introduce 
improved policies, as they are committed to do as signatories to the 2nd International 
Tropical Timber Agreement. Actual policy will remain exploitative if protectionist 
groups inside a country remain weak, and implementation will continue to be 
constrained by institutional factors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Over the last few decades the world has witnessed a plethora of natural resource 
problems, of which tropical deforestation is undeniably one of the most important. The 
underlying causes of deforestation are a complex array of social, economic and political 
forces, deeply rooted in past development patterns, that drive the expansion of 
agriculture and settlement at the expense of forests. But why are the forests not 
managed sustainably so they are protected from these forces? Answering this question is 
the main goal of this thesis. 
Very often the answer to concerns about the rapid depletion of forests and other natural 
resources has been to recommend the introduction of better management. The issues 
appeared quite simple and the remedies self-evident. But the widespread failure of 
programmes funded by large amounts of overseas financial aid with the aim of improving 
resource management has led to a fundamental change in how management is viewed. 
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According to Leach and Mearns (1988): "One expensIve disappointment has led to 
another. Simple certainties have begun to evaporate. Important lessons are now to be 
learnt, since most basic assumptions have proved highly misleading". 
There is a great need to step back from technical aspects of management and to look 
instead at the government policies which determine how resources are managed, and the 
mechanisms by which those policies are implemented. If suitable policies are lacking or 
inadequate, and/or the means to implement these policies are insufficient, it is unlikely 
that management will be sustainable, even though the most perfect management 
techniques have been identified. One of the disturbing features found in developing 
countries is that in many of them the government lacks an up-to-date forest policy, and in 
even those countries that do have one there is a great disparity between the fine goals of 
the policy and what actually happens in the forests (Poore, 1989). 
The basic hypothesis to be tested in this thesis is that poor forest management can be 
attributed to two interwoven problems: (I) a lack of policy resulting in an ambiguous 
policy situation that can be abused by the most powerful actors to exploit forest 
resources; (2) poor policy implementation caused by internal and external conditioning of 
policy as it is channelled through the bureaucratic hierarchy within weak forestry 
institutions. The hypothesis will be tested by a case study in Sierra Leone. 
1.2 DEFINITIONS 
1.2.1 Resource Management 
Resource management was defined by Mitchell (1989) as the actual decisions concerning 
policy or practice regarding how resources are allocated and under what conditions or 
arrangements they may be developed. 
1.2.2 Policy 
A government's policy on any topic states its current and future intentions on that topic. 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "a course of action adopted by 
government". Forest policies typically state how forests are to be managed, who will 
benefit from this, and who will bear the costs (Cubbage et ai., 1993). 
1.2.3 Stated and Actual Policies 
The stated policy of a government or other organisation is that contained in a written 
policy document. This can form part of a piece of legislation, although strictly speaking 
a law consists of a set of rules intended to implement a given policy (Aucoin, 1970). 
The actual policy of a government or other organisation on a given topic is its attitude 
towards that topic at a given time. It may differ from the stated policy because the latter 
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was published a long time ago, or because it is more convenient for the government to 
hide its true policy, or a combination of the two. 
When the actual policy of the government is ditlerent from its stated policy, the actual 
policy is referred to as a hidden policy agendf.l (Rees, 1990). 
1.2.4 Institutions 
The term institution is often regarded as synonymous with an organisation, but it is 
more accurately defined as a group and the set of relationships within that group (based 
on Blondel, 1995). It is a subset of the broader term of institutional arrangements, 
defined by Mitchell (1989) as comprising the interaction of (1) legislation and 
regulations, (2) policies and guidelines, (3) administrative structures, (4) econolnic and 
financial arrangements, (5) political structures and processes, (6) historical and 
traditional customs and values, and (7) key participants or actors. 
1.2.5 Chain of Command 
The chain of command of an organisation links the centre of the organisation, where 
policy is formulated, to the level in the organisation where the policy is physically 
implemented (Dessler, 1992). The chain of command of a government forestry 
department, for example, links the chief executive of that department with the personnel 
physically responsible for managing forests on a day to day basis. 
1.2.6 Forest 
The word forest has many meanings but could be used to refer to an association of planh 
and animals in which trees are dominant (Worrel, 1970). Forests are considered to be 
closed if the trees cover most of the ground, and open if they are more scattered. They 
are considered to be in use if exploited or I1wnaged , and not in use if 1'irgin or 
abandoned. Small areas of forests are commonly referred to as woodland. 
1.2.7 Forestry 
Forestry is the management and use for human benefit of the natural resources that occur 
on or in association with forest lands and other lands managed wholly or in part for 
similar purposes (James, 1981). 
1.2.8 Sustainable Forestry Development 
Sustainable forestry development refers to any set of interventions geared towards 
settling the priorities and the right balance between long term and short term forestry 
development objectives and between measures to satisfy local rural needs of wood for 
fuel and other domestic use on the one hand, and producing wood for industry and 
primarily urban use or export on the other hand (Hummel, 1984). 
1.3 FOREST POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Research into forest policy formulation and implementation is important because it 
relates to, and assesses the totality of forces operating to create current forest resource 
management trends, and aids an understanding of the processes involved. The analysis 
of policy offers a number of returns. The study of the origin, processes, and 
consequences of forest resource management, allows us to understand the manner in 
which these resources are allocated in space, time, and to whom. A knowledge of the 
variables that shape policy can enable researchers to predict future policies, and suggest 
how current policies can be improved. By describing, accounting for, and predicting 
institutional arrangements, it is possible to suggest how existing situations could be 
improved, and/or how future arrangements could be designed to take advantage of 
observed strengths, whilst avoiding identified weaknesses. 
Research into forest policy formulation and implementation is still at an early stage of 
development (Ellefson and Kaiser, 1991; CIFOR, 1995). The first textbook to show 
how modern political science approaches could be applied to the forest sector was not 
published until 1993 (Cubbage et aI., 1993). Until recently, what little forest policy 
analysis was undertaken was descriptive rather than analytical, rational rather than 
behavioural in approach, geared to supporting forest management as a technical practice, 
showing the wider social background against which forestry must operate (Johnston et 
ai., 1967; Hummel, 1984), or concerned with suggesting new policies (Nemetz, 1992), 
rather than investigating the social, economic and political reasons for the choice of 
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prevIOUS policies, or the organisational failings which caused tho\c to be poorly 
implemented. 
Since policy analysis in general, and natural resource policy analysis in particular, are 
more developed than forest policy analysis, this thesis applies to the forest sector 
appropriate techniques developed in other fields. Nevertheless, while a wide variety of 
models have been proposed for use in policy analysis, each has conceptual and practical 
limitations. A rigorous theoretical framework is lacking and no overall schema or model 
has emerged (Mitchell, 1989). 
It is widely recognised that institutional problems are at the heart of all resource 
management problems (O'Riordan, 1971; Fernie and Pitkethly, 1985), but there has been 
relatively little study of institutional aspects of resource management and resource policy 
implementation, e.g. how institutional arrangements are formed, how they evolve in 
response to changing circumstances and needs and the existence of internal and external 
stresses, and how they may constrain policy implementation. By treating the analysis of 
institutional arrangements as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, new insights 
can be gained about human-environment relationships in general, and forest resource 
management in particular. 
This thesis uses methods from political science and resource policy analysis to study in a 
comprehensive manner the factors influencing the formulation of forest policies, and 
organisation theory methods to study how effectively those policies were implemented. 
1.4 SIERRA LEONE 
The West African country of Sierra Leone provides an ideal subject for a case study of 
this problem. As far as is known, a comprehensive forest policy analysis has never been 
undertaken for the country. It merited just one line in a major review of the forest policy 
and the sustainability of forest management in Africa by Rietbergen (1989) and just one 
line in a table in a review of forest policies in West Africa by Gillis (1988). 
Of all tropical regions, West Africa has suffered the most drastic forest loss, with current 
forest cover being only one third of the original climax area (Sommer, 1978). Direct 
overseas exploitation of forest resources in the region dates back to 1823 when 
shipbuilders in Liverpool imported African oak in sizeable quantities (Adeyoju, 1976), 
but smaller cargoes of wood had been shipped by European traders for a long time 
before that. 
In the eighteenth century, at the height of the transatlantic slave trade, some parts of 
present day Sierra Leone may have been as well known for their timber and camwood 
(dye wood) exports as for their slave cargoes (Richards, 1996). By the nineteenth 
century, European merchants were attempting to monopolise the export trade in forest 
products by collusively fixing prices and imposing production quotas on primary 
producers, and excluding African traders from the European market (Freudenberger, 
1992). Even as recently as 1962, before the rapid rise in Asian exports, West Africa still 
held a 30% share of tropical timber exports because of its proximity to Europe. 
Sierra Leone is a typical example of the severe forest depletion found in this region. Even 
though part of it lies within the tropical rainforest zone of West Africa, very little is left 
of the natural vegetation that once existed (Fig. 1.1). Its forests have suffered from 
extensive cutting, clearing, burning and logging for wood, farming, timber, and other 
indirect uses, and so very few undisturbed areas remain. In large areas, primary forests 
have been reduced to secondary thickenings as a result of the above practices. 
According to FAO, by 1980 only 740,000 ha of closed forest remained in the country 
and it was being cleared at a rate of 5,800 ha per annum (Lanly, 1981). However, 
according to the original 1976 aerial photographic survey on which this estimate was 
based, only half of this area consisted of undegraded closed forest. By 1990, FAO 
(1993) gave a higher estimate of 756,000 ha for the area of tropical rain forest in the 
country, and said that the annual deforestation rate had fallen to 4,920 ha per annum. 
But this set of estimates generally suffered from major problems, and in the case of 
Sierra Leone the estimate was actually based on the 1976 survey (Grainger, 1996). 
However, an independent survey in 1987 using low resolution A VHRR (Advanced Very 
High Resolution Radiometer) satellite imagery estimated that closed forest cover, 
excluding mangroves, had fallen to 400,600 ha in 1987 (Paivinen and Witt, 1989; Sayer 
et aI., 1992). The major limitation of AVHRR.satellite imagery is that, unlike other high 
resolution imagery systems like the American Landsat system which can divide the land 
to even less than 80m by 80m square and so can detect objects of that size, A VHRR can 
only register features that are 1 km by I km square. The implication is that parcels of 
forest land below lkm by lkm square cannot be detected by A VHRR and so are not 
o 
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included in the estimates of forest cover, which could result in underestimation of forest 
cover. Since the map (reproduced in Sayer et aI, 1992) shows no forest in the west-
central part of the country, the low resolution censor could have led to many small 
patches of forest fallow being wrongly classed as cleared land. In balancing this highly 
probable oversight, there is a tendency for such imagery to overestimate forest areas by 
aggregating forest and farmland in more highly forested parts of the country. Thus. most 
estimates of forest areas in the tropics are very inaccurate. 
While a large proportion of its forests have been cleared, or at best reduced to secondary 
formations, through shifting cultivation, fuelwood collection and grazing, surprisingly 
little research has been carried out to explain how this happened. Research has tended to 
focus on the symptoms of forest scarcity, ignoring its underlying social, economic and 
political causes. Sierra Leone's population density, though high at 580 persons per 
1,000 ha in 1990, is not exceptional, and is only the six highest out of 15 West African 
countries. The proportion of population engaged in agriculture, estimated at 70% in 
1980, is almost identical to the African average of 69%. 
By 1980, closed forest area per capita had fallen to just 0.22 ha, the fourth lowest in the 
African humid tropics, after Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana. According to Grainger ( 1995), 
once forest area per capita begins to approach a critical limit of 0.1 ha, the need to 
supply domestic wood needs and conserve what is left of the natural environment should 
force governments to intervene to halt deforestation if it has not previously been brought 
under control by market forces. The factors determining the formulation and 
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implementation of forest policy are therefore very important III this wider land use 
change context. 
The lack of a detailed assessment of forest policies in Sierra Leone is therefore very 
surprising given that, advertently or otherwise, they have greatly aggravated forest 
resource depletion. Such policies, even though adopted for worthy objectives, e.g. 
industrial growth, increased agricultural production, job creation, poverty alleviation, 
regional development, to name but a few, are mostly not realised. Forest policies have 
become synonymous with the terms by which potential users can exploit forests. They 
are biased against the judicious use of forests, and toward their exploitation or 
conversion to other land uses that are intrinsically uneconomic. The government has 
typically sold timber too cheaply, thereby sacrificing public revenue and undervaluing the 
value of non-timber products, whilst encouraging rapid, exploitative and wasteful 
logging. This has led to conflicts between groups and individuals, and between social 
and private interests. 
So the problem of forest depletion in Sierra Leone is as much a policy and institutional 
problem as a resource problem. Although the situation is serious it is still not too late to 
tackle it, but until there is some improvement in its forest policies and their 
implementation, the country's environment will continue to be degraded and its 
development will remain unsustainable. Research into policy formulation and 
ilnplementation in Sierra Leone is therefore an urgent necessity if solutions are to be 
found. The results will aid forest policy planning and implementation not only in Sierra 
Leone but throughout the developing world. 
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1.5 AIMS 
A major reason why tropical forest management is currently unsustainable is the disparity 
between fine-sounding government forestry policies and what actually happens in the 
forests. This project will investigate the causes of this problem in Sierra Leone by: 
I.Evaluating the evolution of stated and actual forest policies, and identifying disparities 
and hidden agendas. 
2.Explaining the content of forest policies, and changes in them, by reference to the 
pressures exerted on policy makers. 
3. Analysing institutional constraints that impede implementation of forest policies. 
4. Making recommendations for how to improve the situation and make forest 
management in Sierra Leone more sustainable. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis has seven chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction to the problem and 
the study area, justifies the subject of the thesis, and provides some key definitions. 
Chapter 2 provides more detailed background information on Sierra Leone. Chapter 3 is 
a review of the salient literature on policy modelling and institutional analysis, identifying 
l-l. 
some of the gaps in the literature which this thesis will help to fill, and the mo.'>t 
appropriate methods to use for this research. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodologies employed in this project and the types ane! 
sources of data collected for it. Chapter 5 describes and discusses the results of the 
research into policy formulation, and Chapter 6 the results of the research into policy 
implementation. Chapter 7 contains a synthetic discussion, a list of conclusions, and a 
series of recommendations for future research and practical action. 
2.1 HISTORY 
IS 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AREA 
The name, Sierra Leone, derives from the Portuguese word "Sierra Lyoa" meaning lion 
mountains, or an isolated range of mountains. The country takes its name from the 
mountains of the Freetown peninsula peaks, unique among the low-lying sand bars, 
mangrove swamps and broad estuaries of the West African coastline. This 32 km range 
of mountains rises abruptly to nearly 1000 m above the long white beaches of the 
coastline. Pedro de Sintra, a Portuguese navigator awed by the roaring and growling of 
tropical thunder among the steep-sided peaks gave the country this name before British 
colonisation. As the name suggests, the country has a hilly and mountainous terrain. 
Sierra Leone, which has been known to voyagers and historians for many centuries, first 
became a British settlement in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The settlement 
was established after the formation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery from 
which sprang the Sierra Leone Company, to make provision for a large number of slaves 
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living in poverty in England after the American war of 1782, and also for such slaves as 
were captured by British ships operating against the slavers (GOSL, 1938). The first 
colonists were landed on a strip of land acquired on the north of the Sierra Leone 
peninsula in May, 1787. This was followed by other consignments of freed African 
slaves and Maroons from Jamaica who were brought to Sierra Leone and allotted lands. 
These freed slaves suffered deprivation and desease during the first few years, coupled 
with several attacks by other tribes in Sierra Leone and by the French squadron. 
On 1st January, 1808, this settlement became a Crown Colony. The Colony, which was 
about 663 square kilometres, comprised virtually all of the peninsula of Freetown, the 
adjacent Tasso and Banana Islands, the town of Bonthe in Sherbro Island, Turtle Islands 
and York Island. The Protectorate, which was declared in 1896, consisted of the 
remaining hinterland of Sierra Leone with a total area of about 71.663 square kilometres. 
2.2 LOCATION 
Sierra Leone is situated on the west coast of Africa, between latitudes 6 degrees 55 
minutes and 10 degrees north, and longitudes 10 degrees and 13 degrees west. It has a 
total area of about 72,326 sq. km (27,699 sq. miles). Sierra Leone is a compact country, 
about 346 km from north to south and from east to west. Its immediate neighbours are 
Guinea, with whom she shares a 652 km boundary to the north and north-east, and 
Liberia along a 306 km frontier to the south-east (World Bank, 1991). It is bordered on 
the south-west by the Atlantic ocean. It has a coastline extending to about 402 km along 
the Atlantic, with a territorial sea of 200 km. The principal port is the capital Freetown. 
17 
2.3 CLIMATE 
The climate of Sierra Leone is largely determined by its geographical location, which 
results in a high net radiation due to the elevation of the sun at its zenith all year round: a 
high air temperature (absolute minimum not below 18 degrees centigrade, a mean 
monthly temperature of about 26 degrees centigrade); and a situation where neither 
temperature nor light are limiting crop production. 
The inter-tropical convergence zone or the inter-tropical discontinuity (lTD) divides the 
distribution of rainfall into marked wet and dry seasons. Due to maritime modifications, 
seasonal variations in humidity and temperature are small and the seasons are defined as 
a rainy season from April to October; and a dry season, often with harmattan winds, 
from November to April. 
The climate is generally hot and can become unpleasantly humid. March, April and May 
are the most humid and oppressive months. This is the beginning of the rains, with 
thunderstorms and tornadoes occurring frequently. At the end of the rains, the stormy 
weather returns. By December, the humidity is lower and the dry season is heralded by 
the dust-laden harmattan winds blowing from the north-east. 
Air temperatures are severely affected by rain. Peak temperatures are reached during 
March to April. As the Sahara heats up, a low pressure area is created and the 
monsoons are strengthened and drawn to the Sahara. This results in moist air being 
blown from over the sea toward the whole of West Africa in May to October. The 
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resultant heavy rains and cloud cover have a cooling effect, such that July to August are 
the coldest months. During the winter season, the reverse is true. The Sahara is 
relatively cooler and dry wind blows from the Sahara to the warmer West African coast. 
Mean seasonal temperatures are generally above 25 degrees centigrade. 
Rainfall varies considerably from year to year and can deviate by up to 450mm in any 
one month. The wettest part of Sierra Leone is the coastal belt, and the climate becomes 
progressively drier inland. The Western Area peninsula is the wettest region, receiving 
up to 1400mm of rainfall in anyone month and up to 5000mm annually. The rains fall 
steadily in the wet season and are heaviest in July and August (Bomah, 1988). 
The heavy rams and high temperatures, plus a maritime influence, create a high, 
sustained humidity that rises to 93% in the wet season. Humidity increases inland and 
declines with rainfall, reaching a low of 47%. Mildew and other plant diseases are 
rampant during periods of high humidity and can lead to serious reduction of yield and 
loss of stored products. 
There is little variation in day length due to the low latitude, but sunshine hours are 
affected during the wet season. Cloud build-up peaks in August and there is a 
corresponding decline in sunshine hours. The resultant influence on photosynthesis is 
likely to considerably reduce plant growth over this period. 
Violent storms occur at the start and end of the rainy season. They are caused by the 
meeting of the harmattan and monsoon winds and are accompanied by strong winds, 
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torrential rams, thunder and lightning. The result can be very damaging to crop 
production. 
2.4 RELIEF 
There are four main physical regions in Sierra Leone: coastal plains; interior plains; 
plateaux; and hills and mountains (Figure 2.1). Each of these have several sub-regions. 
The coastal plains to the west of the country have four distinct sub-regions: coastal 
terraces; estuarine swamps subject to tidal flooding; alluvial plains subject to freshwater 
flooding during the rainy season; and beach ridges which fringe the alluvial plains on the 
seaward side. 
The interior plains are the largest of the four regions, covering 43% of the total land 
area. They rise gently from the coastal terraces to elevations of 200 metres in the east, 
where they are separated from the plateau by distinct escarpments (Clarke, 1969). 
The plateaux region lies in the north-east and south-east of the country, and ranges from 
300 to 700 metres in altitude. It covers 22% of the land area and is almost exclusively 
granitic. The region is divided into two - the higher lying plains, similar in morphology 
to the interior plains but at higher elevations with occasional low hills; and the rolling 
hills and plains. The eastern parts comprise dissected hills. In the south, they are 
covered with a thick layer of alluvial ironstone gravel, but in the north, the weathering 
gravel is shallower and outcrops are more common. 
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The hill and mountain region consists mainly of acid rock in the north and east of the 
country. The highest peak, Bintumani (1945 metres) is dolerite capped and found in the 
Loma Mountains. The other sub-region consists of isolated hills formed on basic rock 
, 
The largest being the Freetown Peninsula. These rocks are resistant to erosion, resulting 
in dissected ridges of moderate to high relief. The high content of iron and aluminium 
results in the formation of laterites, either as a surface crust or as densely packed 
ironstone gravel. 
2.5 VEGETATION 
The original vegetation of a large part of Sierra Leone was probably moist high forest. 
except in northern and central regions where drier conditions would have produced 
deciduous woodland. There is a coastal mangrove zone of variable width except in the 
south. Within these zones, the vegetation varies with edaphic changes, but mainly as a 
result of human activities (Johnson and Johnson, 1991). 
In the moist forest zone, bush fallow (shifting cultivation) extends over almost 60% of 
the country, and in the northern moist deciduous savanna zones (Bombali and Koinadugu 
districts) cattle rearing is common. These agricultural activities have so modified the 
vegetation pattern that closed forests only survive as remnant forests over about 5% of 
the country. In the north, grazing and uncontrolled burning are steadily degrading the 
forest types from moist deciduous to savanna, and gradually towards predominantly open 
grassy savannas (figure 2.2). 
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The population have enjoyed a long traditional association with forests which supplied 
good medicines, building materials and fuel. The forests and the bush fallow regrowths 
are the essential ingredients of the traditional bush fallow agroforestry system. 
Population growth increased pressure on the forest resources and led to greater demands 
on the bush fallow system which put both the retention of forest cover and the ability to 
sustain basic agricultural production at serious risk. The forests are far too ecologically 
important to the national well-being not to be adequately managed and conserved. 
2.5.1 Closed Broadleaved Forests 
Closed forests on dry lands are either moist evergreen or semi-deciduous forests and are 
mostly located in forest reserves on hill slopes (Gola, Kambui, Nimini, Dodo hills, 
Freetown peninsula, Tama Tonkolili, Kasewe, Lorna and Tingi hills). Closed canopy and 
trees are common in these generally mature secondary forests, with a large number of 
species and a very uneven distribution. In the Lorna Mountains and Tingi Hills, moist 
semi-deciduous forests have been gradually replaced by sub-montane gallery forests 
reaching up to 1700m altitude. In such situations, epiphytes are abundant. Often in the 
fringes of cultivated areas and in more accessible locations in forest areas, patches of 
degraded forests and undercrops of cocoa and coffee occupy areas in which large trees 
have been removed for timber and other purposes. Typical moist evergreen forests 
include: Lophira alata, Heritiera utilis, Klaine-doxa gabonensis, Uapaca guineensis, 
o ldfieldia africana, Erythrophleul11 . . lvorenS1S, Brachystegia leonensis and 
Piptadeniastrum africanum. The most common semi-deciduous trees include: DalZiel/ia 
thurifera, Terminalia ivorensis, T. superba, Parkia bicolor and Anthonotha flagrans 
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which are associated with evergreen trees such as Paril1ari exce/sa, Sridelia grandis, 
Treculia africana and Pycananthus ango/ensis. However, there are practically no 
untouched forests left owing to logging which has been going on for decades (Mahmoud, 
1992). 
Young secondary forests, which are the result of former agricultural clearing, are found 
mainly on hill slopes in the south-eastern part of the country, with closed canopy and tree 
heights from 10 to 30m. The majority of trees are fast-growing, even-aged and have 
distinctive small crowns. As the forest matures, these are replaced by slow- growing 
typical high forest species. Tree crop species and few large forest trees left standing 
after farming are also common. Secondary forest trees in the lower stratum include: 
Musunga cecropioides, Carapa procera, Macaranga Sarteri, Anthocleista nobilis, 
Bridelia micrantha, Myrianthus arboreus, Phyllanthus discoideus and Sterculia 
tragacantha. These are overtopped by typical forest species such as Afzelia qfricana, 
Albizia zygia, Uapaca guineensis, Daniellia thur(fera, Terminalia superba, Parkia 
bieolor and Entandrophragma utile. Associated tree-crop species are Mallgifera indica, 
Elias guineensis and Cola nitida. Secondary forests are locally exploited for timber and 
fIrewood. They also provide a suitable habitat for undercropping of cocoa and coffee 
near villages. 
Fringing swamp forests are mainly present along valley bottoms, shallow drainage ways 
and lake margins in the northern part of the coastal area. They usually have a closed 
canopy with trees up to 30m high. Stilt roots and buttresses are conunon features in this 
area. These forests are subject to seasonal flooding and the ground is muddy during the 
dry season. The canopy is more open and the trees often fewer along the edges of large 
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shallow lakes. Typical specIes are Perocarpus santalinoides, Newtonia elliotii. 
Myrianthus arboreus, Plagiosiphon emarginatus, Uapaca heudelotii, Napoleana 
vogelii, Cynometrra vogelii and Placodiscus riparius, with trunks covered by 
pneumatophores at the flood level. Paddy rice is cultivated in this region to a limited 
extent. 
Within moist forests and savanna zones, Raphia sp. occurs in valley bottoms with closed 
canopy and trees measuring up to 20m. A process of colluvial sedimentation prevails 
under conditions of seasonal flooding in the freshwater environment of swamps. Raphia 
palms (R. vinifera) are dominant and often constitute a regrowth stage, together with 
climbing rattan palms of Ancistrophyllul11 secund~florul11, Eremospatha hookeri and 
Calamus decratus. The most common swamp tree species are Nauclea diderrichii and 
Mitragyna stipulosa. The undergrowth consists of ferns and other monocvotyledons. 
Some Raphia swamp forests are cleared by farmers for dry season cultivation. 
Mangrove swamps are usually established on tidal flats at the mouth of rivers in the 
coastal area. Stilted shrubs and trees are also frequent in this area with heights of up to 
20m. The larger trees and denser forests create a "gallery forest effect" along the creeks. 
The mud flats between creeks have a low and less dense mangrove cover. The main tree 
species are: Rhizophora racemosa, R. mangle and R. harrison ii, the latter species are 
dominant upstream at the tidal limits, with Avicennia nitida, Conocarpus erectus and 
Laguncularia racemosa. On the littoral fringe of the mangrove, grasses occur together 
with ferns and halophytes. The accessible areas of mangrove cover are mainly low 
regrowth with few trees of any size. These features and bare mud flats are characteristic 
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of the Freetown delta, which has been subject to indiscriminate clearing for poles and 
fuelwood in the past. Paddy rice cultivation is conunon in other mangrove areas. 
A large central block part of the country (about 37.744 square kilometres), which was 
originally closed high forest, is occupied by forest regrowth. Various stages of regrowth 
from newly abandoned farm bush to young secondary forest are represented in this 
vegetation pattern. When left standing for longer than 8 to 10 years, it develops into 
secondary forest. In many areas, however, the bush fallow cycle is being shortened and 
the thicket burnt long before the secondary forest stage is reached. Trees up to 10m high 
compete with shrubs resulting in the formation of thickets with numerous woody 
climbers. During clearing operations, scattered large forest and tree crop are sometimes 
left standing. Typical thicket species are: Lantana camara, Cissus afzelli, 
Manniophytum fulvum, Abrus precatorius, Smilax Krausiana, Discorea bulbifera, 
Clematin grandiflora, Adenia lobata and scieria bovinii. Pioneer secondary forest trees, 
such as: Dichrostachys glomerata, Harungana madagascariensis, Nauclea latifolia, 
Alchornea cordifolia and Trema guineensis succeed farm bush and thicket, if the area is 
no longer subject to the agricultural cycle. 
2.5.2 Open Broadleaved Forests 
Savanna woodlands occur on hill slopes and undulating terrain in the northern part of the 
plateau region. The crown cover is generally between 20 and 50%, but increases to 
some 50 to 80% in a few small sites. Trees reach 15m and an undergrowth of tall 
grasses of up to 3m is practically always present, except when burnt during the dry 
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season (Millington, (1987). The trees are often misshapen, deciduous and fire-resistant, 
commonly with thick bark. Suckers and coppice shoots are common after burning. 
Typical species are Pterocarpus erinaceus, Hymenocardia acida, Daniellia oliveri, 
Parkia biglobosa, Cussonia barteri, Piliostigma thonningii, Phyllanthus disco ide us and 
Cassia sieberiana. Savanna woodlands are used extensively for grazing after burning 
and are also cleared in some areas for mixed cropping rice and cassava. 
Coastal woodlands, characterised by relatively closed canopy of savanna trees and 
secondary forest trees not higher than 30m, are found on inland beach ridges in the south 
western coastal area. The trees are often stunted with an undergrowth of low thicket 
" ", 
and creepers. The soil is sandy. There is also limited dry season burning. Coastal 
woodlands contain stunted specimens of Cassia mimosoides and Hymenocardia acida, 
coastal tree savanna species including Parinari microphylla and Chysotalanus ellepticus 
and among forest regrowth species Anthostema senegalensis. The undergrowth is 
characterised by various farm bush species of Dissotis, Borreria and Leguminosae as 
well as Habropetalum dawei and Triphyophyllum pinnatum. 
Mixed tree savanna occurs on hill slopes and undulating plains in the drier northern and 
north-eastern parts. Grasses up to 3m are predominant with scattered trees. Its 
characteristics are similar to savanna woodland, but crown cover varies between 2 and 
20% only. 
Lophira tree savannas are found mainly in the north-west of the country on lateritic pans 
and undulating plains associated with shallow soils over lateritic layers subject to grazing 
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and dry season burning. Other characteristics include misshapen and stunted shrubs or 
trees of up to 12m. After burning, bright green suckers or coppice shoots develop and 
Lophira lanceolata predominates associated with Pterocarpus erinaceus with savanna 
grasses of up to 3m. This type of tree savanna is used exclusively for grazing. Patches 
of forest fallow occur locally. 
Coastal tree savannas occur on beach ridges and swales in several areas along the coast, 
but mainly in the south of Bonthe Island and Turner's Peninsula. The freely drained 
sands cause drought conditions in the dry season and the vegetation is exposed to salty 
sea winds and occasional fIres. Among medium height grasses of up to 1.5m, scattered 
shrubs or trees of 15m maximum occur with Parinari macrophylla dominating. They 
are often gnarled and have xeromorphic characteristics. Coppicing is common. 
2.5.3 Shrub Formations 
Mixed montane thicket and grassland occur between 900 and 1900m altitude on the 
Lorna mountains and the Tingi Hills in the north-east, where the average temperature is 
the lowest in the country. The slopes and plateaux are subject to annual burning. 
Typical shrubs like Kotachya ochreats, Dissotis jruiticosa, Monechma depauparatum 
and Droogmansia scaettaiana of up to 5m are scattered in a medium 1.3m height of 
grass cover, but are not found above 1700m. Although these areas have a potential for 
grazing, they have been largely abandoned. 
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2.6 SOILS 
The soils of Sierra Leone are referred to as ferralitic, implying that they are formed under 
humid tropical conditions and excessive leaching. The soils reflect the final stages of 
weathering and leaching, wherein only the least mobile and weatherable constituents 
remain. Ironstone gravel at the surface and in the profile is common, and the influence of 
parent material and slope on the soil profile is pronounced Bomah and Sarna, 1990). 
In upland soils, drainage is good and the clay content (consisting of kaolinitic and iron 
and aluminium oxides) increases gradually with depth. The cation exchange capacity 
(CEC) of the clay fraction is generally within the range 3-15 mEq/lOOg, and maintenance 
of even a moderate level of available nutrients is dependent on retaining organic matter in 
the top soil and returning of nutrients through crop residues or forest litter. Under arable 
farming, the more sandy members of this soil type are among the poorest soils in Africa, 
often with less than 1 mEq/lOOg total exchangeable bases in the top soil. The major 
problems under cultivation are control of soil erosion, leaching of nutrients and 
maintenance of soil organic matter. For these reasons, farming on upland soils, even on 
non-sloping land and in lower rainfall areas, will always meet with difficulties relating to 
land management, soils and crops. The soils are best suited to the production of 
perennial crops, such as plantation crops which provide a canopy and litter protection 
against surface run-off and soil erosion and contribute to the efficient cycling of carbon 
and nutrients. Hence a large proportion of the country with steep slopes and shallow, 
often gravelly, soils should be reserved for reforestation rather than farming, particularly 
for the controlled production of valuable hardwoods. 
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In addition to upland ferralitic soils, Sierra Leone has quite extensive and economically 
important hydromorphic soils occurring in valley bottoms and river plains, which are 
usually extensively farmed under arable crops, particularly rice. Both rainfed and 
irrigated crops are grown during the dry season. Although they vary in their physical and 
chemical properties, these soils are relatively fertile and must be regarded as a valuable 
economic asset, justifying proper development. Their main problem is related to 
drainage and water control. Not enough detail is known about their chemical and 
physical properties, but it is known that these are quite variable and can sustain 
continuous cropping over prolonged periods of time. 
2.7 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
The fIrst national census in April, 1963 revealed a population of 2.18 million, with 
Freetown the major growth centre with 128,000 inhabitants. A UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) mission (1988) projected the 1985 census fIgures to 
1989 based on growth rates over the decade to 1985 as shown in Table 2.1. 
Between 1963 and 1989, the total population increased by 78%, while that of Freetown 
expanded almost 3.4 times. The Freetown expansion is partially due to urban drift 
encouraged by the promise of greater economic opportunity in the capital. The 1989 
projection indicated a population density of 52.99 person per kilometre square. 
According to the most recent 1990 estimates, Sierra Leone has a population of about 4.2 
million. With a current population growth rate of 2.49%, this fIgure is projected to rise 
, ~ 
3 1 
to about 5.4 million by the year 2000, and to 9 mjll ion by the year 2020 (WRI 1993). 
The average population density is 150 persons per sq. mile. However, the population of 
Sierra Leone is largely rural, with only about 28% of the population living in the urban 
areas. 
Table 2.1 Projected Population For 1989 
. ·nadugu 
bia 
Portloko 
% 
100 
24.3 
17.4 
11 .0 
18.8 
14.6 
38 .1 
13.2 
25 .8 
29.7 
30.4 
7.3 
9. ] 
16.3 
..• 32.9 
GROWTH 
%+ 
4.95 
7.02 
2. 78 
1.32 
1.66 
1.09 
1.55 
1.02 
2.39 
2. 15 
1.93 
1.20 
2.61 
1.67 
2.31 
Notes: + growth rates revealed by 1985 census as annual rates over the period 1974-85 
(last column). 
Source: FAO; 1988 
The mean population growth rate of 2.49% per annum for 1985- 1990 is actually below 
the African average of 2.99 (World Resources Institute, 1992). Trends in population 
growth between 1950 and 1990 reveal a steady increase in population (Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 Trends In Population 
Source: FAO, 1992 
POPULATION 
1.94 
2.65 
2.93 
3.26 
3.67 
4.15 
Sierra Leone had a crude birth rate of 46.2 per 1000 population per annum in 1990-95, 
ranking 17th out of all African countries. One really exceptional thing abo ut Sierra Leo ne 
is that it has the lowest life expectancy of any country in the world - 43 years in 1990-95. 
Sierra Leone also has the highest death rate (21.6 per 1000 population per annum) in 
1990-95, and the third highest infant mortality (143 deaths per 1000 live births per 
annum, 1990-95), after Afghanistan (162) and Mali (159). Another exceptional feature 
of Sierra Leone population is that it has the second lowest adult literacy rate (20.7 %) 
after Burkina Faso (18.2%) (Economist, 1994). 
2.8 POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
Sierra Leone gained her independence on 27th April, 1961, ending over 150 years of 
British colonial rule, initially by company rule, and later by a tiny crown colony founded 
in 1808, and a much larger Protectorate established in 1896. The colony, which had an 
area of about 663 Sq. Km, included only the Freetown Peninsula, Tasso Island, the 
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Banana Islands, York Island and Bonthe, whereas the remainder of Sierra Leone, about 
71663 Sq. Km, fell under the protectorate. 
Independence brought a more unified administration and more equal opportunities to the 
whole country (Clarke, 1969). Most of the old colony became the Western Area while 
the Protectorate became collectively known as the Provinces. One consequence has 
been the inevitable reduction in the predominance of the former colony, as the peoples of 
the provinces gained political power through universal suffrage. Sierra Leone enjoyed 
unruffled political calm and parliamentary democracy until March, 1967 when the Army 
took power with a National Reformation Council. This Military regime was overthrown 
thirteen months later in April, 1968, and a representative government was restored. 
Sierra Leone became a Republican State in 1971. It is a member of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Mano 
River Union (MRU); and used to be the 100th member of the Commonwealth, before its 
suspension following the latest Military take-over in May 25, 1997. 
The government of Sierra Leone is centralised in Freetown, where the central 
administration, legislature and judiciary are located, along with the Central Bank. 
Freetown is the core of commercial, medical, educational, cultural and social facilities. 
The degree of centralisation could be attributed to the small scale of urbanisation 
elsewhere in Sierra Leone and the poor communication network. 
For the purpose of local government, the country is divided into three provlllces -
northern, eastern, and southern, and the western area (Figure 2.3). The former coinciding 
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with the old Protectorate and the latter with most of the old Colony. Before the Military 
coup d'etat, the provinces were controlled by Provincial Secretaries appointed by the 
central government. The provinces are sub-divided into 12 districts controlled by 
District Officers and District Councils. The districts are further sub-divided into 148 
chiefdoms ruled by Paramount Chiefs who usually reside in the chiefdom headquarters 
from where they oversee the local administration. 
Before the Military take-over on 29th April, 1992, Sierra Leone used to enjoy a multi-
party democracy and later a one-party state Parliamentary democracy. The political 
climate was relatively stable before the rebel war broke out in 1991. This claimed the 
lives of thousands and left millions displaced and dispossessed. The Military junta that 
took over in 1992 formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and ruled for 
four years before conducting democratic elections by proportional representation and 
handing over power in March, 1996. The new President was also overthrown by another 
Military regime known as the AFRC. An air of uncertainty and unpredictability clouds 
the current civil unrest in the country. 
2.9 ECONOMY 
Despite the good rainfall and an abundance of primary resources (both mineral and 
agricultural), Sierra Leone has been classified by the United Nations (UN) as a least 
developed country, with GDP per capita at US$350 in 1985/86, the average income 
figure disguising considerable inequity. The economy has continued to deteriorate 
steadily over the last few years, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) formally 
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announced arrears of US$55 million in April, 1988. The World Bank followed the IMF 
by suspending further disbursements at the end of that year. 
Sierra Leone is now ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1989, it had 
a GNP of US$813 million, and a GNP per capita of US$200 - the seventh lowest in 
Africa after Mozambique (80), Ethiopia (120), Tanzania (120), Somalia (170), Guinea 
Bissau (180) and Chad (190). In spite of the fact that the country exported cocoa, 
coffee, diamonds, gold, Rutile, Bauxite, etc. its long-term public foreign debt was 58% 
of GNP in 1989, while in 1984, debt service was 22% of total exports (World Resources 
Institute, 1992). 
Government revenue as a proportion of GDP has sunk to 5.2% due to indirect taxes and 
import duties. Income taxes have been reduced, with the highest rate at 45%, plus 10% 
surtax. Government expenditure was concentrated on physical infrastructure such as 
roads, education and agriculture only accounted for 13% of total spending with little 
local authority (Chiefdom) revenue. The budget deficit in 1988 was 38% more than that 
of 1987 and is still largely funded by commercial banks, although non-bank holding of 
treasury bills has increased slightly. For a large proportion of the population, the 
marginal propensity to save is probably zero. The development budget of 1988/89 was 
largely funded by grants and loans. 
As part of the policy package to enable people to deal with the effects of the devaluation 
of the Leone, Civil Service salaries were increased in 1988. However, the benefits of 
such increases were lessened by salary payments being three to five months in arrears. 
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Such rrummum wages are generally insufficient to purchase the basic family food 
requirement. In these circumstances, the daily task ceases to have any tangible 
connection with the wage paid - a situation which essentially breaks down the 
employment system. The situation has caused the outflow of the better qualified and 
experienced to the private sector, and subsequent promotion of the less qualified and 
experienced into vacant positions. 
Some progress was made against consumer price inflation (CPI) which fell from 170% to 
60% between 1987 and 1988. However, it should be noted that the cpr reflects official 
prices which to a large extent are less than actual selling prices. Sierra Leone suffers 
from a balance of payment deficit, reflecting adverse movements in the capital account 
situation. The country suffers from an ever increasing foreign exchange starvation of the 
official market. 
The Structural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank and the associated Agricultural 
Sector Support Programme (ASSP) (FAO, 1984) were casualties of the inability of 
Sierra Leone to service her external debts. These could have ameliorated a proportion of 
the stabilisation policies induced by the IMF, only some of which were introduced. 
Selective introduction has forced most of the impact onto vulnerable groups, since they 
affect the price and availability of major consumption items to low income households, 
the level of government spending in the social sector and employment patterns. These 
effects, in turn, have downstream consequences, e.g. the high infant mortality rate, low 
life expectancy and low adult literacy rate. Poor nutrition and education are 
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economically inefficient and the shortage of consumer goods deprive people of 
incentives. 
2.10 LAND USE 
The population of Sierra Leone is basically rural. A large proportion of the population 
are involved in subsistence farming (Table 2.3) . Rice, being the staple food , is the chief 
crop grown in most areas. 
Table 2.3 Percent Of Labour Force In Agriculture 
Source: W orId Resources Institute, 1992 
PERCENTAGE 
72.6 
69.6 
66.0 
62.3 
In some areas, especially towards the eastern and southern extremes of the country, 
plantation agriculture is practised, the major crops being cocoa, coffee, oil palm, raffia 
palm etc. Backyard gardens are largely restricted to the urban areas where competition 
for land is greater. Table 2.4 gives a clear picture of the amount of land apportioned to 
various human activities. Nomadic pastoralism is also extensively practiced in the 
savanna region of northern Sierra Leone. 
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Table 2.4 Land Area Allocated To Various Uses (ThoLl .. and ha) 
1975 1985 1990 
7 162 7 162 7162 
555 615 
'. 
650 
2204 2204 "X>2204 
,".: . ",. 
2140 2090 ;,';2060 
2263 2253 ~~:~]~2248 
Source: World Resources Institute , 1992 
The method of cultivation employed in most cases is basically traditional. It usually 
involves the cutting, burning, and clearing of vegetation. Because of the high poverty 
level resulting in the inability to procure artificial fertilizers, cultivators are compelled to 
shift from one plot of land to the other, leaving the already cultivated land to fallow. The 
free range method practiced by nomads, especially during the dries, contributes to 
widespread destruction of vegetation. These practices have collectively led to the 
clearing of vast expanses of vegetation on arable land for agricultural purposes. This 
exposes the top soil, subsequently leading to an increase in the rate of detachment and 
transport of soil materials, leaching of nutrients, soil infertility, and a reduction in the 
ability of the soil to produce quantitatively and/or qualitatively goods or services. 
2.11 LAND TENURE 
There is a complex pattern of land tenure in Sierra Leone. In the Western Area, formerly 
the colony, there is freehold tenure and the legal intricacies of land tenure are few. 
However, in the Provinces (the former Protectorate) , ownership of land is vested in the 
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Chiefdom, but few Chiefdom authorities retain the practical power to use and allocate 
such land. A common pattern involved the extended family groups gradually acquiring 
for practical purpose permanent rights of use of land allocated to them by the 
community. Land can be transferred or re-allocated within the family or community unit, 
but such re-allocation are not usual, as long as an individual or family are using the land. 
Individual rights have further application relating to economic trees like oil palm, kola, 
coffee, cocoa where the planter is accepted as the owner in the fullest sense, whether or 
not the particular land is held by him. Even where farms of individual tenure have 
become widely established, such areas as sacred bush or virgin forest are seen as being 
for the use of the community. 
Apart from the forest estate in the Western Area which is officially protected, all other 
forest land - even in the forest reserves - is conm1Unally owned. The traditional land use 
rights are determined by the traditional law of the involved ethnic group. In effect, the 
members of a tribe, who are recognised as having claim to a particular area, whether 
forested or not, also possess the right of land use (Turay, 1980). These rights usually 
concern hunting, collection of plant and animal products, collection of fuelwood and 
building timbers, rotational cultivation as part of agricultural use and grazing rights. 
The individual pattern of land tenure, combined with increasing population and growing 
land pressure, would make it difficult to establish any new forest estates using reserve 
settlement procedures. Instead, there would have to be recognition that a real transfer 
takes place when a reserve is constituted and requisite compensation paid for the 
transfer. Compensation is not inconsistent with the preservation of compatible local 
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uses. Such compensation could serve the purpose of increasing the acceptance of 
forestry among the local population, enhance the possibility of multiple forest use and 
involve local communities in enjoying some benefit and in maintaining the forest estate. 
The spread of individual holdings at the local level could make it difficult to preserve an 
essential minimum of land for community use and needs - including forestry. It may be 
necessary to consider zoning, land use controls or the setting up of community 
forests/plantations to meet local needs. 
2.12 ETHNIC GROUPS 
After the population of Sierra Leone by waves of migrants from the north, east, north-
eastern and south, the tribal groups became distinct and lived in almost exclusive tribal 
communities for fear of war, suspicion of other tribes and problems of social cohesion 
This militated against ethnic diffusion. 
As trade increased, and government and Missionary activities resulted in the spread of 
education and medical facilities, and the improvement of communication networks, the 
resulting increase in population mobility led to better intermingling of tribes. Thus, 
representatives of all tribes could now be found in most areas. Notwithstanding these 
later developments, some ethnic groups like the Creoles in the western area, the Mendes 
in the south and east, the Temnes in the north, still have their nucleus areas. 
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The whole population is made up of 20 tribes, with a large proportion speaking Krio (the 
current lingua franca, which originally served as the language of the resettled ex-slave 
population of the Freetown area) (Table 2.5). Even though available data on the 
composition of each tribe in relation to the total population dates back to 1963, it still 
gives a fair picture of the ratio of each tribe to the total population. English is the official 
language to date, but its regular use is limited to the literate minority. 
Table 2.5 Ethnic Composition Of The Population, 1963 
PERCENT PERCENT 
1.9 2.9 
3.1 2.3 
0.1 30.9 
0.2 3.4 
2.3 3. ] 
4.8 29.8 
3.7 0.3 
0.4 0.7 
0.2 1.3 
8.4 0.2 
Source: Clarke, 1969 
The heterogeneity of the country's population is made even more complex by the 
Lebanese, who are found in many large towns, especially along the main routes . Indians 
and Europeans are more localised, but mainly congregate in the capital, where the Creole 
community is also centred. The effect of these ethnic admixtures has been to break 
down tribal traditions, leading to a growing sense of brotherhood and sisterhood in the 
country as a whole. The feeling of being a Sierra Leonean, not a Mende, Temne or Loko 
is slowly growing. 
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2.13 FOREST SECTOR 
Forestry has been one of the most neglected sectors in Sierra Leone resulting in a total 
disregard of the important role it plays in agricultural and economic development. 
Forests constitute an essential resource base for sustainable economic and social 
development, providing a variety of wood and non-wood products and services. Proper 
forest management, especially in an agrarian economy like Sierra Leone's, contributes 
substantially to rural development in the broadest sense and in particular to expanding 
agricultural production. Forests also playa vital role in the protection of soils, water and 
the environment and are an indispensable element of biodiversity and landscape. They 
also serve social, cultural, religious and sentimental importance to many societies. 
Studies between 1978 and 1988 in Sierra Leone revealed the forestry division as a 
grossly ill-maintained sector with little or no resources to face the multifarious threats 
imposed on a resource that has life-supporting significance (Atlanta, 1979; Atlanta, 
1980a; FAO, 1982; GOSL, 1982; GOSL, 1986: Tsoukers, 1987; FAO, 1988). 
2.13.1 Forest Resources 
2.13.1.1 Natural Forests 
Because of the infrequency of national forest surveys, estimates of the area of forest in 
Sierra Leone have tended to be confusing and inaccurate. According to Persson (1974) 
and Myers (1980) there were only 290,000 ha of closed tropical moist forest left in the 
country. A detailed aerial photographic survey in 1975-76 by Gordon et al. (1979), 
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however, arrived at an estimate of 365,000 ha, with another 261,000 ha of secondary 
forest. Lanly (1981) used this last survey, together with additional information. to come 
up with a much higher figure of 740,000 ha of closed forest in 1980. In the absence of 
more recent data FAO (1993) later adjusted this to give an estimate of 756,000 ha for 
1990. However, in 1987 a survey using low resolution (NOAA A VHRR) satellite 
imagery led to an estimate of 401,000 ha. Because of the limitations of AVHRR imagery, 
it is likely that this did not differentiate between mature and secondary closed forest, and 
might also have missed small patches of closed forest too, but it seemed more consistent 
with the estimates of Gordon et al which is 626,000 ha for 1976 than with Lanly's higher 
estimate. The corresponding deforestation rate of 20,400 ha per annum was four times 
higher than that estimated by FAO (1993) for the 1980s, but is by no means impossible. 
2.13.1.2 Plantations 
Planting of indigenous timber species was tried on an experimental basis up to 1929. 
Nursery and plantation techniques were then developed between 1930 and 1940 with 
Gmelia arborea, Tectona grandis, Cassia siamea, Termz"nalia sup., Tarrieta utilis, 
Entandrophragma spp. and Nauclea didderichii. 
The frrst plantations employing the taungya system were established in 1931. The trees 
were either planted in groups, lines or regular mixtures. From 1935 onwards, the 
common practice has been planting Gmelina and local species in alternate lines. Some 
species have been planted on an experimental basis, including various pines and 
Eucalyptus. The usual taungya food crop is rice, and only one crop is grown. Few man-
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made forests have been established in savanna areas (Table 2.6). About 40 ha of all 
plantations are privately owned, with the rest belonging to the government or local 
communities. 
There are conflicting estimates of the total of man-made forests in Sierra Leone. FAO 
(1988) estimated that 4000 ha of plantation remain out of 8000 ha planted. The planting 
consisted mainly of Gmelina arborea and Terminalia ivorensis planted during 1936 to 
1941 and various Eucalyptus spp. and Cassia siamea planted during the 1970s. Kingston 
(1986) and UNDPIWB reported a total plantation area of 10000 ha, but mentioned that 
many areas have been harvested and some lost to urban development and agricultural 
use. Kernan (1980) estimated the productive plantation area to be 4910 ha. According 
to FAO (1993), the areas of forest plantations in Sierra Leone in 1980 and 1990 were 
5810 ha and 8000 ha respectively. 
Table 2.6 Estimates Of Closed And Open Forest Areas In Sierra Leone 1980 and 1990 
(Thousand ha) 
Source: FAO, 1993 
1980 
740 
1315 
2055 
Plantations of export crops such as rubber, gum, oil palm and cola were established by 
the government and taken over by the forestry department in 19 1]. Some 1800 ha of 
rubber plantations (Hevea braziliensis) was established by the forestry division between 
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1964 and 1966 in the southern and eastern regions. There are also 400 to 600 ha of 
privately owned rubber plantations. These have not been tapped for latex production to 
any great extent and more than half the productive life has been lost. The plantations 
have been excluded from forest tabulations since their aim is primarily for latex 
production. 
2.13.2 Forest Estate 
The national forest estate of 331100 ha is made up of three categories of land: (a) 
Gazetted Forest Reserves (285300 ha) under legislative control of the Forestry Division 
(Figure 2.4); (b) proposed Reserves (3400 ha) under the control of the Forestry Division 
but not yet legally gazetted; and (c) Protected forests situated on Chiefdom lands (l1800 
ha), and administered by the Forestry Division (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 National Forest Estate 
Source: FAO, 1988 
285300 
34000 
11800 
331100 
While the stocked reserves contain predominantly natural forest, some of the smaller 
reserves also include plantations and several of these in the Western area consist mainly 
of plantations. 
o , 
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Figure 2.4: The Forest Estate of Sierra Leone 
Source: Clarke, 1969 
Half of the forest estate in the northern region is actually savanna with only sparse tree 
coverage; half of the western region is a protection reserve; forest reserves in the 
Western Area and Southern Province are relatively small (average size 726 ha) and 
encroachment is occurring so rapidly that very little closed high forest of productive 
potential is left. 
The productive forests under government control are almost all located in the eastern 
region and are constituted in larger blocks, making their exploitation financially and 
technically feasible. According to FAO (1988) estimates, about 100000 ha of reserves 
and 65000 ha outside of the reserves make up the exploitable forests of Sierra Leone. 
2.13.3 Forest Yields 
An enumeration by the Forestry Division between 1959 and 1963 of the stocked and 
accessible areas of the Tama (10522 ha) and Tonkolili (15377 ha) forest reserves 
reported merchantable volumes of 42.1 cubic meters per hectare and 40.0 cubic metres 
per hectare, respectively. An inventory of the Gola East and North forest reserves 
between 1969 and 1972 gave a similar mean merchantable volume of 46 cubic meters per 
hectare. These figures were subject to a sampling error of 6.2 - 15.4%. 
Past data are botanically sound but converting such data to timber volumes requlfes 
knowledge of the timber market. The botanical and physical heterogeneity of the forest 
estate and a low proportion of species with high commercial value are the most negative 
factors affecting timber harvesting and commercialisation. Over 200 species occur in the 
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mixed high forests in Sierra Leone. However, only some 30 species were harve ted and 
processed by the forest industry (FAO, 1982). The World Bank (1984) downgraded 
these estimates of the average standing conunercial volume to 33.4 cubic meters per ha 
in the reserves and 21.3 cubic meters per ha outside reserves, with an overall average of 
28.7 cubic meters per ha, noting however that, the volume actually available in the 
exploited forest which has been creamed of its readily marketable species, is unknown . 
2.13.4 Trends in Wood Production 
Industrial roundwood production was only 4% of total roundwood production in 1993, 
much lower than the African average of 11 % (Table 2.8). According to Cline-Cole 
Table 2.8 Wood Production In Sierra Leone 1965 - 1993 (Thousand cubic metres) 
• 2682 
·2695 
2637 
2410 . 
.· 2450 · 
Source: FAO, 1993 
Sawnwood 
10 
13 
16 
23 
23 
24 
14 
11 
...........• _9~ ____ _ 
(1993), the fuelwood in Sierra Leone comes both from open woodlands and from the 
forest reserves. Even though the price of fuelwood is low, the very high dependence on 
fuelwood creates consumer vulnerability to price increases. Thus, producing fu elwood 
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and charcoal is big business in Sierra Leone. This domain is usually exclusive of the 
timber business. 
It is clear that Sierra Leone has been a net importer of forest products sll1ce 
Independence, and probably before that as well (Table 2.9). It has been a heavy importer 
of sawnwood until the 1980s, when it started to export it again. It has also had to 
import wood panels and paper because of lack of domestic production. Incidentally, the 
large exports of forest products in 1993 were due to a large quantity of paper being 
imported and then most of it subsequently being smuggled out of the country again to 
neighbouring states. 
Table 2.9 Forest Products Trade for Sierra Leone (Thousand US$) 
1051 
1224 
1130 
808 
1487 
131 20 
Source: FAO Forest Products Yearbooks, 1995. 
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2.14 CONCLUSIONS 
The background information on Sierra Leone points to the fact that in spite of its 
favourable natu~al conditions, in terms of location, soils, climate, relief and a population 
growth rate of 2.49% which is below the Africa average of 2.99%, the vegetation of 
Sierra Leone has suffered serious exploitation. Most of its once widespread moist high 
forests have been reduced to forest regrowths and secondary formations. 
Even though agriculture constitutes the mainstay of the economy, the low level of 
mechanisation and crude agricultural practices through wasteful bush fallow and shifting 
cultivation systems have resulted in the clearing of vast expanses of arable land and 
vegetal cover without a significant increase in the level of agricultural production. The 
complex land tenure system and cOlmnunal land rights make it difficult for the 
government to expand the protected forest estate and reserves without the consent of 
local communities. Such drawn out negotiations for land rights usually require 
significant financial input which can hardly be met by the government. 
The centralised system of government in Sierra Leone, which closely approximates the 
British colonial style, poses a serious impediment to control of peripheral areas. Even 
though the country is divided into smaller administrative units, such as, provinces, 
districts and chiefdoms with administrative powers vested in appointed leaders to man 
the affairs of the various administrative units, the funds to administer the units were 
largely centralised and grossly inadequate. The recent autocratic rule by the Military 
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even resulted in more centralisation as Officials were required to rule by decree or 
directives from the Military high command. 
Sierra Leone also falls in the category of the poorest and least developed countries in the 
world, with a low GDP and per capita income. The state suffers from inadequate funds 
to provide physical infrastructure, social amenities, education medical facilities, etc. This 
has resulted in a low adult literacy level, high infant mortality, low life expectancy, high 
inflation, and general poverty and depravity. These social problems have made it difficult 
for a neglected and underfunded forestry department to protect the forests from 
desperate poachers, striving to make a living. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the state of the art theories of policy modelling and institutional 
analysis and identifies some of the gaps in the literature which this thesis will help to fill. 
It also identifies the most appropriate methods to use in this research and justifies their 
choice. 
3.2 THEORIES AND MODELS OF POLICY FORMULATION 
Policy analysts have been likened to builders. That is to say, they need to perceive some 
sort of pattern in the world based on which they interpret events. Policy analysts create 
reality rather than observe it. They carry around bundles of basic frames of references in 
terms of which they ask questions such as: What happened? Why did it happen? and 
What will happen next? (Allison, 1971). Such descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive 
models are the conceptual lenses through which analysts view the world and try to make 
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use of it. Thus, practical men like politicians and administrators are as much prisoners of 
theory as academic social scientists (Anderson, 1975). 
Even though many typologies of policy models have been developed, they could be 
classified into two broad groups - prescriptive or normative models, and descriptive 
models (Mitchell, 1989). Prescriptive policy models seek to demonstrate how policy 
formulation should occur according to pre-established standards, while descriptive policy 
models document the way in which policy making actually occurs. 
Geographers have often used prescriptive and descriptive models in trying to investigate 
how an imperfect policy process could be improved to more closely approximate the 
ideal (Hamill, 1968; Sewell, 1973). In spite of the fact that a good number of these 
models have attempted to do justice to explaining the policy formulation process, they 
can hardly be wholly adapted to suit all local contexts. This could largely be explained 
by the deviations which occur during the actual practice of formulating and implementing 
policies in the real world, especially in the light of the pressures from various sectors. To 
provide a basis for a critical examination of these issues, a brief discussion of these 
theories/models is presented below. 
3.2.1 Prescriptive Models 
Prescriptive policy models aim to provide explanations of the ideal towards which the 
policy formulation process should strive. These models are often considered as being 
comprehensive and rational, and suggest that the policy formulation process involves a 
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senes of interconnected steps among which there is continuous feedback (MitchelL 
1989). The policy formulation process starts with the identification and definition of a 
problem, leading to the development of objectives. A range of criteria are then 
developed for analysing the objectives in the light of the existing constraints in order to 
enhance the selection of the best alternative strategy that maximise net expectation. 
Action programmes are then developed with their estimated consequences to serve as a 
basis for the development of a plan of operation to prescribe the direction of 
implementation. Taking into consideration the impact on other organisations, 
performance evaluation is then carried out resulting in a feedback mechanism (Fig. 3.1) 
Purely rational policy making is in fact impossible (Dror, 1968). The ideal model 
provides for the systematic identification and ranking of objectives, and the consistent 
choice of the best alternative development strategy by 'economic man', while giving no 
consideration to the unavailability of the requisite data and resources which usually 
happen in the real world. There are also a variety of other pressures and intangibles 
which tend to bear on the policy formulation process for which no provision is made. 
In the real world, the policy maker often finds him/herself faced with strings of causes 
and effects instead of clearly defmed problems, often resulting in the treatment of 
symptoms rather than underlying causes (Timberlake, 1985). Also, maximisation of 
economic benefits does not always seem to be the major factor influencing decisions in 
policy making, and other non-economic parameters (like environmental or social impact) 
also have equally important influences on the policy processes. The number of 
assumptions associated with "economic man" creates problems for the attainment of 
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Figure 3.1: A general model for policy formulation and decision making 
Source: Mitchell, 1989 
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conditions prescribed by these models. Notwithstanding these lapses, the model 
provides an ideal framework against which actual policy formulation may be compared. 
3.2.2 Descriptive Models 
Descriptive models of policy making are based on realistic courses of action geared 
towards the achievement of specified goals amidst the confusion that characterises the 
real world. They reject the concept of the comprehensive, rational , and emotionally 
detached "economic man", and rely on the idea of the "boundedly rational" person who 
"satisfices" rather than maximises (Simon, 1959). Descriptive models provide 
explanations to the adaptive behaviour of administrative man in his/her attempt to solve 
the multifarious problems associated with the achievement of goals (White, 1972). They 
also make provision for the pressures policy makers usually have to respond to in the 
decision making process. Descriptive models could be classified into three main types -
disjointed incrementalism, mixed scanning, and output models. 
3.2.2.1 Disjointed Incrementalism 
This type of descriptive model, which is also known as "muddling through" was 
conceived by Lindblom (1959). The theory assumes a situation in which there is no 
clearly defmed problem, goals and objectives may be in conflict, only a few alternatives 
are considered which do not significantly differ from existing ones, a restricted number of 
consequences are identified, the problems are continually redefined with no correct 
solution, such that, the policy process never terminates. Because of the inconclusive 
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nature of such a policy process, the policy maker has to stretch his/her analytical 
capacity, experience and resourcefulness in solving incremental problems. A wide ranae 
b 
of options need to be left open to provide for the pursuit of an alternative strategy if the 
first fails. 
While demonstrating an accurate approximation to the policy process, this model is not 
without weaknesses. It does not account for abrupt or radical changes. Since the model 
assumes the selection of alternatives that do not significantly differ from existing ones, it 
does not explain or predict fundamental changes. This is a serious weakness especially 
when a model is expected to have predictive capacity. The model also focuses on the 
short-term, thereby neglecting long-term implications. Since the model only reacts to 
existing imperfections in the policy process rather than indicating future goals, it is 
therefore considered to be basically remedial. Nonetheless, the model provides some 
insight into the policy process in the real world. 
3.2.2.2 Mixed Scanning 
This model proposed by Etzioni (1967) represents a compromise for investigators who 
reject the rational model of "economic man", and find Lindblom's disjointed 
incrementalism unattractive, especially with regards to its inability to account for 
fundamental changes. The model recognises the need for fundamental or contextual 
policies as well as incremental or bit policies. It is based on the premise that incremental 
decisions lead to fundamental decisions, and that the cumulative effect of incremental 
decisions is influenced by fundamental decisions. 
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The model suggests that, in the policy formulation process, the policy maker does not 
only make incremental decisions but also scans a limited range of alternatives which 
deviate significantly from the existing approaches. Since only a few alternatives receive 
more than a passing appraisal, the selection of which alternative is to receive in-depth or 
cursory scanning is based on the ordering of priorities. This model is more systematic 
than the incremental model and, unlike the rationalist model, does not have the 
maximisation of net gains as a primary criterion. 
This model is conceptually attractive in that it is more comprehensive than the rational or 
incremental models. It points to the fact that different processes of policy making may 
occur depending on the nature and magnitude of the problems to be addressed. Its major 
inadequacy is reflected in its apparent lack of guidance as to how empirical distinctions 
could be made between fundamental and incremental policies. It does, however, alert 
policy analysts as to the different processes in policy making, thereby bringing to light 
the weaknesses of the incremental and rational models. 
3.2.2.3 Discussion 
However, all these models have limitations. The idea of perfect knowledge in the 
rationality model is unacceptable to many (Drury, 1975). It requires the decision-maker 
to follow rational processes, but does not guarantee rational outcomes. The prescriptive 
models are also largely dependent on values. The big question is: how can value 
judgements be made on anything other than a personal, intuitive, or subjective basis. 
The models do not make any reference to the nature of the inputs that shape the outputs 
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or resulting outcomes. The idea of the emotionally detached "economic man" hardly 
provides for policy making in the real world in which policy makers sometimes have to 
respond to a number of overlapping constituencies. Policies are sometimes the outcomes 
of external stresses that are transformed into pressures and exerted on policy makers 
(Caldwell, 1990). Policy therefore reflects the ability of policy makers to respond to 
specific and concrete emergencies in order to ensure positive outcomes. 
While the prescriptive models suggest a detached and comprehensively rational 
atmosphere for policy making, the descriptive models attempt to fill this gap by 
providing for policy making in a pluralist society in which competing groups struggle for 
power over scarce resources (Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952). However, descriptive 
models are basically of two types - those that specifically deal with inputs to the policy 
process and those that deal with outputs to the policy process. The two approaches have 
rarely been merged in analysing the policy making process. The incremental model does 
not account for abrupt or radical changes as it considers policy making as a continuous 
series of incremental or bit decisions that never terminate. The model assumes that 
problems are not significantly different from preceding ones and, therefore, cannot 
predict fundamental changes. It focuses on the short-term and neglects long-term social 
innovations. It is therefore basically remedial. Mixed scanning tends to be more 
appealing in that it provides for fundamental and incremental policies, but does not draw 
any empirical distinctions between the two in order to determine the limited range of 
fundamental alternatives to scan. 
61 
3.2.2.4 Output Models 
Most of the models (both prescriptive and descriptive) reviewed so far concentrate on 
inputs to the policy process. Another group of models known as output models take a 
different approach. They concentrate on outputs of the policy process, in the belief that 
different outputs reflect different policy processes. The output models proposed by 
Lowi (1964) are of three types - distributive, regulatory, and redistributive. 
3.2.2.4.1 Distributive Models 
Distributive models deal with situations in which governments allocate resources and 
services on an individual basis. It involves coalition building by groups through 
bargaining and accommodation at the local level without directly competing with other 
groups (Mann, 1975). This approach eliminates conflict and enhances the probability of 
both the government and local groups achieving their desired objectives without much 
interference. This situation is often referred to as "logrolling", "consensual politics", or 
"mutual non-interference". Since governmental actions are based on specific local 
demands, little by way of policy emerges as decisions are based on the exigency of the 
need and the bargaining power. There is also little or no room for external inputs to the 
decision making process. 
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3.2.2.4.2 Regulatory Models 
Regulatory models propose a different scenario. They assume the existence of various 
interest groups with different wants, each group competing with the others for its wants 
to be met. Since all wants cannot be met, the needs of one group are usually satisfied at 
the expense of the others, reSUlting in overt conflicts reflecting the pluralist school of 
thought. The interests are often sectoral (e.g. economic and environmental), rather than 
local, and are represented by national organisations concerned with public policy and 
specific projects or programmes. The conflicts in this model are more visible than in the 
distributive model, with obvious winners and losers. This approach usually results in a 
policy which defines the winners and losers and provides a departure point for future 
decisions. 
3.2.2.4.3 Redistributive Models 
Redistributive models deal with conflicts over significant class interests rather than 
sectoral interests. The central issue usually involves an attempt to alter the distribution 
of benefits and costs in society, especially in relation to levels and rates of taxation, levels 
of public spending, and subsidies. The conflict in this model is usually between the 
"elite" or ruling class and the "counter-elites" or outsiders. The major participants are 
usually large organisations, bureaucracies, business associations, political parties, 
corporations, etc. 
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The output models discussed so far basically deal with policy outputs in the belief that 
policy outputs reflect different policy processes. Since inputs are inextricably linked to 
outputs, the failure of the output models to consider in detail the mechanisms of inputs to 
the policy process justifies a thorough re-examination of policy modelling. The 
distributive output models stress on coalition building by groups through collective 
bargaining without any visible conflicts as outputs of the policy process. The regulatory 
models make reference to various interest groups with conflicting interests, but hardly 
stress on how these conflicts are transformed into pressures and exerted on policy 
makers. The regulatory models go on to talk about winners and losers determined by the 
policy outcomes. The redistributive models stress on class rather than sectoral interests 
and an attempt to alter the distribution of benefits as outputs of policy. These models 
make little or no mention of the inputs that shape the outputs of policy, and the 
mechanisms by which policy is formed are also less defined. 
Malayang's balance of policy pressures will be used to bridge these major gaps In 
analysing forest policy formulation in Sierra Leone. Like the regulatory output models, 
this model identifies and acknowledges the existence of various interest groups with 
conflicting interests, but goes further to discuss these conflicts in terms of pressures on 
policy makers which could be considered as inputs. The output, according to 
Malayang's models, is the policy which reflects the balance of pressures on policy 
makers. 
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3.2.2.5 Malayang's Balance of Policy Pressures Model 
Malayang (1996 ) proposed a model to explain the changes that led to government 
intervention to protect forests in the Philippines. This model, which was based on the 
group theory, states that laws reflect the balance of power between different interest 
groups. Latham (1952) applied this theory to the legislative process by stating that "the 
legislative vote on any issue represents their composition of strength, that is, the balance 
of power among contending groups at the moment of voting. Public policy constitutes 
the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given moment. The model portrayed 
legislators as passive arbiters of conflicting pressures. Bentley (1967) stated that the 
balance of group pressure is the existing state of society, that is to say, policy is the 
balance of power between different social groups. 
Malayang identified two broad groups - exploitative and protective, depending on 
whether they promote or support exploitation or protection of forests. According to 
him, government policy changes when there is a change in the balance of pressures on 
policy makers. A state will intervene to control deforestation when the power of groups 
favouring protection become more equivalent to the power of those favouring 
exploitation. 
The model does not make prOVISIon for collective bargaining among groups and, 
therefore, cannot account for the policy process III all circumstances, but it can be 
appropriate when forests become very much depleted in a country and state intervention 
is crucial. The model can be applied to policy making in a pluralist society with many 
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groups, but can also be applied to an elitist society with a restricted range of groups 
influencing policy makers. 
However, in the light of the powerful class and sectoral interests of the business elite in 
the forest resources and policy process in Sierra Leone, the application of Malayang's 
model in a regulatory output sense will help to better explain the general pressures and 
specific business influences on policy makers. This double-barrelled approach will also 
bring out the strong ties between the business elite, the executive and forest resources 
and the resulting patronage that has had a devastating effect on the allocative process 
and untold misery as renegades strive to exert control over natural resources. 
In the light of the top-down nature of the forest policy process, especially in the Third 
World, and the multifarious forces that policy makers are obliged to respond to, not all 
groups can be satisfied at the same time. Little wonder then that some groups are 
usually satisfied at the expense of others - usually the groups with aspirations that are 
more closely related to the interests at the top benefit the most. The latter culminating in 
conflicts between winners and losers at all levels. Therefore, the use of the Malayang 
model in a regulatory output sense will help explain the policy formulation process in 
Sierra leone and, perhaps, provide some alternative explanation for the ongoing war in 
Sierra Leone. 
The application of the Malayang model in a regulatory output sense will also provide for 
the treatment of policy making both in terms of the inputs to the policy process in terms 
of the pressures on policy makers, and outputs of policy in terms of the balance of 
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pressures (the policy) and the satisfaction of specific interests at the expense of others 
and probably the general good. 
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES AND MODELS 
Studies of the management of organisations have broadly taken two forms - a Illicro 
perspective which focuses on the behaviour of human beings within the organisation 
(otherwise known as organisational behaviour), and a macro perspective which looks at 
why organisations take the forms they do, how external pressures on organisations affect 
their members, and the types of alternatives available for designing, managing, and 
administering organisations (Jackson, 1986). According to Jackson, behaviour is a 
function of an interaction between variables in the individual and variables in the 
environment within which the individual works (i.e. B = f(l, E)), and therefore can hardly 
be dissociated from each other. Jackson further strengthened this view by stating that: 
"The complexity of formal organisations poses problems in their study. First, it is 
not valid to fractionate an organisation and then reify the parts. The whole is more than 
the sum of the parts. It is the interaction of the parts with each other and with the 
complex of which they are a part that constitutes organisation. In short, an organisation 
is a dynamic field. It should be studied as a whole gestalt. It will not yield to simple 
cause and effect reasoning. To change one part is to change interaction among other 
parts and to change the whole. One cannot comprehend the whole by dealing with the 
parts in isolation" 
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Nonetheless, research into organisational issues has been largely based on the mIcro 
dimension, with hardly any comprehensive macro-perspective studies (Bruce and 
Maasland, 1968; Q'Riordan, 1971). In spite of the attraction of micro-perspective 
studies, they cannot adequately account for the complex processes that constitute 
organisations. Piecemeal analysis of individual aspects of organisations as components 
of organisational management can never serve as a surrogate for comprehensive macro-
perspective studies. Therefore the current trend should be towards a more 
comprehensive treatment of organisations as interdependent hierarchical interacting 
institutions, rather than clinging to individual behavioural aspects which can never 
account for the whole. 
Micro-perspective thinking has also largely influenced the analysis of organisations in the 
light of the fact that most of the earlier studies on organisational relations tended to be 
centred on intraorganisational relationships, as if organisations were isolated and 
independent closed systems with individuals interacting within. The fact that individual 
behaviour (which constitutes the core of micro-perspective thinking in organisational 
theory) is a function of both an individual's physiological and psychological state and 
environmental variables seems to be disregarded. So too is the fact that the word 
'environment' comprises both internal and external influences. However, relatively recent 
studies have taken organisational interdependence into consideration. Such studies 
essentially conceive the organisation as an entity that needs inputs and provides outputs, 
linking together a number of organisations via their mechanisms of exchanges or 
transactions. 
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Notwithstanding the relatively recent recognition of the interdependence of 
organisations, it IS rare to find studies that deeply penetrate both dimensions of 
organisational relations. The real need is for an in-depth treatment of intra-
organisational and inter-organisational relations as inseparable components of 
organisational management, and the avoidance of any piecemeal analytical approach. 
This is inevitable if a rational explanation is to be given for organisational relationships in 
terms of structure, processes, and outputs; and if a sound theoretical base is to be 
provided for future research. 
Based on these two different perspectives of organisations, various theories/models of 
organisational analysis have emerged. These are now critically discussed in the light of 
their potential significance and applicability to the analysis of organisational management 
systems in the real world. 
3.3.1 The Functional Model of Organisational Analysis 
The functional model serves as an important model for the analysis of natural systems. It 
was first postulated by Fayol (1949) and considers the organisation as a social unit with 
requirements that need to be satisfied if it is to be sustainable. This analytical approach 
stresses the need to first consider the degree of transparency of organisational policy 
formulators in setting out functional prerequisites before the analysis of the specific 
structures that constitute the organisation in terms of the needs they meet, and the 
functions they perform to ensure the survival of the system. It also considers the analysis 
of both internal and external communication systems, the functions an organisation 
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performs, and the consequences of such actions, rather than making reference to its 
ongm. Even though it emphasises final causes over efficient causes, this analytical model 
concedes to the fact that structural elements are interdependent, and that variations in 
one reflect on the other. 
However, the application of this model to the analysis of social systems poses a few 
difficulties. First, there is the difficulty of specifying essential needs (i.e. real as opposed 
to felt needs). There is also the difficulty of specifying what is meant by the survival of 
the system depending on the size, type, and level of the organisation in question. 
Organisational forms are also not as interdependent as biological systems. There might 
be a need for more emphasis on the origin of an organisation to enable the researcher 
um'avel the extent to which it has evolved over time. Otherwise, this could serve as 
rational analytical framework for the analysis of institutions. 
3.3.2 Weber's Ideal-type Model of Organisational Analysis 
Weber's (1952) model consists of conceptual methods by which the actual performance 
of an organisation can be studied in comparison with an idealised model in order to note 
differences in actual and optimal performance. It makes specific prescriptions as to how 
hierarchies of control can be developed such that one group could, in effect, dominate 
other groups. According to Weber, the bureaucratic structure is superior to any other 
form of organisation in terms of its precision, stability, stringency of discipline, and 
reliability. 
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This model compares to other models as does a machine to non-mechanical modes of 
production. It suggests that in order to maximise benefits from implementation design, all 
of an organisation's tasks must be divided into highly specialised jobs to ensure 
performance effectiveness. Each task must be performed according to a system of rules 
to assure uniformity and co-ordination of different tasks, and to ward off uncertainty in 
task performance. Each member or office of an organisation should be accountable for 
job performance to one, and only one, manager above him or her. Each employee of an 
organisation relates to other employees and clients in an impersonal, formalistic manner, 
maintaining a social distance with subordinates and clients so that favouritism does not 
interfere with organisational effectiveness. Employment in the bureaucratic organisation 
should be based on technical qualifications, and is protected against arbitrary dismissal. 
Promotion should be based on seniority and achievement. 
The model identifies activities to be corrected if organisational performance shows 
substantial deviation from the criteria set out in the ideal type. For example, if there is a 
co-ordination problem, there will then be need to look at the centralisation of authority. 
If there is a problem with efficiency, then there will be need to look at the personnel 
programme in terms of selection and placement. According to Weber, bureaucracy is the 
most rational system of organisation available to enhance efficiency and optimal 
organisational performance. 
The bureaucracy model is limited in scope in that it provides a one-sided prescription for 
organisational design - intra-organisational. In like manner, models which address inter-
organisational relations hardly make provision for intra-organisational issues. Thus. the 
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need is for the addition of an inter-organisational treatment in order to increase its scope. 
The ideals of the model presuppose a routine organisational system in which strict 
adherence to rules constitutes the life of the organisation. This model reflects the ideals 
of the drab, colourless and routine organisation man with highly idealistic bureaucratic 
standards and with little or no provision for bureaucratic disfunctions. Unlike machines 
however, human beings have a natural tendency to establish interpersonal relationships, 
which directly or indirectly influence the types of networks within organisations and the 
organisational structure as a whole. 
Given that an individual's behaviour is a function of his physiological and psychological 
lllake-up and the influence of the environment in which he finds hinlself, it follows 
therefore that extra-organisational influences within the environment also influence 
organisational processes. Organisations can hardly solely subsist on vertical 
relationships, and employees formally or informally establish horizontal relationships. 
The rational organisation man has to respond to a variety of overlapping constituencies 
which might inhibit appropriate action even when deviations from ideal organisational 
prescriptions are evident. The model makes no provision for this. Its ideals give no 
consideration to the availability of other inputs like resources, demands and support from 
extra-organisational sectors. However, since intra-organisational structures and 
processes largely determine inter-organisational linkages, this model could serve as a 
basis for analysing institutional structures and processes in relation to external linkages. 
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3.3.3 Urwick's Technique Model of Organisational Analysis 
Urwick's (1929) model stresses the study of human experience of organisations which 
should govern the arrangements for human association of any kind. This principle can be 
studied as a technical question, irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the 
personnel comprising it, and the political, constitutional or social theory underlying its 
creation. The model focuses on the method of subdividing and allocating to individuals 
the various activities, duties and responsibilities essential to the purpose contemplated, 
the correlation of these activities, and the continuous control of the work of individuals 
so as to secure the most economical and effective realisation of purpose. 
The model belongs to the school of classical organisational theory. It recogmses 
rationality and efficiency of organisational goals, and contains three essential elements of 
bureaucratic theory - specialisation, co-ordination, and rational assignment of duties. It 
also incorporates span of control, line-staff relationships and functionalism into 
organisational studies. The real message of this model is improved techniques for the 
application of rational principles of organisation to ongoing enterprises. This model is, 
however, silent on inter-organisational issues. 
3.3.4 Models of Assessing Organisational Effectiveness 
These models stress the setting of standards (normative not descriptive statements) 
against which effectiveness will be measured. It compnses explicit guidelines for 
assessing effectiveness. These include the selection of indicators, determination of 
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outcomes, identification of processes, structures, and samples to enhance the assessment, 
before considering participants, constituents and measures (Scott, 1987). 
Gibson (1985) carried out a study of organisational behaviour, structures, and 
processes, and came up with three perspectives of effectiveness - individual, group, and 
organisational. In assessing individual effectiveness, the task performance of specific 
employees was assessed through performance evaluation processes. Group effectiveness 
was obtained by measuring the sum total of the contributions of all employees. 
Organisational effectiveness was considered as the function of individual and group 
effectiveness. However, it should be more than that because an organisation can obtain 
higher levels of performance than the sum of the performance of its parts. Gibson further 
identified three approaches to the analysis of institutional effectiveness: goal approach, 
systems-resource approach, and time dimension approach. The goal approach measures 
effectiveness as the degree to which objectives are accomplished. There is however need 
to look at purposefulness, rationality, and achievement. The systems-resource approach 
considers internal and external linkages of organisational behaviour. While the time 
dimension model considers the entire life span of the input-output cycle. Gibson also 
developed four criteria for effectiveness: production (quality and quantity), efficiency 
(ratio of outputs to inputs (input-process-output process cycle), satisfaction 
(benefits/extent to which organisations meet needs), and adaptation (response to internal 
and external changes). 
The criteria for evaluating organisational performance/effectiveness cannot be produced 
by some objective, apolitical process. Like other theoretical models of organisational 
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analysis, they are often controversial and varied. Indicators could be chosen from several 
possible types, and data from several sample frames. Measures are usually based on 
outcomes, processes and structural features of organisations. Even though this model 
cannot be universal, adaptation can be achieved in many ways. 
3.3.5 Systems Model of Organisational Analysis 
The systems model of organisational relations, according to Lockett and Spear (1980), 
considers organisations as open systems which, of necessity, engage in various modes of 
exchange with their environment. The model identifies input elements, process elements, 
output elements, and feedback effects. The theory assumes the existence of a focal 
organisation and postulates its interaction with a complement of organisations in its 
environment known as organisational sets. An input organisational set provides 
resources to the focal organisation. An output organisational set receIves the goods 
and/or services including organisational decisions generated by the focal organisation. 
The systems model also requires that feedback effects are traced from the output 
organisation set to the focal organisation, and thence to the input organisation set; or 
directly from the output to the input organisational set. These feedback effects can be 
positive or negative, as well as anticipated or unanticipated. The four components of the 
model - focal organisations, input organisational set, output organisational set, and 
feedback effects may jointly be conceived as comprising an interorganisational system. 
Three dimensions have significant consequences for the focal organisation: the (a) size, 
(b) diversity of the input and output organisational sets, and (c) network configuration. 
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The size of the organisational sets refer to the number of input and output organisations 
with which the focal organisation interacts. Diversity of the organisational sets refers to 
the number of organisations in the input and output sets differing in gross manifest 
functions such as legislatures, community organisations, professional associations, etc. 
The network configuration refers to the formal properties of interaction among the 
members of the input and output organisational sets. The latter are of four types: (a) 
dyad network (in which focal organisation A interacts with B); (b) wheel network (in 
which the focal organisation interacts with more than one organisation of a particular 
type, but with no mutual interactions among the members of the set); (c )aU channel 
network (in which all members of the set interact with each other and each interacts with 
the focal organisation); and (d) chain network (in which the members of the set are 
linked in a series with the focal organisation which has only direct interaction with the 
first link in the chain). 
The systems model also focuses on the interrelationships between, at least, three levels of 
analysis - the subsystem of an organisation, the organisational system in its entirety, and 
the suprasystem. The subsystem analysis entails the study of the interaction patterns of 
various subunits within an organisation. The analysis of the entire organisation involves 
an examination of the cultural components of an organisation in terms of its values and 
goals, and the structural component which comprises the various relationships among the 
subunits, and the technological component. The suprasystem level of analysis involves 
an enquiry into the network of interactions or linkages of a given organisation with other 
organisations in its environment. 
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The analysis of formal properties of organisational sets points to an intriguing question 
concerning the relationship between the formal properties of an organisation, and models 
of interaction between focal organisations and members of the input and output 
organisational sets. For example, under what conditions would a researcher find both 
co-operation and conflict in a network because of the pressures arising from the 
constrained pattern of interdependence? The mode of interaction also has consequences 
for the internal structure and processes of the focal organisation, such as the formation of 
new subunits, the development of new organisational norms, and the articulation of new 
goals. 
Even though the model serves as a positive as well as a normative theory of 
organisational change, it also has its shortfalls. A closer look at the proposed 
interactions between the focal organisation and members of its organisational set with the 
aid of the various dimensions discussed presents serious limitations. As if influenced by 
the 'black box' approach to organisational analysis, the level of aggregation of the 
organisations in the system model reveals not only the danger of hypostatizing 
organisations, 1.e. treating them as disembodied entities, but also of leaving sight of 
intervening mechanisms that contribute to the various modes of interaction. The model 
reveals an ideal streamlined approach to the study of organisational structures and 
linkages. 
The model does not also pay much attention to the need for a thorough assessment of 
the potential efficacy of interactions between role partners in organisations comprising 
input and output organisational sets. The proposition of fixed dimensions of interaction 
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also places a limiting factor on the direction of interaction between organisations. Since 
individuals in various organisations interact both formally and informally, one can hardly 
pinpoint a streamlined one-dimensional approach to social interaction. Variations almost 
always occur in reality depending on the disposition of the role players in the various 
organisational sets. Hence the need to pay much more attention to the individuals within 
the organisations. Input organisation sets could also indirectly qualify as output 
organisational sets if they benefit or heavily rely on the goods and services provided by 
the focal organisation, which could modify the mode of interaction. 
There is therefore a need to redesign the interaction network in the input and output 
organisational sets, with a view to increasing organisational effectiveness. Innovative 
ideas designed to alter the original ecology of the focal organisation may include 
proposals for co-operation, co-optation, bargaining, coalition formation, consortia 
formation, amalgamation, etc. with members of the input and output organisational sets. 
Thus, an organisational theory model of Grainger (1996) which bears some similarities 
with the systems model in terms of importance of size, diversity and network interactions 
of the various input and output organisations, shall be discussed and applied to the Sierra 
Leone forest management context. The organisational theory model is, however, more 
detailed in scope as it takes into consideration other factors like the strength and 
structure of an organisation, its internal and external conditioning and its relationship 
with the external linkages environment. The model provides for the analysis of both intra 
and inter-organisational relationships. 
78 
3.3.6 Grainger's Organisational TheorylModel 
In this model, Grainger (1996) started with the premise that the inability of a state to 
control deforestation is symptomatic of a wider problem in which governments of 
developing countries often cannot properly control their peripheral areas. According to 
Dessler (1992), explaining why state institutions are unable to channel sufficient power 
from core to periphery is an appropriate application of organisation theory, especially in 
relation to organisational outputs. Grainger therefore argues that how policy is 
implemented by an organisation's hierarchy is influenced by the structure and strength of 
an organisation; the internal and external conditioning of its behaviour; and its 
relationship with its external social environment, in terms of relations between the culture 
of an organisation and that of its operating environment, and adaptability to changes in 
its environment. 
The diagnostic elements of this model span nearly the entire spectrum of organisational 
features needed to assess institutional constraints on public policy implementation in 
Sierra Leone. The application of Grainger's organisational theory model to the Sierra 
Leone context bridges a major gap in knowledge by providing for the thorough analysis 
of the internal and external conditioning of policy implementing institutions in Sierra 
Leone. 
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3.3.7 Social Class Model 
The social class model, otherwise known as the Marxist model, could be identified with 
Pfeffer (1992). It points to the fact that the linkages among dominant organisational 
actors have social as well as economic roots. Linkages between organisations. 
foundations, policy making groups, government agencies, etc. have more to do with 
ensuring the continued dominance of capitalist interests than with helping the resource 
needs of organisational actors. The central focus of the theory is on institutional sectors 
and not on the social organisation of the economy. 
The social class model is based on a broad and hasty generalisation that organisational 
linkages are highly capitalistic in nature, which poses a problem of applying it to real life 
settings especially in the Third World. However, it stimulates thought as to the 
possibility of the existence of a hidden agenda within the top management of an 
organisation geared towards the realisation of personal gains rather than organisational 
interests. A researcher would therefore need to establish whether in fact there is a 
hidden agenda, and to identify the causes or reasons behind its existence, and its impact 
on organisational networks. It also necessitates the addition of a political component to 
organisational analysis. 
3.3.8 Institutional Framework Model 
The institutional framework model was developed by Zucker (1977) and is based on the 
premise that organisations do not have a free reign to pursue resources. but rather must 
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behave In accordance with the laws and traditions of the societies In which they are 
found. As cultural systems become more complex, and the powers of the state and 
dominant subcultures permeate the boundaries of the organisation, decision makers are 
forced to adapt accordingly, even if this runs contrary to their resource needs and 
interests. It identifies the network among individuals as an important element in 
explaining organisational behaviour. 
The institutional framework model demonstrates that organisations do not shape 
themselves, but rather tend to shape up to the demands of society. The implication is 
that organisational policies and implementation strategies are a reflection of the interplay 
of internal and external factors. Hence the need to establish the nature and strength of 
the external forces that bear so much influence on internal organisational processes. It 
also builds on the fact that the more complex an organisation becomes in terms of 
activities and linkages, the more the external pressures it has to respond to. It lays 
emphasis on the role of individuals in influencing organisational outcomes, thus 
portraying a stronger intra-organisational component than the preceding theories. 
However, like the other models, it does not address critical intra-organisational issues 
like organisational structures and individual behaviour in terms of power, functions, 
potentials, fears, hopes, constraints, etc., and how they relate to organisational 
performance, goals, communication networks, effectiveness and efficiency. The model 
however makes adequate reference to the pressures/overlapping constituencies which 
organisations respond to. The latter is invaluable in accounting for the potential conflicts 
between policy makers, policy implementers, and interest groups. 
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3.3.9 Resource Dependence Model 
The resource dependence model of Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) considers organisations as 
operating in turbulent and uncertain environments over which they try to gain control. 
Because critical resources are often controlled by other organisations, organisations must 
find ways to ensure a smooth and predictable flow of resources from other organisations. 
This could be done through co-option, or establishment of ties to leverage resources 
from other organisations. Once an organisational strategy is pursued, a network of 
relations is created that may constrain the subsequent behaviour of actors. The original 
focus of this theory was on individual organisations as a unit of analysis, but later 
resource dependence theorists conceptualised the organisation/environment interface in 
inter-organisational network terms. 
The premise of the resource dependence model that organisations operate in difficult 
situations is not far from reality, especially in the developing world. But there has always 
been a goal towards which all organisations strive. Hence the need to inquire as to why 
and how these goals are developed amidst all the uncertainty - who are the major actors 
in the process, what are their functions, hopes, needs, constraints, fears, potentials, etc. 
One also needs to find out about the pressures organisations receive from various 
interest groups and persons, and perhaps the resulting conflicts, since they can hardly 
satisfy everybody due to inadequate resources. Organisations naturally establish contacts 
with each other whether they have adequate resources or not. A researcher therefore 
needs to know why and how organisational links are established in the first instance, 
before delving into the nature of the links, that is, whether they are strong or weak, and 
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in either case be in a position to discover why. One can then consider the impact of the 
networks on individual behaviour in terms of performance, information sharing, 
efficiency, degree of compliance etc .. Thus the model needs further modification to 
provide for the inclusion of all the issues raised. 
3.3.10 Discussion 
Despite the differences in the last three models, they tend to overlap with regard to 
certain issues. They are at one concerning the existence of networks between 
organisations, and cultural, professional and governmental agencies in an effort to 
influence the conditions under which organisations operate. Resource dependence and 
social class perspectives could be viewed within the institutional framework as examples 
of how organisations seek to co-opt political actors who represent generalised belief 
systems. 
Even though the resource-dependence, social class, and institutional models make 
reference to the two-way influence between organisational networks and individual 
behaviour (which is largely intra-organisational), they tend to deviate from enhancing an 
in-depth understanding of intra-organisational issues, and instead concentrate wholly on 
inter-organisational networks. However, in the light of the importance of internal 
organisational structures and individual behaviour on inter-organisational relations, 
control of power, organisational performance, participation levels in organisational 
activities, organisational effectiveness and efficiency, and communication flows. the 
failure of these models to adequately treat intra-organisational issues is a major gap that 
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needs filling. Researchers cannot afford to care less about treating intra and inter-
organisational issues as inseparable entities in organisational analysis. Thus, instead of a 
shift from the analysis of intra-organisational issues to the study of inter-organisational 
relationships, the current need is to merge the two approaches in order to develop a 
more comprehensive framework for the analysis of both internal and external 
organisational networks, thereby serving as a basis for organisational analysis and 
organisational theory in general. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing discussions point to the fact that inasmuch as individual theories 
contribute to the understanding of certain principles and practices, they do not always 
prove completely exhaustive on the subject matter to be analysed. Thus, policy analysts 
have to learn the art of combining the approaches of various schools of thought in order 
to develop a comprehensive analytical framework to suit individual demands. 
The prescriptive models of policy making are too rational and idealistic to be real. They 
preclude considerations that have to do with policy making in a realistic and complex 
world with different internal and external stresses and pressures from various interest 
groups. No provision is also made for the multifarious problems faced by policy makers 
in the policy process. The descriptive models attempt to bridge this gap by introducing 
the concept of the boundedly rational decision maker who satisfices rather than 
maximises. The descriptive models tend to bring policy making closer to the real world, 
but they are largely funited in scope as they either address inputs to the policy process or 
policy outputs, but hardly address both. Since policy outputs usually reflect the inputs to 
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the policy process in the real world (Hogwood and Gunn, 1990), it is important that both 
the inputs and outputs of policy making are critically analysed in order to enhance a 
better understanding of the policy process, especially in terms of the various pressures 
policy makers have to respond to and how this is reflected in the policy decision making 
process. 
Malayang's model provides a general framework for the analysis of pressures on policy 
makers and how a balance is achieved - which is the policy itself. The development of a 
double-barrelled approach by applying Malayang's model in a regulatory output sense 
provides for special emphasis on the role of conflicting groups and individual interests in 
policy formulation in Sierra Leone. It also bridges a major gap in the earlier approaches 
by treating both the inputs and outputs of policy. The inputs being the pressures on 
policy makers, and the outputs being the balance of pressures (policy) and resulting 
conflicts between winners and losers. 
Even though organisational theories/models can be divided into two broad groups -
micro-perspective and macro-perspective - most of the organisational models have 
tended to concentrate on the micro-perspective model of organisational analyses which 
focuses on intra-organisational issues, with little or no reference to inter-organisational 
Issues. Another major limitation has to do with the fact most of the micro-perspective 
models discussed earlier fail to gIve an exhaustive analysis of internal institutional 
arrangements. The organisational models that attempt to incorporate macro-perspective 
thinking, like the systems model, do not pay much attention to the assessment of the 
potential efficacy of interactions between input and output organisational sets. This is a 
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major handicap because individuals interact both formally and informally and hardly tune 
mode of interaction to the streamlined one-dimensional approach suggested by the 
systems model. The social class and institutional models which deal with inter-
organisational relations also fail to consider intra-organisational issues. 
The need, therefore, is for a macro perspective model of organisational analysis that will 
fill this gap. This is what the author aims to achieve by applying Grainger's 
organisational theory model to the analysis of institutional constraints to forest 
management in Sierra Leone. Grainger's model provides for the analysis of organisation 
strength, structure, and the internal and external conditioning of organisational behaviour 
in relation to the sustainable management of forest resources. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MA TERIALS AND METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodologies used to analyse forest policy formulation and 
implementation processes in Sierra Leone and the sources of data used for this analysis. 
It is in two main parts. The fIrst part describes in turn the assumptions and principles of 
the models of forest policy formulation and implementation, the hypotheses tested in the 
course of the project, and the types of data required for this. The second part describes 
the data collected during the project, the sources from where they were obtained, and the 
design of the questionnaire and interview methods used to collect primary data. 
4.2 METHODOLOGIES 
This research was carried out using specific methodological frameworks to structure the 
analysis of policy formulation and implementation. Each methodology is now described 
in turn, together with the assumptions on which it is based and the data required to apply 
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it to the study of past and current experience in Sierra Leone. The formulation and 
implementation of forest policy form two sub-systems of an integrated forest policy 
system (Fig. 4.1). 
4.2.1 Policy Analysis 
4.2.1.1 Model Assumptions 
This research takes a descriptive approach to the analysis of policy formulation. It 
assumes, based on the model of Malayang (1996) which was in turn based on political 
science theory (Latham, 1952; Bentley, 1967), that: (a) the forest policy process in Sierra 
Leone, like most developing countries, is largely centralised with policy formulated at the 
top by political leaders (the Executive) and senior officials (the Bureaucracy); (b) policy 
makers are subject to constant pressures from various individual and group actors with 
varying and sometimes conflicting interests, depending on whether their concerns about 
forest management are economic (exploitative) or environmental (protectionist); (c) the 
actual policy of the government at a given time corresponds to its true intentions but may 
not necessarily be identical to the last stated policy; (d) where no other information is 
available, the actual policy of the government can be inferred from events on the ground 
which the government makes no attempt to change, i.e. policy as done (Aucoin, 1971). 
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Figure 4.1: Policy Pressures Model 
(Based on Malayang, 1996) 
R9 
4.2.1.2 Model Principles 
The basic principles of the model are: (a) the dominant goal of a government's actual 
policy at any time, i.e. exploitation or protection/sustainable management, is determined 
by the interests of the most powerful actors; (b) the strength of pressures received by 
policy makers from different actors is determined by both their social power and also 
their ease of access to policy makers and the efficiency of transmission of these 
pressures; (c) policy changes when the balance of policy pressures changes; (d) this in 
turn is related to changes in the relative powers of the actors involved, and to any 
stresses (social, economic, political or environmental) which impinge on actors and 
change their views. 
4.2.1.3 Data Requirements 
To study these factors it was therefore necessary to determine: (a) when forest policies 
and other directives or plans had been published in Sierra Leone and what their contents 
were (e.g. general goals and specific details); (b) the changes that occurred between 
successive policies; (c) who was involved in formulating forest policy; (d) how the policy 
was formulated; (e) the major actors influencing policy formulation; (f) changes in the 
relative power of each actor over time; (g) the pressures on policy makers, the actors 
from which pressures came, and the pressures which policy makers had to respond to; 
and (h) gaps between stated and perceived actual policies. 
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4.2.1.4 Hypotheses 
Major hypotheses arising from the model were: (a) there was a gap between the stated 
and actual forest policies of the government, which revealed a hidden policy agenda; (b) 
policy changed when the balance of policy pressures changed; (c) this was linked to a 
change in the relative power of major actors and to stresses on them. 
4.2.2 Institutional Analysis 
4.2.2.1 Model Assumptions 
This research took the view that government policy is implemented by one or more 
organisations, of which the most important is the Forestry Division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources (or the Forestry Department in the colonial 
era). It used organisation theory (Dessler, 1992) to model the transmission of policy 
through the organisation from core to periphery, and assumed that: (a) organisations are 
the means by which power and authority is structured to promote realisation of an 
organisation's goals; (b) the organisation of forest management consists of a hierarchy of 
functional units, i.e. at national, regional and local level; (c) organisational outputs are a 
function of organisational structures, behaviour, processes, and both internal and external 
linkages; (d) organisations shape their policies and activities in conformity with 
government policy and local demands; (e) the larger the organisation, the more complex 
it becomes, the more linkages it establishes, and the more pressures to which it has to 
respond. 
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4.2.2.2 Model Principles 
An organisation theory model (Grainger, 1996) was used to explain why organisational 
behaviour deviated from its ideal (rational) behaviour and resulted in the policy as 
implemented differing from the policy as originally formulated. 
The capacity to condition policy as implemented away from policy as formulated is 
determined by the structure of the implementing organisation, its overall strength (as 
measured by personnel numbers, financial resources, material resources etc.), and how 
the latter influences, through their working conditions, the functioning of the staff of the 
organisation. 
As policy is transmitted from the top of the organisation to the grassroots, it passes 
through various levels of the organisational hierarchy, i.e. national, regional and local. At 
each level are groups of actors who constitute the linkages along the chain of command 
and have varying degrees of discretionary powers to determine the course of 
implementation. Each actor has the potential to distort policy, according to his or her 
own particular needs, and pressures exerted by external actors. The accumulation of 
distortions along the chain causes policy as implemented to be different from policy as 
formulated. 
The degree of compliance by actors with policies transmitted to them from the top of the 
organisation is influenced by: (a) their degree of participation in policy formulation; (b) 
their overall morale, which depends on level of commitment to the organisation. salary. 
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training, information sharing, team spirit etc.; (c) their degree of discretion in interpreting 
policy; (d) the degree of supervision of their work by headquarters, and the strength of 
their relationship with it, both of which may be a function of the distance from the centre 
of the organisation; (e) pressures exerted on them by external actors; (f) conflicts 
between the culture of the organisation and that of the environment in which it operates 
at grassroots leveL 
4.2.2.3 Data Requirements 
Data were required on: (a) the evolution of the structure of the Forestry Division and the 
former Forestry Department; (b) its strength; (c) the physical, social, and political 
infrastructure available for the execution of functions, e.g. in terms of offices, equipment, 
finance, personnel, and an established hierarchy of control/authority; (d) the effect on 
individual behaviour of the education, qualifications, and experience of the employees; 
(e) the degree of commitment and compliance to the goals of the organisation at different 
levels of the chain of command; (f) the effect of staff morale on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the organisation; (g) internal organisational processes, concerned with 
decision making, information sharing, and delegation of responsibility; (h) which 
organisations the Forestry Division was in communication with; (i) the nature and 
strength of these linkages; U) the impact of these links on internal organisational 
networks and organisational performance in general; (k) the types of pressures received 
from external organisations; (1) conflicts resulting from the inability to satisfy the needs 
of certain groups owing to lack of resources. 
93 
4.2.2.4 llypotheses 
Major hypotheses arising from the model were: (a) distortion of policy was a result of 
internal institutional behaviour, or external institutional linkages, or a combination of 
both; (b) effectiveness of implementation was a function of organisational strength; (c) 
compliance with stated policy by different actors within an organisation was a function of 
(i) the strength of the organisation and its influence on staff morale, (ii) the geographical 
or social distance from the centre or capital, and (iii) pressures from within and outside 
the organisation to modify policy at particular levels. 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION 
4.3.1 Data Sources 
Four main data sources were used: official documents, the academic literature, and 
original data collected by informal interviews and formal questionnaires. 
Administrative records were examined in the Forestry Division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and in appropriate non-government 
organisations and Multilateral donor organisations, to identify and obtain formal policy 
documents, and key directives and plans relating to the period 1912 to the present day 
(Table 4.1). Other documents consulted included consultancy reports on agroforestry 
projects and afforestation programmes in Sierra Leone; policy-related reports undertaken 
by individuals and/or groups in Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Gazette; and the National 
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Development Plan. The establishment of a National Documentation Centre ( ADOC) 
at the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning made it relatively easier to 
access what other data were available - though that was really not much. Other archival 
material of the Forestry Department and Forestry Division was consulted at the library of 
the Oxford Forestry Institute, University of Oxford. Academic literature on forestry in 
Sierra Leone was obtained there and from other sources. 
Table 4.1 List Of Multilateral And Bilateral Donor Organisations, And NGOs 
Consulted In Sierra Leone During The Field Study 
NAMES OF ORGANISATIONS 
United Nations. Development Programme/ Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations 
(UNIFAO) 
'-'V .• U~<"LJ Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
PLAN International 
CARE Sierra Leone 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds/ International 
Council for Bird Preservation (RSPB/ICBP) 
World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF) 
Wildlife Conservation International 
National Science Foundation 
Conservation Society of Sierra Leone (CSSL) 
Commonwealth Human Ecology Council Sierra Leone 
(CHECSIL) 
Organisation for Research and Extension of 
Intermediate Technologies (ORIENT) 
Project Green Scenery 
Future in Our Hands 
Friends of the Earth 
Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL) 
Rokel Leaf Tobacco Development Company Limited 
TDC). 
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Analysis of administrative records provided information on the location, characteristics, 
and size of the forest reserves and ranger districts. It also provided data on the various 
Forestry Division Offices and Non-Governmental Organisations involved in forest 
management in Sierra Leone. For both the Forestry Division (FD) and NGOs, 
information was collected from their regional and local offices as well as their national 
headquarters. The Regional Forestry Offices in Freetown, Bo, Moyamba, Portloko. Mile 
91, Kenema, Kambia, and Makeni were also visited. 
Because of the limited amount of information available in official records, it was 
necessary to complement this by a questionnaire survey and interviews. Officials 
involved in policy making within the Forestry Division and NGOs were interviewed for 
their views on why policy changes occurred, who was responsible for formulating forest 
policy, who was consulted in the process, and what pressures they responded to (Table 
4.2). Questionnaires were administered to forestry staff at ali levels of the organisational 
hierarchy to ascertain their level of involvement in the policy formulation process, their 
awareness of the existence of policy documents and the extent to which they guide their 
activities, and the functioning of organisations. 
4.3.2 Questionnaire Design 
The research design used in this project was arguably more comprehensive than in earlier 
researches. Various designs and sampling procedures were adopted in the past for the 
J 
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Table 4.2 List of Questionnaire Questions 
SECTION A: THE POLICY DOCUMENT 
1. Is there a policy document that guides your operation? (Y/N/DK) 
2. For how long has this policy been in existence? (> I Oy/<l Oy/DK 
3. Are the purposes/goals of this policy clear to you? (Y /pIN) 
4. Are you required to follow strictly the policies in this document? (YIN/OK) 
5. Does this policy identify broad goals? (YIN/OK) 
6. Does the policy define specific objectives? (YIN/OK) 
7. Has the policy document undergone any changes since it was tirst developed" (Y/N/OK); If 
yes, please specify. 
8. What in your opinion is the reason for the change(s); Please state reasons. 
SECTION B: THE POLICY FORMULATION PROCESS 
9. Was the policy document developed by the central/natio~al government only? (Y/N/OK) 
10. Does your organisation develop its own forest policy? (YIN/OK) 
11. Is your policy developed in agreement with government policy? (Y /N/OK) 
12. At what level (s) are officers involved in policy formulation? (N/O/LiNAA/OK) 
Please state in your opinion what is responsible for this? 
13. Are local community groups involved in policy formulation? (YIN/OK). 
If yes, why? If no, why? 
14. At what level(s) are consultative meetings held for policy forest formulation? 
(Na/DlLoIDK). 
Please state why? 
15. Do outside groups or individuals (donor organisations, interest groups, constituency 
representatives, etc.) influence policy formulation? (YIN/OK) 
If yes, please state the various groups or individuals? If yes, in what ways? 
16. How often do policy makers accept conditions set by these outside groups and individuals 
on policy formulation? (AiSlNo) 
SECTION C: INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES 
17. Does your organisation have sole responsibility for implementing forest policy? (YIN/OK) 
18. Does your organisation work closely with other GOs in implementing forest policy? 
(YINIDK). If yes, please specify which GOs? 
19. Does your organisation work closely with other NGOs in implementing forest policy? 
(YINIDK). If yes, please specify which NGOs? 
20. What is the level of information sharing between your organisation and other organisations? 
(ALISlNo) 
21. Does your organisation share equipment with other organisations? (Y /N/OK). 
If yes, please specify which equipment and what organisation? 
22. Does your organisation share personnel or offer expert services to other organisations? 
(YIN/OK). If yes, please state how this happens? 
23. How strong are your links with other organisations? (VS/S/Av/w/No) 
Please in your opinion what is responsible for this? 
24. What is the level of information sharing within your organisation? (H/LlNo). 
25. Are you encouraged to express your opinion to other workers? (Y /Se/N) 
If yes, please specify? 
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26. 00 you get on well with other workers in your organisation? (Y/Se/N) 
Please state reasons for your answer? 
SECTION D: COMPLIANCE POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
27. To what extent are forest policies successfully implemented? (A/SelNo) 
28. Is the institutional arrangement of your organisation good enough for the successful 
implementation of forest policy? (Y/N/OK). Please give reasons for your answer? 
29. Based on your experience within the organisation, does the rate of success rate of forest 
policy implementation increase with nearness to the centre/national level (Y/N/OK). 
Please give reasons for your answer? 
30. Is the success rate of forest policy implementation based on the frequency of contact with 
the centre/national level? (Y/N/OK). Please give reasons for your answer? 
31. Is the degree to which an organisation successfully implements forest policy related to the 
extent to which the organisation participates in the policy formulation process? (Y/N/OK) 
32. Is the degree to which your organisation successfully implements forest policy related to the 
amount of external pressures on the organisation during the implementation process? 
(YINIDK). 
If yes, please give examples? 
SECTION E: INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH 
33. What level of equipment and resources are available to help you successfully carry out your 
work? (HlLlNo) 
34. What training did you receive for your present job? (F/P/No) 
35. Are you satisfied with the training you received? (YIPIN) 
36. Are your job duties related to what you expected to do? (Y/Se/N) 
37. Are you satisfied with your working conditions (Y/P/N). Please state reason for your 
answer? 
38. What level of freedom is given your organisation in implementing forest policy? (HlL.IN) 
39. Is the level of freedom granted your organisation in implementing policy related to the 
financial, material and human resources of your organisation? (Y/N/OK). Please gIve 
reasons for your answer? 
40. Does your job allow you to make major decisions that affect your work? (Y/SelN) 
41. Are meetings held at regular intervals to plan and evaluate progress? (Y /Se/N) 
42. Does your organisation have a promotion system that lets the best qualified person rise to 
the top? (YIN/OK). 
43. Do you want more opportunities in your job to assume more important responsibilities? 
(YIN/DK) 
44. Is your organisation better run under the NPRC than under past governments? (YIN/OK) 
45. Are there criticisms by employees about your organisation? (Y/Fe/N) 
If yes, please state the criticisms? 
46. Have you ever been transferred from one job or area to another? (Y /N). If yes, please state 
number of times? 
47. What in your opinion was the reason for your transfer? 
48. What do you think about transfers? (G/8/Ne) 
Notes: 
Y=Yes, N=No, DK=Don't Know, No=None, S=Some, AL=A lot, Se=Seldom, VS=Very Strong, 
S=Strong, Av=Average, W=Weak, H=High, L=Low, F=Full, P=Partially, Fe=Few, G=Good, B=Bad, 
Ne-Neutral, Na=National, O=Oistrict, Lo=Local. 
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analysis of policy and institutional settings, e.g. one-shot case studies, ad hoc sample 
surveys, and analysis of administrative records (Robson, 1997). But rarely has a 
synthesis of two or more approaches or research designs been employed. Analysis of 
institutional settings has largely been largely restricted to analysing internal institutional 
arrangements with little or no reference to vital external linkages with other institutions 
which heavily bear on internal structures (Doktor and Lie, 1991). This author would 
argue that a complete analysis of policy and institutional arrangements requires a multi-
directional approach. 
The use of a questionnaire was based on the assumption that respondents were both 
willing and able to give truthful answers. Serious thought was given to the extent to 
which respondents were be willing to rUl1llnage around in fIle cabinets to fmd requested 
data. Thus, the questions were made as simple and understandable as possible. The 
author also undertook to administer the questionnaire in person in order to reduce the 
possibility of misinformation. Gibson and Hawkins (1968) stated that each study using 
questionnaires is unique and must be tailored to fit the individual circumstances of the 
study. 
Moser and Kalton (1971) noted that a questionnaire is not just a list of questions or a 
form to be filled out. It is essentially a scientific instrument for measurement and 
collection of particular kinds of data. Like all such instruments, it has to be specifically 
designed according to particular specifications and with specific aims in mind. Thus, the 
author did not only administer questionnaires but resorted to unstructured interviews and 
observation techniques in situations in which administering questionnaires proved 
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problematic. Even when questionnaires were administered, unstructured follow-up 
questions were sometimes asked to elicit the required information (Berger and Sullivan, 
1970). 
4.3.2 Survey Design and Implementation 
The sample survey design used a structured questionnaire administered to a sample of 
156 employees of the Forestry Division and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
involved in forest resource management at headquarters, regional, and local levels in 
Sierra Leone. In comparison with previous research, which often concentrated on a 
certain cadre of bureaucrats referred to as "policy makers" disregarding the "underdogs" 
and "beneficiaries" at the grassroots, this sample was designed to be as representative as 
possible. 
Structured and unstructured interviews and observations were also conducted to elicit 
information from barely literate and/or illiterate forestry-related personnel, and from an 
additional 44 representatives of local target groups, such as chiefdom elders, local tribal 
heads, and community representatives in selected areas with representative forest 
reserves. Several visits were paid to forest communities at Gola North reserves, Kangari 
Hills, Dodo, Gwala, Nimini, Sankan Biriwa, Lorna, Tama (Tonkolili), and around the 
Western Area. Government officials in other Ministries like Development and Economic 
Planning; Interior and Rural Development; Lands, Housing and the Environment and 
Agriculture were also interviewed in order to establish the linkages between other 
government Ministries and Departments, and the Forestry Division. Rose (1976) stated 
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that even though observing behaviour is a useful enquiry technique, the interview is a 
flexible and adaptable short-cut to seeking answers to research questions. The use of 
human language in unstructured interviews opens a window to both the behaviour of the 
respondent and what lies behind his/her actions. Interviews also offer the possibility of 
modifying a researchers line of enquiry as thought provoking responses are received. The 
questionnaires were largely self-administered. 
A proportionate stratification sampling procedure was employed to determine the 
composition of this sample of 200 persons. Identification of the sample of 156 forestry 
officials at the national, regional and local levels of both the Forestry Division and NGOs 
started with preliminary visits to the various units in the different administrative levels 
(national, regional, local) of the organisations. During these visits, officials within each 
unit of the various administrative levels were placed into distinct groups or strata based 
on their levels in the management hierarchy (i.e. senior, junior, casual). A list of all 
employees was then reconstructed into a matrix based on these stratification factors, and 
separate samples selected from each stratum for the purpose of administering 
questionnaires or conducting interviews. The sample sizes were proportionate to the 
population within each stratum. The selection of correct proportions from each stratum 
was expected to reduce the sampling error of survey variables to which the grouping is 
related. This approach ensured that various viewpoints were gathered from different 
administrative units without having to work with an extremely large sample size. 
Whether a questionnaire or an oral interview was used depended on the literacy of 
individual employees. Because of the low literacy level among casual forestry personnel, 
101 
they were largely subjected to oral interviews. These were recorded on micro-cassette 
tape to create a more relaxed atmosphere which holding papers might have militated 
against, and to ensure accurate reproduction at a later stage. By so doing the researcher 
was able to elicit information on the functions, potentials, fears, conflicts, stren£ths 
L- , 
weaknesses, internal linkages within the institutions, and external linkages between 
institutions in their quest for sustainable forest management. 
The sample of 44 representatives of local communities and other government Ministries 
were determined through consultative meetings with local communities and employees of 
the Forestry Division. The sample size was proportionate to the number of reserves in 
each province. The author guided the selection process to ensure that the sample was 
representative of people from various works of life, and of various ages such as chiefdom 
elders, local tribal heads, youth leagues, teachers, students, and both senior and junior 
employees of other government departments. The interviews were also recorded on tape. 
Informal visits (site observations) were also paid to samples of local communities within 
forest reserves to gain fIrst-hand personal information, e.g. on the current status of the 
forests, the attitudes of the local communities to forest management and the reasons for 
this, their reactions to conflicts with central government in forest management, and ways 
by which their participation in the forest management process could be improved. The 
visits were very informal to enhance close interaction with the various target groups, and 
individuals within the local communities. 
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4.3.3 Data Analysis 
These data were analysed qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitative data were coded, 
summarised and presented in tables and analysed using simple percentages. The tables 
were then subjected to simple T -tests to analyse the significance of variations between 
responses. Qualitative data and existing documents were subjected to various forms of 
content analysis, some of them using numerical techniques. Some of the data collected 
were reproduced verbatim and other data were summarised. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE FORMULATION OF FOREST POLICY IN SIERRA LEONE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, the Government of Sierra Leone acknowledged that forests in the 
country were poorly managed, claiming that the seeming current lack of policy on 
forestry has been responsible for the neglect of this sector in recent years (GOSL, 1982). 
But is there really a lack of policy, or merely a lack of an up-to-date stated policy, and is 
this the only cause of the problem? Could poor policy implementation also be to blame, 
or perhaps a combination of both? The aim of this chapter and the next is to find 
answers to these questions. 
Sierra Leone is not unique in having problems of this kind. Many developing countries 
have no written forest policy at all, and in those that do the policy is decades old and 
consists of a list of general praiseworthy goals that have little to do with guiding present 
forest management activities (Poore, 1989). But lack of attention to formal policy does 
not mean that a government has no interest in its country's forests or no policy on them. 
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Aucoin (1970) distinguished between policies as stated, implied, perceived, or done. 
Stated forest policies are often all things to all men, so as to disguise a hidden policy 
agenda (Rees, 1990), such as forest exploitation, or conflicts between policies for 
different sectors, e.g. forestry and agriculture. All governments must surely have a 
policy on the forests in their countries, though they may not want to turn this actual 
policy into a formal stated policy. If the latter does exist it may not correspond to the 
actual policy. 
The chapter is in two main parts. The fIrst part traces the evolution of forest policy in 
Sierra Leone since colonial times, assessing whether the stated policy at each stage was 
equivalent to the actual policy, and if not what the latter was. Where there is an 
ambiguous forest policy situation, it is customary to assume that, whatever the stated 
policy, how the forest is treated conforms with the government's actual policy, i.e. policy 
as done. The degree of success in implementing these policies is evaluated in Chapter 6. 
Another crucial question concerns what determines a government's policy and what 
causes it to change. Actual policies are rather fluid phenomena representing, JJ1 
Malayang's (1996) model, the balance of pressures on policy makers at a given time. If 
the model is correct, then policy changes should occur when the balance of pressures 
changes, which is related to changes in the relative power of different groups, and their 
ability to transmit pressures, which depends in turn on the degree of democracy and 
pluralism in the country. 
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The second part of the chapter tackles this question by identifying the major groups that 
have influenced forest policy in Sierra Leone in the last hundred years. It assesses the 
changes in their relative power as the country moved from colonial rule to independence, 
and links between these changes and changes in forest policy. 
An important assumption in Malayang's model, which is retained in this chapter, is that 
changes in central government policy can be fully implemented so as to have the desired 
effect in peripheral forested ranges. This assumption is relaxed in Chapter 6, which 
assesses the extent to which poor forest management is also caused by poor 
implementation of existing policy, as a result of institutional constraints. 
5.2 THE EVOLUTION OF STATED AND ACTUAL POLICIES 
5.2.1 Colonial Era 
5.2.1.1 1808-1912 
For more than a hundred years after the Crown Colony was established in 1808, Sierra 
Leone had no stated forest policy. Intensive exploitation of timber from Sierra Leone's 
forests began in 1816 when John McCormack began exporting timber from the Bullom 
Shores, Scarcies and Portloko areas (MacGregor, 1942). Former slave trade depots 
were soon flourishing as timber depots. By 1840 forests near the coast had been 
depleted and exploitation moved inland, but while exports declined after 1860 because of 
supply limitations, no organised attempt was made at conservation or reforestation until 
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1911, when the colonial administration appointed Lane Poole to assess the status of the 
country's forest (Ribot and Cline-Cole, 1997). It therefore appears that the actual policy 
until then was to promote unrestrained exploitation, for the benefit of timber trade 
entrepreneurs. 
In his report, Lane Poole (1911) stated that 99% of the rain forests of Sierra Leone had 
been destroyed by local people through wasteful and reckless methods of shifting 
cultivation, and that the peace and prosperity that followed the end of the tribal wars had 
led to an increase in the farming population and a reduction in fallow periods. He made 
no mention of uncontrolled logging by European traders which actually also contributed 
to forest depletion and proposed no plans to counteract this. A wrong diagnosis of the 
problem therefore led to solutions that were unworkable in practice, further extending 
the actual policy of exploitation. 
5.2.1.2 The Forest Act of 1912 
However, Lane Poole's report did lead to the formulation of the country's first Forest 
Act and to the establishment of the Forestry Department in 1912. He served as the first 
Conservator of Forests (Cole, 1968). Acts of Parliament, and other legislation are not 
policies in themselves, but in as much as they are intended to provide a set of rules to 
implement the policy, they say a lot about the policy. 
The Forest Act of 1912 generally emphasised the protection of forests. It included legal 
procedures for establishing forest reserves, especially on hill tops, and along river banks 
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and railway lines. It also sought to protect rubber trees, vines and gum copal. On land 
designated as forest reserves jurisdiction was transferred from local people to the central 
government. Any form of harvesting by local people in the reserves was strictly 
forbidden and punishable by law. The Act emphasised the need to promote the well 
being of the country as its primary goal, and to preserve climatic and physical stability, 
but contained nothing to guide the practical management and exploitation of the forest 
reserves (GOSL, 1912). This is not a unique problem. For example, in the USA, the 
Forest Reserves Act of 1890 gave the President authority to designate areas of public 
lands as forest reserves but did not specify how or if the forests should be managed. The 
problem was not resolved until the Forest Management Act in 1897 gave the Secretary 
of the Interior authority to regulate how forest reserves were used (Williams, 1989). 
5.2.1.3 Amalgamation o/the Forestry and Agriculture Departments 
In 1922, the Agriculture and Forestry Departments were amalgamated under the 
Commissioner of Lands and Forests. The reason given publicly for this was to improve 
efficiency, but it would appear that the actual motive was to cut costs - little revenue was 
being received by the government at this time from the forest reserves (Buttoud, 1995; 
Fairhead & Leach, 1996) - and to promote timber exports (MacGregor, 1942). 
5.2.1.4 The 1929 Directive: From Conservation to Exploitation 
A major change in actual policy occurred in 1929, when the Agriculture and Forestry 
Departments were made separate entities again. Although the 1912 Forest Act still 
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remained in force, the colonial administration issued a new Directive announcing that it 
was abandoning forest reservation and concentrating on timber exploitation and the 
rehabilitation of small areas of degraded farmland which had been designated forest 
reserves (GOSL, 1930). The Forestry Department was expected to become financially 
self-sustaining and higher timber production was expected to help it achieve that. Even 
though this new directive was not a formal policy document, it was a public statement of 
a change in actual policy towards a more exploitative approach. 
One result of this new approach was the establishment of the first pit-sawing plant at 
Kenema, with the aim of making the country self-sufficient in sawn timber. All forestry 
operations, i.e. logging, processing and marketing, were now carried out by the Forest 
Industries Branch of the Forestry Department, using specially recruited technical officers. 
With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, further emphasis was given to implementing 
this actual (and stated) policy, to increase timber production to levels not achieved 
hitherto, for in 1939 the country was only 17% self-sufficient in sawn timber, (Cline-
Cole, 1993). By 1944, sawn timber production peaked at 15,576 cubic metres per 
annum, compared with less than 5,664 cubic metres before 1939. There was a sharp rise 
in firewood production too (Fig. 5.1). The increase in production to supply both 
domestic and war needs, e.g. wood for bridge and railway construction (Killingray, 
1982; Dummett, 1985; Evans, 1944), was achieved by the Royal Engineers Forestry 
Company, which established and operated two large sawmills at No.2 River and Kasewe 
in 1942. Two other mills - a small lumber mill and a mangrove firewood mill - were 
established and operated by the Forestry Department, which also supplied rubber. wild 
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silk, shea nuts and shea nut butter for export. Forest products were probably the 
country's most important export commodity at this time (Cline-Cole, 1993). Britain 
appointed a Resident Minister to co-ordinate West Africa's contribution to the allied war 
effort (Allison, 1946; Olusanya, 1973; Njoku, 1981). 
The colonial administration's actual policy of self-sufficiency and export promotion was 
successfully implemented under wartime conditions, but at a cost. First, low pay and 
poor working conditions reduced the morale of forestry staff, who were often reassigned 
to non-forestry duties that were even more essential to the war effort (Blood, 1941). 
Second, the high degree of intervention by the colonial administration distorted market 
prices, because it now controlled the marketing and export of all timber. Third, 
intensive logging badly depleted timber reserves. The first sawmill closed in 1945, and 
the second was shut in 1949 when log supplies in the vicinity were exhausted. The 
equipment from these mills was then transferred to Kenema, which continued to produce 
wood only for domestic needs. Even this sawmill closed later when local enterprises 
were unable to continue operating it. 
Export demand for timber from Sierra Leone declined, owing to the lack of markets for 
the wide mix of species being processed by the mills (Blandford, 1942), and complaints 
from importers about the excessive hardness of local timber and need for pre-boring 
before nailing. These difficulties were compounded by ignorance about the true 
mechanical strength of the timber, and the high transport costs caused by long distances 
and poor road links between forested areas and the ports (Kamara, 1994). 
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5.2.1.5 The Forest Policy of 1946 
In view of these problems, and the general depletion of forests caused by 15 years of 
intensive exploitation, in 1946 the Conservator of Forests proposed a limited programme 
of forest conservation and afforestation in the form of a new Forest Policy which was 
accepted by the Colonial Administration as Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1946 (GOSL, 
1946). This provided for the protection and development of natural vegetation when this 
was essential for climatic stability, soil and water conservation for agriculture, and 
ensuring an adequate supply of forest products. It also included provision for an 
organised forest administration on a territorial basis, the systematic training of field staff, 
development of a decentralised indigenous forestry administration, ecological and 
silvicultural research, an economic approach to management, exploitation of the forest 
estate for the benefit of the people without impairing its protective functions, and 
building public awareness so as to develop a universal forest sense by demonstration and 
education. 
Although the main goal of the new policy was to achieve a balance between forest 
reservation and economic development, involving the judicious utilisation of forest 
products without depleting the resource base, in practice it seemed to be geared towards 
implementing a hidden agenda of preventing local people - for whose supposed benefit 
the policy was enacted - from harvesting forest products. Subsequently, no new 
protected forests were constituted, and traditional rulers even made requests for the 
dereservation of parts of the roadside forest reserves, primarily to allow villages and 
towns to expand. 
112 
The 1946 policy therefore lacked practical appeal to the people of Sierra Leone, and 
seemed to be just another example of saying one thing and doing another. When the 
colonial administration did make several attempts to promote the protective functions of 
forests they were received politely by the populace, but deforestation continued. This 
was due to the fact that forest communities were never actually consulted before and 
during the forest policy formulation process, neither were they provided with an 
alternative means of securing their livelihoods which would have reduced their 
dependence on forest products. 
5.2.1.6 Pre-Independence White Paper 
In 1960 the colonial administration issued a White Paper on natural resources, including 
agriculture, livestock and fisheries, as well as forestry. The aim was to give advice to the 
forthcoming government of independent Sierra Leone. It emphasised improving 
productivity through the use of more up-to-date farming methods, better crop storage 
and marketing, the improvement of living standards, and the conservation of land for 
future generations. On forestry, it stressed the need to patrol and protect the forest 
estate, undertake forest surveys and research, manage forests on a sustained yield basis, 
promote natural regeneration and forest maintenance, and only undertake new planting 
when proper protection and management had been achieved (GOSL, 1960/61; Cole, 
1968). 
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5.2.1.7 Conclusions 
The colonial administration and its commercial associates exploited Sierra Leone's 
forests widely, and while some effort was put into enhancing forest management, it was 
not as effective and sustainable as expected. The first Colony was established in 1808 
but the colonial administration did not have full control over the country until 1896, 
when their dominion was extended to include the rest of Sierra Leone, which became 
known as the Protectorate. This might explain the apparent delay in developing the first 
Forest Act of 1912. 
The Governor and his officials also had to act under instructions from the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and probably found it difficult to introduce new ideas into Sierra 
Leone without seeking approval from London. Later events were to prove that the belief 
that over-exploitation of forests in African countries was a function of the colonial 
system, and would change after Independence, was sadly misconceived. What happened 
after 1961 showed that stark deviations between fine-sounding government policies and 
what actually happens on the ground are not confined to colonial regimes. 
5.2.2 Policy after Independence 
5.2.2.1 The First Twenty Years 
The stated Forest Policy of 1946 remained in place after Independence in 1961, although 
there was a shift from the former protectionist view to one that placed more emphasis on 
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forestry as a business, as forestry activity expanded to meet the growth in demand for 
sawn timber for construction, furniture and joinery. This change of outlook o-reatlv 
c . 
helped to arouse public awareness of the value of forests and forestry (GOSL, 1974). 
The Forestry and Agriculture Departments were again amalgamated under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Forestry in 1962 with the aim of enhancing a 
closer working relationship between the two (GOSL, 1963/64), and a comprehensive 
Ten-Year Development Plan was prepared in 1964 by the new Ministry of Agriculture, 
Natural Resources and Forestry (MANR&F) (GOSL, 1964/65). This was more of a 
short-term strategy to implement the 1946 Forest Policy, rather than a new policy 
statement in its own right, although it did contain a few additions. It was geared towards 
managing forests for both protective and productive purposes. The latter included minor 
forest products, which provided an important intermediate yield before timber trees 
matured. 
Forest protection was also promoted by the Bush Fires Act, which prohibited burning on 
upland farms in the dry season without seeking the assistance of five other people, 
though since the Act did not require these to be adults, often children were used and this 
led to many problems (Allieu, 1992). 
Ambiguity about forest policy continued. For example, in 1969 a mass film campaign 
was launched to create public awareness about the benefits of forestry, but a few years 
later this was followed by a government initiative to increase the rate of exploitation to 
substitute for imports of forest products, which had more than doubled in 1973 (Kamara, 
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1994). World Forestry Day was first observed in Sierra Leone on 21 March, 1974, and 
there was a new drive to promote the establishment of forest plantations on farms, e.g. 
by holding Agricultural Shows in the provinces and incorporating forestry into Integrated 
Agricultural Development Projects. However, the planting rate was slower than 
expected, and by 1974 plantations only covered 52 square kilometres, or 3% of total 
forest area (GOSL, 1974). 
The lack of a substantive and up-to-date forest policy to guide forest management 
provided a conducive atmosphere for those in high places to capitalise on obsolete 
clauses in the 1946 Forest Policy, e.g. those dealing with harvesting levies, so as to allow 
forests to be exploited with hardly any return to the government and with no regard to 
the environmental implications. Much of the legislation was very broad and had no 
specific provisions for forest preservation and sustainable management. Some of the 
penal provisions were no longer taken seriously by potential offenders. Dubious deals 
and contracts were made, leading to the uncontrolled exploitation of forests for the 
benefit of a select group of individuals and organisations. Also contributing to 
deforestation was an increase in mining, shifting cultivation and fuelwood cutting. 
5.2.2.2 The 1982 Forest Sector Review 
The 1946 policy remained in place for 42 years. By 1980, the government had 
recognised that it was obsolete and therefore requested the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (UN/FAO) to undertake a comprehensive Forest Sector 
Review. FAO's report drew attention to the high rate of deforestation and gave high 
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priority to the need for afforestation progranunes for soil conservation purposes. It also 
made proposals for a new Forest Act that would include strict penalties for violators 
(FAO, 1982). 
However, the government did not implement these proposals. Many top officials 
benefited directly or indirectly from the ambiguous policy situation and wanted it to stay 
that way. For example, politicians within this period felt a bit more secure in their jobs 
after the introduction of the one party system of government and individually undertook 
a number of construction and farming projects on both state and privately owned land 
with readily available timber and forest lands to satisfy their desires at hardly any cost to 
them. Many private houses were built at Hill Station in Freetown on government land 
formerly occupied by forests. What the government did do, however, was to give a high 
priority to agricultural expansion, which would convert even more forest lands to 
farming. The lack of protection and inadequate reforestation inevitably led to high levels 
of illegal felling and encroachment on remaining forest reserves. 
The government promoted agricultural development by establishing a Green Revolution 
Progranune in 1986. This recognised forestry as an important component of land use 
and agricultural development. Its main goals were to conserve and develop forestry 
areas to protect soil and water resources in order to maintain climatic stability, to 
promote forest regeneration to replenish soil fertility on abandoned agricultural lands, 
and to increase significantly the production of non-timber forest products which 
contributed directly to the food supply. Priority was also given to the development of 
fuelwood plantations and agroforestry schemes. However, despite funding from 
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international agencIes and the extensive publicity gIven to ceremonial tree planting 
schemes, the programme did not achieve any of its desired objectives and the total area 
of new plantations established was insignificant (FAO, 1988). Yet again, the hidden 
agenda of the government was made plain by its actions - or rather the lack of them. The 
hidden agenda here being the government's inherent interest in financial aain bv fakina b _ b 
commitment to the national tree planting programme and undertaking massive publicity 
to satisfy the interests of international donor organisations that had already committed 
large sums to the programme or were thinking of supporting the programme. Such 
funds were never accounted for when the programme was considered as closed. Such 
pranks by people in very high offices creates the need for a thorough re-examination of 
foreign investment especially in agroforestry programmes and projects in the developing 
World. The huge sums invested in forestry development by donor organisations seem to 
have very little effect on the ground as evidenced by the above. For until and unless the 
root causes of forest depletion and mismanagement are actually addressed, foreign aid 
will simply serve the purpose of treating leprosy with skin cream which will only pretend 
to heal the surface without actually adressing the core problem. This inavariably results 
in a vicious cycle of foreign investment, misuse, poor forest resource management, forest 
depletion, degradation, and further requests for development aid. 
5.2.2.3 The Forest Act of 1988 
By the 1980s, what Gleave (1992) referred to as "the heady optimism of the 
independence years" had began to evaporate giving rise to widespread international 
concerns about faltering development processes especially in the developing world. 
118 
Sierra Leone was no exception to this state of affairs. Following the government's lack 
of action in the 1980s, donors were reluctant to commit themselves to providino any b _ 
more funding for forestry activities (FAO, 1988). This, and probably also pressures fro111 
them behind the scenes, gave the government a strong incentive to implement the 
proposals of the FAO Forest Sector Review of 1982, converting them into the Forest 
Act of 1988 with hardly a phrase changed. 
The new Act contained provisions for reforestation programmes, concession agreements, 
land acquisition, stumpage rates and forest protection and development. There was also 
an afforestation fund so the Forestry Division had money to spend on tree planting. The 
Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Forestry was empowered to declare any 
area a protected area for the conservation of soil, water, flora or fauna, and declare any 
type of tree protected too. The cutting, burning, uprooting or destruction of protected 
trees or trees in protected areas was forbidden. However, the Chief Conservator of 
Forests could grant a licence to authorise any person to fell trees in protected areas, and 
authorise any Forest Officer to issue a licence for the felling and extraction of a protected 
tree. This gave room for abuses that could defeat the objective of setting up protected 
areas. The Act also provided for competitive bidding on logging concessions of 
significant size, but did not specify what this should be. 
The 1988 Act seemed to be a step forward, but in practice it was used by government 
officials to maintain their control over forest resources, and it led to an increase in the 
illegal invasion of protected forest reserves for personal benefit (GOSL, 1989). 
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The government's lack of commitment was apparent when subsequent progranm1es 
funded by international agencies also achieved poor results. For example, a fuelwood 
project initiated in 1988 with funds from FAO and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to supply Freetown with fuelwood, and similar projects undertaken 
by PLAN International and the Rokel Leaf Tobacco Development Company in the 
provinces did not yield any positive results. The government also signed an agreement 
with FAO and UNDP in 1990 to adopt a national Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) 
for the country. FAO was mandated to look for other donor agencies to fund specific 
projects to implement this Plan, which contained wide ranging proposals to: address the 
role of forestry in land use through agroforestry, watershed management and forest 
development; support forest-based industries development by undertaking an inventory 
of forest areas; develop fuelwood plantations for domestic and commercial energy use; 
conserve forests for ecological purposes; and strengthen the Forestry Division. However, 
the long-term success of the TFAP programme was prejudiced because most of the ideas 
and funding came from overseas. 
5.2.2.4 The National Environmental Policy of 1992 
When a military regIme took over power from the All Peoples Congress (APC) 
government in 1992, it established a new Ministry of Lands, Housing and the 
Environment (MLHE) which shared responsibilities with the Forestry Division in respect 
of environmental conservation. To meet conditions laid down by the World Bank for 
providing financial assistance the government also formulated an all-encompassing 
National Environmental Policy (MLHE, 1992), with the aim of achieving sustainable 
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development through sound environmental management, conserving renewable resources 
for the benefit of present and future generations, and promoting a better understanding 
of the essential linkages between environment and development. 
In contrast to its fine-sounding stated policies, the actual priority of the military junta 
was to make its presence felt. For example, forestry department equipment, such as 
vehicles, which was already grossly inadequate for their normal role, was impounded and 
used for national security purposes. Stringent decrees were put in place to discourage 
the illegal harvesting of forest resources, but these simply left most of the forests at the 
mercy of the military so it could exploit them for construction and other purposes. So in 
contrast to its stated protectionist policy, the military's hidden agenda was to make 
forests available to those who considered themselves above the law. 
5.2.2.5 Forest Policy Since 1996 
In 1996, following a bloodless palace coup in February in which the Chairman of the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and Head of State, Captain Valentine 
Strasser, was overthrown by his deputy, Julius Maada Bio, elections were held six weeks 
later and the military government handed over power to a democratically elected 
government. In his inaugural speech, the new President, Ahmed Tejan Kabba, pledged 
to promote self-sufficiency and sustainability through proper management of the 
country's resources. No new forest policy was proposed, but it would have been 
redundant anyway, since the main problem now was not the lack of an up-to-date policy 
but the inability to implement a perfectly satisfactory one. Part of the reason for this 
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failure, however, was that forests became no-go areas during the five years of rebel \\'ar 
that preceded the return to democratic rule, with the government losing control of 
peripheral areas to the rebels. 
Barely a year after the new democratic government took office, it was overthrown in 
May, 1997 by another coup by a military junta known as the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council CAFRC), which collaborated closely with the rebels of the 
Revolutionary United Front CRUF). Law and order broke down, the Central Bank and 
National Treasury were destroyed and other government offices (including those of the 
Forestry Division) were looted, making it impossible for government employees to return 
to work effectively or be paid for it. The rule of law has been suspended and replaced by 
decrees. Employee morale is at an all time low and hardly any forest management is now 
taking place. 
5.2.2.6 Conclusions 
It appears from this discussion that there has been a gulf between the government's 
stated forest policy and its actual policy since colonial times. The use of archaic and 
inadequate forest laws, coupled with inadequate funding, created an ambiguous policy 
situation on which political leaders and officials could capitalise to satisfy their personal 
vested interests. The level of discretionary powers granted to the Chief Conservator of 
Forests and his associates, with no up-to-date policy guidelines against which to compare 
their actions, enabled them to satisfy the needs of powerful groups whose aims might 
have been quite contrary to those of the stated policy of sustainable forest management. 
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Changes in actual policy have largely corresponded to changes in stated policy. but not 
always. For example, there were a number of instances of changes in actual policy 
between 1961 and 1981, even though the stated policy remained that of 1946. The 
continuous depletion of forest resources during the period of ambiguity between 1946 
and 1988 was a clear manifestation of the operation of an actual policy of forest 
exploitation. 
Reference is often made to policy failures that occur when a government intervenes to 
distort the rational management of the economy and the environment. But another type 
of failure occurs when it should intervene for the collective good and fails to do so. The 
history of forest policy formulation and implementation in Sierra Leone over the last 
hundred years is a prime example of this latter type of policy failure. 
5.3 THE ROLE OF MAJOR GROUPS IN FOREST POLICY FORMULATION 
5.3.1 Assessing the Balance of Pressures on Policy Makers 
This part of the chapter analyses the processes that lead to the formulation of the actual 
and stated policies described in the fIrst part of the chapter. Policy formulation and 
implementation processes in Sierra Leone can be represented by a single system, based 
on Mitchell (1989) (Fig. 5.2). The forest policy process in Sierra Leone, like most 
developing countries, is largely centralised, with policy formulated at the top by the Head 
of State and Cabinet, from where it is expected to trickle down to the grassroots for 
implementation. Forest policy makers in Sierra Leone are usually subjected to pressures 
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from various individuals and groups with varying and sometimes conflicting interests. 
which may be broadly defined as either economic (exploitative) or environmental 
(protectionist). In Malayang's model, described in Chapter 4, changes in government 
forest policy are associated with a change in the balance of pressures on policy makers. 
corresponding to changes in the relative power of interest groups. This can apply to both 
stated policy and actual policy. 
The changes in stated and actual policy over the last hundred years are now interpreted 
in terms of changes in the relative power of ten main interest groups: (a) Executive; (b) 
Traditional rulers; (c) Bureaucracy; (d) Business elite; (e) Legislature; (f) External 
Actors; (g) NGOs; (h) Church; (i) Media; (j) Military. For convenience the discussion is 
divided into two parts: (a) the Colonial Era, from 1808 to 1961; (b) the Post-Colonial 
era, from 1961 to the present. 
5.3.2 Colonial Era 
5.3.2.1 Executive 
Forest policy formulation in the colonial era was largely centralised in the hands of the 
Governor. But while he had ultimate local responsibility for declaring areas as forest 
reserves and determining concessions, harvesting fees and royalties, his actions were 
always subject to approval by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in London. 
Between 1808 and 1896, the power of the colonial administration was confined to the 
Crown Colony, which consisted of the Freetown Peninsula. It had little or no control 
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over forests in the rest of what is now Sierra Leone until 1896, when the Protectorate 
was declared. 
5.3.2.2 Traditional Rulers 
Traditional rulers are locally elected and appointed heads of local administrative units 
such as chiefdoms (Paramount Chiefs), villages (village heads) and tribes (tribal heads). 
Paramount Chiefs convey the aspirations and expectations of their chiefdom to policy 
makers whenever consulted. When serious problems arise they summon meetings to 
discuss them and determine the general view. 
Even before the fIrst proper survey of Sierra Leone's forests and the appointment of the 
fIrst Conservator of Forests, steps were taken to appoint a Reserves Settlement OffIcer, 
whose main duty was to negotiate with tribal authorities to ascertain the legality and 
acceptability of the conversion of forest lands to forest reserves. The Paramount Chiefs 
played an important role in such consultations, because they had the fInal say in land 
allocation. Local inhabitants also had the right to appeal against such decisions. 
Because of their deep-seated cultural attachment to land, local inhabitants, especially 
those within the Protectorate, refused to hand control over the land to the colonial 
administration. Instead they only gave the Forestry Department the right to remove 
timber from it. Thus, the 1912 Forest Act was wholly geared to establishing forest 
reserves but was highly problematic, owing to the lack of mutual trust between the 
negotiating parties. Local people were mainly concerned with short-term benefIts from 
the forests and tended to be protective of the land. They were never fully informed of the 
dangers of forest depletion, and so were not happy with the prohibitive rules that strictly 
forbade them to harvest produce within the forest reserves. 
Once reserves were established, traditional rulers co-operated with the colonial 
administration in enforcing the rules and even developed local by-laws at the chiefdom 
level against the abuse of resources within the reserves. As a compromise, probably to 
avoid a revolt, no control was extended to forests outside the reserves, but this did not 
prevent local communities from imitating the government and overseas companies by 
exploiting the forest reserves. Some critics believe that the Forest Policy of 1912 was 
only a ploy to keep local communities away from the forest reserves, and that the 
consultations were a diplomatic means of gaining access to more forest reserves and 
justifying the legality of penal restrictions imposed on forest communities by the Crown. 
However, in retrospect, Paramount Chiefs probably were more powerful in the Colonial 
Era than they were afterwards. 
The involvement of local communities at the negotiating table ended with the declaration 
of the reserves and penal restrictions. They were not involved in the daily management of 
reserves. The Reserves Settlement Officer was only consulted when there was a need to 
establish more reserves. Operational decisions were taken unilaterally by the Chief 
Conservator of Forests, subject to the approval of the Governor and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 
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5.3.3 Post-Colonial Era 
5.3.3.1 Executive 
When Sierra Leone became independent in 1961, the country was ruled by an Executive 
consisting of a President and a Cabinet appointed by him and taken from elected 
Members of Parliament. The government decided to retain the centralised system of 
forest management established in the colonial era. No attempt was made to change the 
existing Forest Policy of 1946 or the Pre-Independence White Paper. Some of the 
colonial forestry staff were retained to help with the training of local foresters and forest 
management. However, there was a change in actual policy towards a more exploitative 
approach, under pressure from local and foreign businesses, as described below. 
The Executive tried to manipulate actual policy to improve its own popularity and secure 
political advantage over other parties. For example, when it was in power, the Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) responded to protectionist pressures from the Media and 
the Church by establishing oil palm plantations. This gave the appearance of 
afforestation, provided income for the government and individual politicians, and 
promoted the SLPP itself, since its symbol was a palm tree. But when the All Peoples 
Congress (APC)) came to power in 1967, it tried to undo this work by destroying large 
areas of palm plantations, especially in the north of the country where it had majority 
support. 
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Patronage and corruption increased markedly during the 1970s under the APC 
govermnent and the link between the Executive and the Business Elite became ever 
closer. The APC introduced one-party government in 1978, using its powers as the 
Executive to further promote forest exploitation. This approach was continued by the 
Military when it overthrew the APC in 1992 and governed by decree instead of the rule 
of law. 
Before the Military take-over in 1992, Cabinet Ministers were appointed by the President 
largely from among Parliamentary representatives, so ministers were under an obligation 
to their electorate and would try to influence policy formulation in ways that benefited 
the people in their constituencies. In the first eight years of the APC government, 
Cabinet Ministers had a reputation for being poorly educated and under the control of 
the President, but the Cabinet that served from 1977 to 1981 included doctors, university 
professors and other highly educated professionals, and these did make some notable 
innovations, such as inviting FAO to undertake a review of the forest sector. 
5.3.3.2 Bureaucracy 
Sierra Leone lacks a career bureaucracy. Leading civil servants are politically appointed, 
creating scope for the patrimonialism which is deep seated in the country. The highly 
politicised bureaucracy is compliant to the political will of the Executive, and also limited 
in its ability to control the activities of private entrepreneurs that usually implement the 
government's actual policy of forest exploitation. Though the bureaucracy is sometimes 
well represented at regional and local levels, the most powerful bureaucrats are those in 
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headquarters offices where actual policy decisions are made, following either brief or no 
consultations with officials and organisations outside the capital. 
The role of civil servants in policy formulation is variable. They usually take care of most 
of the paper work relating to the production of forest policy documents, under 
instruction from Ministers. They are sometimes covertly used as instruments to create 
room for the actual policies of government by including vague clauses that give ill-
defined responsibilities to leading officials. These could be used to circumvent the 
restrictions supposedly included in the stated policy. For example, the Forestry Act of 
1988 gave the Chief Conservator of Forests unlimited powers to declare forest areas as 
protected or unprotected and to assign logging licences to whoever he/she deemed fit. 
This could be used to promote the interests of those responsible for appointing the Chief 
Conservator. 
The bureaucracy had considerable influence in the colonial era when it was closely linked 
with the Executive. Its influence continued in the first seven years of independent rule, 
when the remaining colonial administrators were highly respected. However, its power 
decreased in the 1970s as patronage became more extensive under the APC government 
and the Business Elite became more powerful. 
5.3.3.3 Business Elite 
The power of the Business Elite in Sierra Leone has increased steadily over the last three 
decades, taking over more of the role played by the European expatriate business elite in 
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colonial times. This group is largely of Lebanese and Syrian ongm, though it also 
comprises Fullahs from Guinea and Sierra Leone, and is based in Freetown and the 
major regional towns. Its main influence has been to promote forest exploitation, as did 
its colonial counterpart. 
When the country became independent, local and overseas business interests exerted 
pressure on the government to make its actual policy even more exploitative than in the 
past, in order to expand timber production for construction, furniture and joinery. The 
official explanation was the need to increase self sufficiency for sawn timber. The actual 
reason was to make money for local business interests. However, the government 
received very little mcome from this exploitation which could be reinvested in forest 
management. 
Through their close links with the Executive and the Bureaucracy they have been able to 
exert pressures to ensure that forest policy is business oriented, and royalties and 
licensing fees are fixed at rates satisfactory to them (though they are hardly ever paid). 
Officials are given bribes to facilitate the selection of logging licences. The 
commercialisation of the forest management process influenced the inclusion of open 
ended clauses into policy documents which could be used to meet the specific demands 
of this group, made even more powerful by the formation of consortia. The government 
has occasionally forced companies to divert from their profit-at-all-cost approach and 
operate in more environmentally-friendly ways. However, a combination of self interest 
and altruism is leading to a belated rise in business environmentalism. 
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5.3.3.4 The Legislature 
In most developing countries the Legislature is dominated by the Executive (Blondel, 
1995) and Sierra Leone is no exception. Even during the multi-party era, elected 
Members of Parliament had relatively little power, though they could playa significant 
role in delaying legislation and the views of influential members were heeded by the 
President. There was not much sharing of power between the Executive and the 
Legislature, so reformist legislation that threatened the interests of influential elites and 
their political representatives was delayed and/or heavily diluted by the time it became 
law. The Executive used its discretionary powers whenever possible to determine policy. 
After the transition to one-party rule in 1978 the power of the Legislature declined even 
further. In the March 1996 elections, Members of Parliament were not directly elected 
but appointed by proportional representation from party lists, since the electorate now 
voted only for the President and Party of their choice. This removed the problem of dual 
allegiance of political parties to both the electorate and the State. 
5.3.3.5 Traditional Rulers 
Paramount Chiefs used to be widely respected but became highly politicised during the 
APC era, some of them becoming involved in facilitating over-exploitation of forests by 
corrupt politicians. It became difficult for forest officers to bring to justice those 
responsible for illegal logging as this would mean going against the full force of their 
political backers - the local rulers. They therefore found it difficult to operate etfectively 
for fear of losing their jobs and facing personal harm. The central government therefore 
132 
gave a de facto role to traditional rulers in local forest management. But this, and the fact 
that some were appointed by the government in contravention of long-standing electoral 
procedure, caused them to lose authority as the mouthpieces of the peasants they were 
supposed to serve, and paved the way for the abuse of forests by local inhabitants and 
the business elite. Despite a concerted attempt by the NPRC regime to restore their pride 
and integrity this will take considerable time. 
5.3.3.6 Donor Organisations 
After it became independent in 1961, Sierra Leone continued to receive bilateral aid from 
the British government, negotiated as part of the independence settlement and channelled 
to it through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, most recently through the latter's 
Overseas Development Administration (aDA). It also received bilateral aid from other 
governments, such as West Germany, through German Technical Co-operation (GTZ), 
and multilateral aid from such agencies as FAa, UNDP and the World Bank. 
Such donor organisations have mainly influenced forest management in the country by 
funding specific projects and programmes. But in the late 1980s, they actually exerted 
sufficient pressures on the government to change its forest policy. At that time, the stated 
forest policy of the government was still the Forest Policy of 1946, despite the wide-
ranging forest sector review undertaken by FAa in 1981. Politicians, senior bureaucrats 
and the business elite had opposed FAa's proposals because they would have an adverse 
effect on their income. It was not until strong pressures were exerted by bilateral and 
multilateral donor organisations that the government published the new Forest Policy of 
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1988, corresponding almost verbatim to the recommendations of the FAO review. They 
were able to do this by threatening not to fund any new projects and missions until this 
was done. The government had to accede to their demands because it badly needed 
overseas aid to fund the Forestry Division. 
Following the publication of the new policy, the government agreed to sign up to the 
Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). FAO co-ordinated preparation of a national 
TFAP for Sierra Leone and its implementation by individual projects supported by 
different agencies. For example, GTZ focused on the protection and rehabilitation of the 
Gola Forest Reserve; ODA on Forest Ranger certificate training, forestry research, forest 
inventory in the eastern region; the World Bank on supporting a national mUlti-purpose 
forest inventory and, together with UNDP, conservation programmes (GOSL, 1988). 
5.3.3.7 The Military 
The serious influence of the Military on the policy process in Sierra Leone dates back to 
March, 1967 when Military rule was established in Sierra Leone by the National 
Reformation Council (NRC), and the former ministries were replaced by eight 
departments additional to the National Reformation Council Secretariat, which was 
responsible for economic development and planning. The Freetown City Council was 
suspended and replaced by a Management Committee. The District Officers were also 
reverted to their pre-independence title of District Commissioners. The NRC suspended 
the constitution and wielded state power by a number of decrees which had to be 
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adhered to at all costs. The NRC was put down by another coup d' etat thirteen months 
later, and a democratic government was restored. 
The Military again became a dominant power in Sierra Leone after a group of junior 
Army officers brought down the one-party APC government in a coup d'etat in April 
1992, in frustration after the APC had cut soldiers salaries and ended their rice 
allowances. It was always an important arm of state power, but used to be largely 
autonomous and focused on national security and sovereignty, rather than politics, 
though there were a number of short-lived coups in the thirty years after Independence. 
Only when it took the reins of government in 1992 did it actually get directly involved in 
public policy making. After handing over briefly to a democratically elected government 
in March 1996, it took power again in June 1997, clearly feeling that it had a right to 
give political leadership. 
When the new military regime came to power in 1992 it was warmly welcomed by many 
people in Sierra Leone, who were impatient for change after more than two decades of 
moral decadence and administrative neglect. It was also under immense pressure to 
prove itself to the international community, and to environmentalist groups within Sierra 
Leone. It made a good start by establishing a new Ministry of Lands, Housing and the 
Environment, and appointing technical and professional experts in various fields to 
advise it and develop national progralllil1es for sustainable development. This resulted in 
a comprehensive National Environmental Policy in 1992, geared towards achieving 
sustainable development in Sierra Leone through sound environmental management. It 
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encompassed the activities of the Forestry Division even though the latter was In a 
different ministry. 
But while the Military has publicly taken a protectionist stance on forests, it has in 
practice generally promoted forest exploitation. Its young leaders used rule by decree to 
obtain free timber for house construction and to gain huge sums of money for themselves 
from timber sales. Its stringent forest policy was simply a device to dissuade the public 
from interfering with the actions of a ruthless and greedy regime. The regime also 
alienated a lot of people by resorting to autocratic action to protect the environment. 
Minor mistakes and irregularities by staff of the Forestry Division were misinterpreted as 
being against the Revolution, resulting in gross violations of human rights that were 
frequently reported in the Media. This, and the secret logging contracts signed with local 
business interests, eroded the Military's credibility as environmentalists. 
5.3.4 Less Influential Groups 
5.3.4.1 Non-Governmental Organisations 
The capacity and activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have risen greatly 
in Sierra Leone in recent decades but are still not sufficient for them to exert a major 
influence on government policy. NGOs include all organisations that are not government 
or quasi-government agencies, e.g. charities, private voluntary organisations, church 
social welfare organisations, grassroots organisations etc. Their merits and limitations in 
comparison with government have been reviewed by Gordon-Drabek (1987) and various 
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strategies proposed to improve their relations with government (Korten, 1990; Edwards 
and Hulme, 1992; Farrington et aI., 1993). NGOs were divided by Farrington and 
Bebbington (1995) into (a) functional NGOs which actively deliver services in the fields 
of health, rural development etc. and (b) non-functional NGOs that include pressure 
groups campaigning on particular issues, and think-tanks concerned with policy studies. 
Farrington et al. (1993) distinguished between NGOs in term\) of their scales of 
operation (grassroots versus larger scale), ownership (membership versus non-
membership) and approach (enlightened top-down, partial participatory or fully 
participatory (empowering). 
NGOs only started to become active in environmental campaigning in Sierra Leone in the 
1980s. Since then, both individually or collectively, have successfully influenced forestry 
programmes on a number of occasions. For example, it was the concerted efforts and 
commitment of NGOs and donor organisations to the afforestation programme that 
culminated in the government's declaration of a national tree planting drive in 1986. 
Sometimes their role has been to try to change government policy, and sometimes to 
promote or implement it (see Chapter 6). Several of the newer NGOs, like ORIENT (the 
Organisation for Research and Extension of Intermediate Technologies) and CHECSIL 
(the Commonwealth Human Ecology Council of Sierra Leone) focus on policy and 
regulatory change advocacy, questioning certain government forest management 
practices and the illegal harvesting of timber to which the government turns a blind eye. 
Others, like CSSL (the Conservation Society of Sierra Leone), play an important role in 
building environmental awareness among the general public. Relatively small NGOs 
enhance their overall impact on the government, and on national affairs generally, by 
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forming regional and local coalitions and national consortia. But even small but well 
established NGOs can provide a powerful representation at regional and national level 
for spontaneous grassroots organisations set up to protest about specific problems. 
5.3.4.2 The Church 
There is no established Church in Sierra Leone, though most of the country's Prime 
Ministers and Presidents have been nominal members of one of the many denominations 
in the country. The most powerful actors among these churches are the Council of 
Churches of Sierra Leone and the Roman Catholic Church. For a long time the attitude 
of the churches towards forests was broadly exploitative, but this changed in recent 
decades and is now fairly neutral, though some radical denominations take a more 
protective approach and the church voices its concerns about the environment and 
corruption through the media, in the pulpit and through other public forums. 
5.3.4.3 The Media 
The power of the Media has grown consistently over the last three decades. It has always 
held a very strategic position in the policy formulation process, being used by both 
politicians and interest groups to transmit pressures to policy makers. It promotes a 
rational debate on important issues by informing and seeking realistic and rational 
comments from them in return. Journalists in Sierra Leone sometimes argue against 
government policies at great cost to their personal welfare and that of their families 
through physical assault and imprisonment. The Media has played a vital role in 
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campaigning against abuses of forest management regulations and bringing to light 
alleged irregularities in the operation of the Forestry Division, It was also prominent in 
publicising the destructive mining activities of the Sierra Rutile and Sieromco companies, 
which were then forced by the government to undertake afforestation programmes. It 
also upholds the rights of grassroots communities and has successfully thwarted several 
attempts by the Forestry Division to violate these. 
5.3.4.4 The Extent of Grassroots Consultation 
Increasing popular participation in forest management was an integral part of the new 
Forest Act of 1988. This represented a major shift from the traditional approach in which 
rural people were regarded as ignorant and in need of guidance from the government on 
how to halt deforestation and undertake afforestation. After it seized power in 1992, the 
NPRC recognised the value of grassroots organisations by establishing a national 
network of Local Mobilisation Squads to articulate grassroots concerns to national 
government, on the one hand, and diffuse innovation and build awareness, on the other. 
However, in some areas, these local mobilisation squads usurped the role of local 
vigilantes/militia and levied untold misery and grief on grassroots communities. Local 
inhabitants were unreasonably fined and physical manhandled for minor breaches of 
forest laws and by-laws of which they might hardly be aware. Such draconian measures 
only succeeded in alienating local communities from the forests which invariably affects 
forest management. 
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Although government documents show that there has been progress in making the 
transition from the old centralised approach to forest management to a more 
decentralised one, a survey of government forestry personnel revealed that a majority felt 
that there is still little consultation at local level, and that consultations prior to forest 
policy formulation are concentrated in the hands of a few elites comprising politicians 
and professional forestry staff (Table 5.1). Reasons put forward to explain this ranged 
from lack of logistical support and finances for holding grassroots consultative meetings, 
to the inaccessibility of forest communities, and the belief among professional forestry 
staff that they know what local people think and so do not need inputs from them. The 
interviews revealed that forest communities now tend to accept this inferior role and do 
not even expect to be consulted by government officials, but rather carry out activities to 
ensure their personal livelihoods regardless of the implications for effective forest 
management. 
Interviews at grassroots level suggested that people there were only consulted when a 
policy had been decided and was about to be implemented, e.g. by exploiting timber in 
nearby forests. Interviewees believed that forest policy formulation was the province of 
people in the capital city and had nothing to do with them, revealing a level of alienation 
that most residents of forest communities have come to accept as normal. Some of the 
people interviewed said they were only interested in managing a resource if they derived 
some benefit from it. As they were not consulted they thought there was no reason to get 
involved in forest management and so felt quite relaxed about illegal forest exploitation. 
When asked about grassroots consultations by senior forest staff at headquarters, a 
Forest Ranger confessed that all he was only interested in bringing up his children 
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because they will have to take care of him in his old age, and that he was not intere. ted 
in forest management because it benefited only a few at the top. Such statements re eal 
a bleak future for sustainable forest management in Sierra Leone. 
Table 5.1 The Opinions Of Employees Of The FD And NGOs About The Levels At 
Which Consultations Are Held For Forest Policy Formulation Expressed In Percentages 
Consultations with local people was regarded as entirely normal by a vast majo rity of 
NGO personnel, who involve representatives from national, district and local levels in 
their decision making processes through periodic meetings, workshops, brainstorming 
exercises etc. 
5.3.4.5 Changes in Power and Denwcratisation 
Experience in other countries (Malayang, 1996) suggests that if the government 's actual 
forest policy is to become more protectionist then the power of groups favouring forest 
protection must increase. In practice, this also requires an increase in the level of 
democracy and pluralism so such groups are free to exert pressure and develop the 
necessary strength and influence to transmit this effectively. 
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Although it can be argued that the stated policy of the government of Sierra Leone on 
forestry has become more protectionist and less exploitative since 196], it is clear that 
the actual policy has not changed very much. Moreover, while Sierra Leone was 
considered to be a democratic state before 1992, the real extent of democracy and 
pluralism was at a low ebb during the APC regime that preceded the military coup of 
1992, because in 1978 the APC abolished the representative multi-party democracy that 
had been in operation since Independence, in favour of a one-party state. 
The VOIces of ordinary people were hardly ever heard in the process of policy 
formulation. Decision making basically rested with self-seeking demagogues at the top of 
the political hierarchy. When the Military took over government in 1992 they attempted 
to reverse this process but their heavy-handed autocratic actions scared people from 
taking part in consultative exercises. 
The reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1996 again allowed credible opposition 
parties to act as checks and balances on the governing party, but this did not affect things 
very much in practice, as the government had such a large majority in Parliament. The 
Leader of the Opposition was actually suspended from Parliament for making subversive 
remarks to the effect that there was no real democracy in the country. In the year before 
the next coup the government's attention was focused on trying to end the five-year 
rebel war that had been raging in the countryside, and it made no further changes to 
forest policy. 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing analysis of the policy formulation process in Sierra Leone has revealed a 
number of interesting findings that support the hypothesis that poor policy development 
is a major reason for poor forest management in Sierra Leone. The analysis reveals that 
even though forest management in Sierra Leone has been guided by some sort of policy 
over the century, there has been a consistent lack of an up-to-date forest policy to guide 
effective forest management. The lack of an up-to-date forest policy results in the use of 
archaic and inadequate forest laws, and this coupled with inadequate funding, creates an 
ambiguous policy situation which policy makers in Sierra Leone have capitalised upon 
over the years to practice their hidden agenda of satisfying their personal vested interests. 
The lack of an adequate forest policy does not, however, imply a lack of attention to or 
interest in the country's forest resources on the part of the government. Even though 
they may not formally state them, all governments have policies towards the management 
of forest resources. Where stated policies do not exist, the government's policy usually 
correspond to its actual policy. The analysis of the evolution of forest policy in Sierra 
Leone revealed that for much of the last hundred years the actual policies of the 
government did not correspond to its actual policy. Even though the stated policies of 
the government (1912, 1946, 1988) have been protectionist over the years, government 
directives in 1922 and 1969, and its actual policies have consistently been exploitative, 
especially since 1922. 
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Consistent with Malayang's balance of pressures model, which was applied in a 
regulatory output sense to account for the reasons for changes in policy, actual policies 
in Sierra Leone reflect the balance of pressures on policy makers, reSUlting in ultimate 
winners and losers. Policy changes when the balance of pressures changes relative to the 
relative power of exploitative and protectionist groups. The dominant actors since the 
colonial era have been the Executive and the Bureaucracy, subject to varying degrees of 
leverage from the Business Elite, Traditional Rulers and later on the Military. The 
Traditional Rulers, who used to command massive land rights during the Colonial era, 
were major actors in determining whether land was converted to reserves or not. The 
interests of the Executive and the Business Elite became closely intertwined after 
independence and following the change of government in 1969, resulting in varymg 
degrees of patronage, corruption and forest exploitation. 
Even though the need for a new policy was recognised in 1981182, it was not until 1988 
that the government published a new policy, due to protectionist pressures from 
international donor organisations. However, due to the relatively late emergence of 
NGOs and other interest groups in the 1980s, they are still relatively weak and lack 
enough momentum and strength to counter the massive influence of exploitative groups. 
Thus, actual policy in Sierra Leone is still exploitative. Even though changes in actual 
policy sometimes correspond to changes in stated policy, this is not always the case. For 
example, between 1946 and 1988, there was no change in the official stated forest policy 
of the government of Sierra Leone, which was basically protectionist, but exploitation of 
forest resources continued to increase. 
1-1.-1. 
On the whole, two types of policy failures generally exist. The fU'st type occurs when 
government intervenes to distort the rational and effective management of forests. and 
the second occurs when the government does not intervene when it should have done for 
the common good. Both types of policy failures could be exemplified in the Sierra 
Leone forest management situation in which a hidden agenda (actual policy) has always 
been adopted, in contravention of the stated policy. Sometimes obsolete policies have 
been used to guide forest management over a protracted period in order to create room 
for ambiguity which could be used to exploit forests. 
145 
CHAPTER 6 
FOREST POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN SIERRA LEONE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Poor forest management may result from poor policy implementation as well as 
inadequate policies. Without effective institutions the stated policy goal of sustainable 
forest management can never be achieved. In most developing countries, and Sierra 
Leone is no exception, the state has difficulty in properly transmitting its policy from the 
centre to the grassroots, owing to weak linkages over the large physical, cultural and 
social distances separating the core from the periphery. Factors contributing to this 
include a lack of fmancial, material and human resources; a centralised hierarchical 
organisational structure; policy distortions at various levels of the organisational 
hierarchy, and differences in perception between high-level government officials and rural 
populations at the grassroots. 
The arm of this chapter is to evaluate the institutional constraints on policy 
implementation in Sierra Leone. It uses an organisation theory model to compare ideal 
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implementation procedures with what actually happens in practice, and examine the 
structure and strength of forest management institutions, the institutional linkages for 
policy implementation, and the roles of the various actors involved, paying particular 
attention to the degree of compliance and relative efficiency of governmental and non-
governmental organisations. 
The fITst part of the chapter provides an overVIew of the degree of success in 
implementing stated and actual forest policies described in Chapter 5. The Forestry 
division's organisational structure and strength are assessed in parts two and three 
respectively. Part four assesses the influence of internal organisational linkages on the 
transmission of policy down the chain of command in both the Forestry Division and 
NGOs. Part five discusses the sharing of forest policy implementation between state 
organisations and NGOs in Sierra Leone. Part six evaluates the degree to which policy is 
conditioned by external actors. Comparisons between organisational features of the 
Forestry Division and NGOs are supported by the results of questionnaire surveys and 
informal interviews. 
6.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD 
The record of forest policy implementation in Sierra Leone IS not a good one. 
Admittedly, operations had been brought to a virtual standstill during World War I 
(GOSL, 1946). But seventeen years after the Forest Department was established, and 
seven years after an attempt to improve its performance by combining it with the 
Agriculture Department, a government evaluation stated that it had not been able to fulfil 
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its goal of combating forest destruction with any appreciable degree of success (GOSL, 
1930). Deforestation continued as before. The only forest safe from clearance was that in 
inaccessible areas. 
A change towards a more exploitative actual policy occurred in 1929 with the aim of 
achieving national self sufficiency in sawn timber production and making the Forestry 
Department pay for itself. To implement this the fIrst sawmill was established at Kenema 
and all operations (logging, processing and marketing) were run by the Forest Industries 
Branch of the Forestry Department. However, by 1939, only 17% of Sierra Leone's 
annual consumption of sawn timber came from domestic sources. 
Forestry activities peaked in Sierra Leone during World War II, when the Forestry 
Department opened a mangrove firewood mill and developed furniture and joinery 
industries and the British Army built and operated two large sawmills. Military 
involvement and strict government control over the timber trade enabled the country to 
meet the previous policy goal of self sufficiency and the new goal of contributing to the 
allied war effort (Evans, 1944; Cline-Cole, 1993). 
Full advantage was not taken of the possibility for a fresh start provided by the 1946 
Forest Policy. Deforestation continued, there was logging outside forest reserves, and no 
new forests were planted. New camps were established, supposedly to allow forest 
guards and rangers to keep a better eye on the forest reserves, but this did little to 
prevent exploitation. In the late 1950s, as Independence approached, forest management 
was hampered by rapid staff turnover and the breaks in continuity which this caused. 
148 
Despite the fine ideals in the Pre-Independence White Paper on Natural Resources 
produced by the colonial adrninistration deforestation continued after Independence in 
1961, as did logging outside forest reserves. A loan and credit scheme was started in 
1961 to support the establishment of plantations and other agricultural developments. 
But this merely resulted in the conversion of more forest land to agricultural uses. It was 
later phased out after having benefited only a select few. 
On the other hand, some of the former colonial forestry staff stayed on to help with 
forest management and training of local foresters. The Forestry Department became the 
Forestry Division of the new Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources. A 
new forest reserve was established at Gola North, and other reserves in the Moyamba 
District completed preliminary reservation procedures. Groups of Liberian squatters 
who were hunting, burning and fanning illegally in forest reserves were successfully 
removed. This was one of the first instances of insurgency affecting forests in Sierra 
Leone. 
One of the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of implementation between 1912 and 
1970 was the general lack of attention paid to surveying forests in Sierra Leone, which 
has been commented on by various authors (Lanly, 1981; Sayer et aI, 1992). In the 
colonial era forest inventories were confined to appraising the timber content of forest 
reserves that were reasonably accessible, rather than surveying the forest resources of the 
whole country, so it was difficult to make reliable estimates of the rate of deforestation, 
or of how much afforestation was needed to supply future needs for forest products. A 
map of the forest estate was produced in 1961 (DOS, nd), followed later by an F AO 
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survey of forest resources (Smithussen, 1977). The latest (and probably the first) 
definitive national forest survey seems to be that carried out for FAO using 1976 aerial 
photographs at 1 :70,000 scale). An assessment was also carried out by the UN 
Environment Programme in 1989 as part of a survey of forest in the whole of West 
Africa but it used low resolution (A VHRR) satellite imagery (Paivinen and Witt, 1989). 
However, the 1976 survey was chosen by FAO as the most reliable baseline for makina 
b 
its most recent estimate (FAO, 1993). 
The quality of forest management deteriorated in the 1970s when the election of the 
APC Government led to an even greater emphasis on forest exploitation than before. 
The number of sawmills rose in the 1970s and was accompanied by an expansion of 
logging activities by contractors employed by the sawmill companies. An Italian 
company, with government participation, was granted a concession to exploit the Gola 
East and Gola West reserves without any restrictions (GOSL, 1974), resulting in 
overlogging and the use of improper logging practices. These reserves were also 
exploited by the SILETI Company, whose logging practices had the worst reputation of 
all. At the same time the Panguma sawmills were logging the Nimini Hills reserves, and 
the Forest Industries Corporation was logging the Kambui and Gola North reserves. By 
1978, total roundwood production in Sierra Leone had reached 182,000 cubic metres. 
NGOs became an increasingly important group of actors in implementing forest policy in 
the 1980s, in a response to the inability of the Forestry Division to control the continuing 
deterioration in forest cover. They focused on afforestation rather than the protection 
and management of existing forests. For example, NGOs like CSSL played a significant 
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role in the nation-wide tree planting campaign in 1986. Besides its extensive agricultural 
and rural development programmes, the Wesleyan Church of Sierra Leone also 
established a number of tree crop nurseries. NGOs became important intermediaries to 
transmit grassroots concerns to the government. Although progress was made toward 
decentralising forest management, as called for in the 1988 Forest Act, popular 
participation was still limited, owing to the Forestry division's lack of financial and 
material resources, and later the disorder created in rural areas by the rebel insurgency. 
6.3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FORESTRY DIVISION 
6.3.1 The Bureaucratic Model 
An organisation's structure plays a key role in conditioning its behaviour. It influences 
communication between various parts of the organisation and the morale of its members. 
It may be considered unsatisfactory if it does not allow programmes to be executed as 
planned. The organisational structures of forestry departments in most tropical countries 
closely approximate to the ideal bureaucratic model of Weber (1952). This is a rational 
organisation with a hierarchical structure and formal rules, functioning by the actions of 
impersonal expert administrators who exercise authority so the wishes of those at the top 
are carried out by those at the bottom. Such a structure not only offers continuity but, 
according to Downs (1967) is essential for co-ordinating and managing large-scale 
activities. Other pluralist theorists believe that employees generally tend to resist the 
demands of their superiors in bureaucracies, which are therefore always at risk of 
dysfunctionality. 
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A major problem afflicting bureaucratic organisations is a tendency to be overcentralised. 
with professionals, administrators and funds concentrated at the top, leaving the lower 
levels understaffed and underfunded. Another has to do with the potential for intra-
organisational conflict created by increasing differentiation as an organisation grows in 
size and as departments with incompatible goals strive to maximise their individual shares 
of a common pool of resources, or engage in disputes over territory. Every part of an 
organisation is in ecological competition for more human, financial and material 
resources (Dunleavy, 1985). Organisations also compete among themselves. Different 
government departments often compete with each other for funds, territory and 
influence. For example, the Department of Agriculture and Department of Forestry may 
each want to use a particular area of land, but for a different purpose. So an appraisal of 
the effectiveness of an organisation should examine its structure, strength, linkages and 
ability to comply with stated policies and implementation procedures. 
6.3.2 The Forest Policy Implementation Process in Sierra Leone 
The institutional arrangements for forest policy implementation in Sierra Leone are 
hierarchical, comprising national level, regional level, and local level, and form a subset 
of the forest policy system described in Chapter 5 (Fig. 5.2). The implementation process 
starts with the development of a plan of operation by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. Although it is nominally the responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry to provide the mode of direction for action, the normal procedure is for the 
Minister to delegate that responsibility to technical forestry personnel at headquarters. In 
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developing the plan of operation, officials usually come under pressure from \'anous 
interest groups both within and outside the country. 
6.3.3 Structure of the Forestry Division 
6.3.3.1 1912-1962 
Formal forest management in Sierra Leone began in 1912 with the establishment of the 
Department of Forestry as an independent government department under Lane-Poole. It 
initially divided the country into two regions, the Colony and the Protectorate, for 
administrative purposes. 
In 1922 the Department of Forestry was amalgamated with the Department of 
Agriculture, ostensibly to increase efficiency but actually in order to cut costs. Foresters 
were forced to focus on agricultural work, such as establishing oil palm plantations, 
instead of protecting forests. This, and the differences in culture between the two former 
departments, created a good deal of antipathy between the agriculturalists and foresters. 
So the merger did not prove successful and the two departments became separate 
entities again in 1929. 
After 1930 the Forest Industries Branch of the Forestry Department became increasingly 
important. The first sawmill was established at Kenema and the Branch was responsible 
for all operations (logging, processing and marketing). After the outbreak of World War 
II it opened a mangrove firewood mill and developed furniture and joinery industries, 
The Royal Engineers Forestry Company built and operated two large sawmills, These 
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were closed down when the war ended but all the equipment was moved to Kenema 
where timber processing was consolidated. One third of the entire forest estate at that 
time (891 square kilometres) was allocated to the Kenema Sawmill. 
In 1960 the sawmill became a separate government department and the Forestrv 
Department no longer had control over how it exploited forests. The Colonial 
Administration also established another sawmill at Kasewe, but limits were imposed on 
its activities (GOSL, 1962/63). 
6.3.3.2 1962-1984 
In 1962, a year after Independence, the Department of Forestry became the Forestry 
Division of the new Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Forestry, though it 
retained a large measure of autonomy. The Chief Conservator of Forests remained the 
executive head of the Division, which was also made responsible for rubber development 
and wildlife conservation (GOSL, 1962/63). 
Between 1962 and 1984, the organisation of the Forestry Division was structured in such 
a way that the Chief Conservator of Forests and his headquarters staff were directly 
responsible for the overall direction and control of forestry staff in each of the four 
regions into which the country was divided. Most forestry activities were, like remaining 
productive forests in the country, concentrated in the eastern region. Each region was 
under the direction of a Regional Forester. Separate units were devoted to forestry 
research, training and utilisation (Fig. 6. I). 
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Once the plan of operation has been agreed, responsibility for implementing it is in the 
hands of national officials, such as the Chief Conservator of Forests and his staff, who 
have considerable discretionary powers. They give directives to Regional Forest Oftlcers. 
who come under pressure from interest groups and local beneficiaries. The physical 
management of forest then takes place at the local chiefdom or village levels under the 
control of District Forestry Officers, who themselves corne under pressure from other 
appointed or elected district level officials of government and NGOs, local target 
groups/beneficiaries, and local leaders such as Paramount Chiefs. In this structure the 
lines of responsibility, control and reporting were relatively clear cut, but somewhat long. 
Decision making was said to be slowed down by the length of the reporting chain 
(Atlanta, 1980). Another problem was the high degree of centralisation, so that 
everything revolved around the Chief Conservator, threatening a complete breakdown of 
authority in his absence. 
6.3.3.3 Post-l 984 
In 1984, the structure of the Ministry underwent major changes. In the new structure the 
field staff of each division (Forestry, Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Land and 
Water Development) now reported to the Chief Regional Officer in each of the newly 
created seven regions. The Chief Regional Officers reported in turn not to Division 
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Directors (like the Chief Conservator of Forests), but to the Director General of the 
Ministry, a newly created professional position below the Permanent Secretary (Fig. 6.2). 
The new, more decentralised, structure was a response to the recommendations made in 
the 1981182 FAO Forestry Review for achieving better forest management, conservation 
and afforestation, through more community participation and institutional strengthening. 
It could also be considered as a pretence on the part of the government to implement the 
FAO recommendations of 1981182 when, in reality, they were not committed to the 
implementation the recommendations. The restructuring was a ploy to appease other 
donor organisations that were committed to restructuring and revitalising the forest 
Division. 
Although the new structure shortened lines of communication between field staff and 
their immediate superiors, it also made communication between Division Directors and 
field staff more indirect - through the Director General and then the Chief Regional 
Officers. Moreover, the head of the Forestry Division (and those of the other divisions 
too) no longer had direct authority over his field staff, even though they came under his 
divisional budgets. So coordination was more difficult than in the past. 
Communication up the organisational hierarchy was officially the reverse of the above, 
and equally slow and awkward. For the sake of expediency, regional staff of each 
Division therefore continued to follow the old lines of communication, reporting directly 
to their Division directors, e.g. the Chief Conservator of Forests. With two channels of 
communication now operating there was great potential for confusion and contlicts, e.g. 
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at the top between Division heads and the Director General. The ne\v structure also 
created dual allegiance by subordinate staff at all levels. Forestry staff at the grassroots 
might seem to have been unaffected by changes at the top, but they could easily fall prey 
to conflicting instructions from separate superiors struggling for authority and control. 
If the disadvantages are so great why were the changes made? It could have been a 
simple attempt to decentralise power and control, in order to ensure greater public 
participation in forest management. Another reason may have been to reduce the 
influence of the Chief Conservator of Forests, who had dominated forest management in 
the country for decades. It could also have been a corruption control measure. A review 
of the new structure was recommended by the joint inter-agency forestry sector review 
mission set up under the auspices ofFAO and UNDP (Tsoukers, 1993). 
The new structure has had serious implications for forest policy implementation. The 
well defined chain of conllnand has been constantly breached by regional staff who 
continue to follow the old lines of communication. The more the Director General is 
bypassed the more likely he will consider it an attempt to sabotage his authority. Even 
though the Chief Conservator of Forests has nothing to do with this development, it 
might lead to all sorts of suspicions about his role, which would inevitably affect the 
effectiveness of policy implementation. The possibility for intra-organisational conflict is 
therefore very great. 
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6.4 ORGANISATIONAL STRENGTH 
6.4.1 Organisational Strength and Policy Implementation 
Constraints on policy implementation caused by limitations of organisational strength and 
structure are closely linked. The strength of an organisation refers to the total availability 
of personnel and other resources, and its structure to how these are arranged in different 
hierarchical levels and locations. Organisations usually try to influence their environment 
by how they use the resources available to them, establishing a network of power to 
achieve their goals and objectives. Those with limited and inadequate resources are 
sometimes dwarfed into insignificance by organisations with huge financial, material and 
human resources. 
The Forestry Division seems to have suffered from a chronic organisational weakness for 
most of its existence. But since most government departments in the country are also 
weak the Forestry Divisions problems do not seem to be just a consequence of 
inadequate policy. It therefore seems justified to regard policy limitations and 
institutional constraints as two separate - if interlinked - causes of poor forest 
management. 
6.4.2 Personnel Numbers 
Data were insufficient to monitor changes in the levels and distribution of forestry 
personnel in this century, though it is known that there was a drastic cut in staff levels 
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after the old Forestry Department was demerged from the Agriculture Department in 
1929. Further cuts were made in 1970, for although more funds were allocated for 
forestry development wages were also increased at the same time. 
On the basis of the best set of administrative records available, the Forestry Division 
currently has a staff of 15 professional foresters, 7 sub-professionals, 163 technical 
personnel and close to 900 other employees, a total of 1072 (Table 6.1). However, 
based on personal observations and interviews, the figure for "other employees" is not 
reliable. Established positions do not necessarily reflect appropriate staffing levels of the 
forestry division. For example, under the restructured Forestry Division, the established 
positions in the professional ranks were increased from 20 positions in 1987/88 to 29 
positions in 1988/89, but only about half (15 positions) are currently filled. Sub-
professional positions were also raised from 13 positions in 1987/88 to 17 positions in 
1988/89, but only one-third of these (7 positions) are filled (GOSL, 1989). This clearly 
substantiates the degree of understaffing within the Forestry Division in Sierra Leone, 
even though records of established positions provide a highly misleading picture of the 
reality. Alternative sources of employment data in the Forestry Division yielded slightly 
different numbers that could not be easily reconciled. 
The Forestry Division is subdivided into the rubber division and wildlife conservation. 
Even though the rubber division operates within the forest division, it has a separate 
budget. The rubber division is headquartered in the South from where it operates rubber 
plantations and extension operations to private plantation owners. The wildlife division 
operates within the forestry division and within its budget, with a small staff substantially 
South North North 
Western Eastern Southern Northern Western Western Central On 
Staff Headquaters Region Region Region Region Region Region Region Leave Total 
Professional 
Chief Conservator of Forests 1 
Deputy Chief Conservator 1 
Assistant Chief Conservator 1 
Senior Assistant Chief Conservator of forest 3 
Senior Forest Research Officer 1 1 
Assistant Conservator of Forest 3 7 
Forest Research Officer 1 
Sub-Professional 
Senior Forestor 3 
Forestor 1 
Assistant Forestor 3 
Technical 
0"-
Forest Supervisors 4 2 8 
Chief Forest Ranger 1 1 
Rangers 7 14 10 8 6 6 9 60 
Head Guards 4 3 1 2 10 
Forest Guards 16 17 13 10 4 12 12 84 
Other Employees 
2 22 23 20 8 14 17 9 2 115 
Other Staff 3 9 8 10 6 3 3 5 3 47 
Clerical & Accounts 3 104 164 161 109 72 59 53 3 725 
Labour - Permanent 
Total Employees 10 166 237 219 144 101 98 93 4 1072 
Table 6.1: Regional Distribution of Forestry Division Employees 
(Source: FAO, (1988) 
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less than the established positions. It is headed by a Game Superin tendent in FreetO\ n, 
with field staff located in each region . 
The wildlife conservation unit is badly understaffed relative to establishment level. , with 
only half of the established positions filled and mostl y at the technical level. The 
production and utilisation unit is operating at about one-quarter, but with the shortages 
of equipment and parts, lack of operation and perhaps direction is unnecessary. 
6.4.3 Levels of Financial and Material Resources 
The majority of Forestry Division staff questioned by the author acknowledged the low 
level of resources and equipment at their disposal (Table 6.2). Further personal 
observations and oral interviews revealed that even the headq uarters office has 
Table 6.2 The Opinion Of Employees Of The FD And NGOs About The Level Of 
Equipment And Resources Available To Them, Rated As High, Low and None And 
Expressed In Percentage 
insufficient resources to function on a daily basis, and the situation is much worse for 
regional and local offices. There has been a long-standing shortfall between budgeted 
expenditure and actual expenditure. For example, in the 1987/88 financial year, ac tu al 
spending was £6. 3 million compared to the approved budget es timate of only £5.4 
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million (Table 6.3). It is understood that the deficit was met by overseas aid. After the 
second coup d'etat in 1997, the institutional strength of the Forestry Division 
deteriorated further as it was looted, along with other government buildings, so it is 
hardly conducive as a place to work. 
The low level of operation of the forestry division was further exemplified by the fact 
that, in 1988/89 for example, the forestry division's estimated expenditure totalled Le 
9.88 million. Wages, salaries and allowances accounted for 90% of the estimates. 
Estimated expenditures on office supplies and equipment, travel, fuel, materials, etc., was 
Le 0.94 million and accounted for the other 10% of the budget. Not all of the funds 
allocated to other expenditures are spent, due to delays in purchasing approval and other 
factors. In 1986/87, the actual expenditures requiring purchasing approval were only Le 
42,500 although budgeted estimates for these items totalled Le 246,400, so that wages, 
salaries and allowances were 98% of actual spending. In 1987/88, wages, salaries and 
allowances were 95% of the projected actual spending. 
Conditions of service play a large part in influencing the morale of workers, their 
commitment to the management process, and hence the overall productivity of the 
organisation. The average salary of a Forestry Division employee, about LelO,OOO (ten 
thousands Leones) per month, cannot even buy a bag of rice - the staple food in the 
country. Some forestry staff may therefore be tempted to make ends meet by taking 
bribes in return for allowing people illegal access to forests, which suffer as a 
consequence. More than 80% of FD employees questioned were not satisfied with their 
working conditions (Table 6.4). This is not surprising given their dilapidated working 
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Table 6.3: Forestry Division Budget Estimates & Actual Expenditures 
Forestry Division - Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources & Forestry 
Expenditure 1986/87 
Personnel 
Salaries 
Wages 
Allowances (Medical transport) 
Total 
Budget 
Estimates 
Approved 
(Le' 000) 
617.8 
1,315.4 
23.1 
1,956.3 
Expenditures Requiring Expenditure Approval 
Overtime 1.0 
Transport, Fuel oil 45.0 
Total 46.0 
Expenditures Requiring Purchasing Approval 
Office and General 50.0 
Transport, Fuel oil 60.0 
Stoves 50.0 
Cablegrams, Postage 0.5 
Printing 2.0 
Office Furniture and Equipment 6.0 
Building Maintenance 10.0 
Purchase of Tree Seeds 2.0 
Agriculture Show 6.0 
Voluteer Support 12.0 
Urban tree Felling 6.0 
National Tree Planting Day 10.0 
Subscriptions 1.9 
Forestry Training School 15.0 
Upkeep of Bambawo Research 15.0 
& Training Centre 
Total 264.4 
Grand Total Expenditures 2,248.7 
Actual 
Spending 
(Le' 000) 
1,048.2 
2,518.3 
0.0 
3,566.5 
0.0 
32.2 
40.0 
9.7 
32.2 
0.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
42.5 
3,649.0 
1987/88 1988/89 
Budget Projected Budget Actual 
Estimates Actual Estimates Spending 
Approved Spending 
(Le' 000) (Le' 000) (Le' 000) (Le'OOO) 
1,909.8 1,922.6 2,035.8 
2,687.9 2,688.0 5,552.4 
227.9 1,299.5 1.354.7 
4,825.6 5,910.0 9,942.9 
1.5 0.0 1.5 
60.0 60.0 80.0 
61.5 60.0 81.5 
100.0 100.0 200.0 
80.0 80.0 200.0 
60.0 0.0 100.0 
5.0 0.0 10.0 
5.0 0.0 10.0 
50.0 16.4 60.0 
20.0 0.0 30.0 
10.0 0.0 20.0 
15.0 0.0 15.0 
20.0 8.7 20.0 
10.0 0.0 10.0 
20.0 20.0 50.0 
5.0 0.0 10.0 
30.0 25.1 50.0 
30.0 0.0 50.0 
440.0 250.2 855.0 
5,327.1 6,220.3 9,879.4 
Notes: 1. Expenditures cover the Forestry Division including Wild Life Conservation, Production Unit, and Utilization. 
The Rubber Division is not included. It operates under a separate budget 
2. Fiscal years July 1st to June 30th. 
3. 1986/87 Actual Salaries and Wages expenditures exceed the estimates as a result of a salary and wage 
increase of 70% to 100% in Feb. 1987. 
4. 1987/88 Projected Actual Spending based on six months actual expenditure July 1st - Dec 31st 1987, and 
anticipated expenditures Jan 1st - June 30th 1988. 
5. 1988/89 Actual Salaries and Wages will be 75% to 80% higher as a result of an approximate 100% increase 
in salaries and wages planned to be introduced in Oct 1988. 
Source: FAD (1988) 
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environments and low salaries and allowances. Even the most basic essentials for office 
and field work are sometimes lacking, so employees find it very difficult to perform to 
their maximum. 
This is not a new problem however. For as early as 1941, a report from the Acting 
Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that professional staff in the 
Forestry Department were demoralised by low pay and poor working conditions, even 
though at this time timber production was rising at a rapid rate (Blood, 1941). 
NGOs in Sierra Leone have much stronger organisations. A large number of the NGO 
personnel questioned believed they had high levels of resources and equipment (Table 
6.2). In reality, however, most NGOs simply have adequate resources to manage their 
affairs optimally. Those who complained of resource inadequacy mainly worked for 
smaller NGOs or pressure groups. These cannot function without support from larger 
NGOs and are usually involved in executing specific consultancies and forest 
management projects. 
Only 25% of NGO employees questioned expressed dissatisfaction with their working 
conditions (Table 6.4). Nevertheless, 42% of them were only partially satisfied, and 
observations and interviews revealed that an important reason for this was that they see 
expatriate counterparts with similar qualifications and experience enjoying much better 
conditions of service, although NGO salaries and working environments are superior to 
those in the FD. 
IAA 
Table 6.4 The Level Of Satisfaction With Working Conditions Of FD And NGO 
Employees, Expressed In Percentages 
Not 
Satisfied 
# 
90 
13 
103 
% 
87 
2S 
rotal 
The overall strength of an organisation can best be tested by analysing its weakest points. 
Employee interviews revealed lots of criticisms about the operations of the FD and far 
fewer criticisms of NGOs. Criticisms of the FD included lack of funds to complete 
projects, preferential treatment for a few at the expense of the many, bribery and 
corruption, back-stabbing, and too many barely literate staff at the grassroots. NGOs 
were most criticised for demanding very high standards of work and being heavy handed 
in dealing with allegations that require disciplinary action. 
6.4.4 Training Opportunities 
The lack of scope for employees to receive training to improve their skills also leads to 
dissatisfaction and poor morale. Training in forestry has been neglected in recent years. 
With the decline and closure of the Mano River Union Training Centre at Borni HiIJ in 
Liberia, training of forest rangers and guards has all but ceased. There has been a decline 
in the technical trainina of staff in other institutions in West and East Africa, and 
b 
overseas. No training courses are currently available in Sierra Leone. In recent year. 
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most of the training has been restricted to a few short courses and refre her COUL es 
with the Forestry Division and the Ministry generally. T hese were funded by aid agencie. 
and covered specific topics thought useful by the sponsoring agency, rather than the 
Forestry Division. 
Higher level pre-service and in-service training for forest management is also a thing of 
the past in Sierra Leone, and so very few trained individuals are available to implement 
the government's new stated policy on sustainable forest management. In fact, most of 
the forestry staff are barely literate and would not be able to benefit from advanced 
training. The shortage of training opportunities in the Forestry Division is unlikely to 
change in the short term because of lack of resources. NGO employees seemed from 
interviews and the author's personal observations to be better trained (Table 6.S ), mainly 
because NGOs usually prefer to employ people with outstanding academic capabilities 
and professional experience. Table 6.5 further substantiates the fact that employees 
within NGOs are better satisfied with the training opportunities ava ilable to them, quite 
unlike government employees who revealed a very high level of di ssati sfaction. 
Table 6.5 Opinions Of FD And NGO Employees About Their Level Of Satisfaction 
With The Quality Of training Opportunities, Expressed In Percentages 
Not 
Satisfied 
# 
59 
2 
61 
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6.4.5 Conformity With Job Specifications 
Employees can also become dissatisfied with their jobs if their duties do not corre po nd 
to their official job descriptions. About half of those interviewed in the FO believed that 
their actual jobs were different from what they were expected to do (Table 6.6) and 
personal observations and interviews suggested that an appreciable number of 
employees, especially at local levels, did not receive any written document at all which 
listed their duties. They relied wholly on verbal information and instructions from their 
immediate superiors, and most of the information they received did not give them a clear 
picture of what to expect. In contrast, most NGO employees interviewed stated that their 
job duties were as expected. Most NGOs in Sierra Leone seemed to ensure that they 
gave their employees detailed job descriptions and verbal explanations when there were 
any areas of doubt, though they are also expected to respond to emergencies that might 
require changes in duties. 
Table 6.6 The Percentage Of Employees Of The FD And NGOs Who Believed That 
Their Job Duties Were Directly Related To What They Expected To Do 
% 
50 
2 
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6.4.6 Level of Participation 
Employee commitment and morale is generally enhanced if they are involved in deci. ion 
making. About half the FD employees interviewed stated that they had ne er be n 
involved in making decisions that affected their work, while another 37% had seldom 
been involved (Table 6.7). Most decisions are made at headquarters and the only time 
that regional and local staff appear to be invo lved in decision making is when there i a 
crisis to be resolved and a meeting or brainstorming exercise is held . On the other hand , 
over half of NGO employees interviewed believed that they were fully in vo lved in 
making decisions that affected their work. They consider themselves more as partners in 
development than as superiors or subordinates. Such an attitude greatly enhances the 
commitment of employees to achieving the objectives of the organisation for which they 
work. 
Table 6.7 Opinions Of FD And NGO Employees About Their Level Of Involvement In 
Making Major Decisions That Affected Their Work, Expressed In Percentages 
% 
46 
2] 
. 
ai1\ff ;t 
Consultative meetings are essential for updating plans and evaluat ing progress within an 
organisation. A large number of interviewees within the FD said that con ultati ve 
meetings were never held, and when they were they only involved a few se le t 
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employees. Local staff are never asked to travel to attend such . 
meetmgs, though 
sometimes they may receive reports on the meeting - after a protracted period. NGOs 
hold frequent consultative meetings of this kind and normally have adequate resources to 
enable representatives to come from all levels of the organisation. 
6.4.7 Promotion Possibilities 
The potential to be promoted to increasingly higher levels of an organisation engenders 
hard work, determination and ambition among employees. Few FD staff questioned 
believed that there existed a promotion system which would enable the best qualified 
employee to rise to the top (Table 6.8). Appointments and promotions seemed to be the 
prerogative of the better qualified people already near the top of the organisation. Some 
employees complained of favouritism in appointments and promotions. NGOs, by 
contrast, tend to have more transparent promotion systems with required qualifications 
for all positions in the organisation, although promotion is hindered by the short -term 
nature of their projects. 
A high proportion of FD employees questioned felt the need for more opportunities to 
assume more important responsibilities within their organisation, and also more varied 
ones to relieve the boredom of routine tasks. Since there are large areas of forests to be 
managed, employees of both the FD and NGOs are regularly transferred from one job or 
area to another. Some transfers are accompanied by promotions, but they can also be 
carried out on disciplinary grounds, when an employee is not felt able to continue serving 
in a particular area or position. Opinions varied about the desirability of transfers, though 
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most employees were not bothered whether they were transferred or not. Mo t of th : 
who were opposed to transfers had got emotionally attached to their jobs and \\lanted 
them to remain that way for ever. Proposals for transfers were therefore iewed 
calculated efforts to rid them of all they had acquired over time. There were sugge tions 
that some employees preferred not to move because their successors might fllld out 
about past personal gains which, if reported, would lead to disciplinary action. 
Table 6.8 The Percentage Of FD And NGO Employees Who BeJi eved That There Was 
A Promotion System That Lets The Best Qualified Person Rise To The Top Of The ir 
Organisation 
Don't 
Know 
# % 
Total 
7 7 ,::;lQ4<, 
3 6 ii;~~< ~tf%' ; 
10 '>156 
:;~?-:. 
6.4.8 Compensating for Lack of Organisational Strength 
Weak organisations tend to rely on stronger organisations for support of various kinds. 
For example, forestry departments in many tropical countries lack either the power or the 
institutional strength to apprehend and charge those contravening forest laws. In the 
newly independent Sierra Leone the Forestry Division had to rely on the police to 
enforce these laws, but the police often left such matters to the Paramo unt Chief, 
resulting in very weak enforcement of forest laws which did not provide a deterrent ( 
violators. The District Councils which assisted in forest management at local I vel w · r 
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dissolved in 1972. The relative weakness of the Forestry Division, and the relative 
strength of NGOs involved in forestry activities, has, in the last twenty years, led to 
exchanges and alliances between them. 
6.5 INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY TRANSMISSION 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Good internal linkages are essential for the efficient transmission of policy down the 
chain of command in an organisation. The better these linkages are, the better the 
communication within the organisation, the higher the morale of staff, and the more 
effective the organisation is in implementing policy. This section evaluates the linkages in 
the Forestry Division and other government organisations in Sierra Leone, and compares 
them with similar linkages in NGOs. 
6.5.2 Factors Limiting Internal Linkages 
6.5.2.1 Poor Information Sharing 
Internal linkages within GOs in Sierra Leone are beset with a variety of problems, 
ranging from inadequate resources to a blatant refusal by employees to share information 
with each other. As corruption continues to be rife in high places, employees prefer to 
shroud their activities in secrecy instead of opening them up to other colleagues. This 
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seriously militates against team workina and the o-eneral efficl·eI1cy of th . . . b b e olganl. at lon a · 
a whole. 
Tabl~ 6.9 !h~ Opin.ions Of FD And NGO Employees About The Level Of Info rmation 
Shanng WIthIn TheIr Organisations, Expressed In Percentages 
None 
# % 
5 5 
0 0 
" .;~. 
5 
NB: + indicate not significantly different at 95% confidence level (Z = 0.87) 
A high percentage of the FD staff interviewed believed that there is a high level of 
information sharing in their organisation (Table 6.9). However, personal observations by 
the author suggested the opposite is the case. Lines of communication in the Forestry 
Division cannot be maintained over a protracted period. Forestry staff must so met imes 
revert to passing instructions by word of mouth in order to cut costs. This can lead to 
misinterpretations and misunderstandings that invariably hamper policy implementation . 
Most of the NGOs studied appear to have adequate resources to establish and maintain 
internal linkages among their staff These are strengthened by periodic con ultative 
meetings, brainstorming exercises and impromptu interviews and discussions to asse . 
employee satisfaction. Interviews carried out by the author, together with adrnin istrati e 
records and other material consulted, revealed that NGOs take great pains to keep th ir 
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employees updated on developments. This is constrained by the poor po tal ~ er ice in 
the country - employees in poorly accessible areas hardly receive circulars, and when 
they do they are obsolete by the time they receive them. NGOs try to counter thi , 
however, by holding meetings, even in the least accessible areas. 
6.5.2.2 Freedom of Expression 
An essential component of information sharing within an organisation concerns the 
ability of employees to express their personal views to fellow employees without fear or 
favour. Just under 50% of those interviewed in GOs believed that they were always free 
to express their opinions (Table 6.10). Further discussions and personal observations 
revealed that much effort is made within the Forestry Division to encourage free 
expression, but it remains difficult because of fear of victimisation. Employees at 
grassroots level have hardly any contact with senior staff to whom they can express 
opinions, and there are only limited resources for managers to survey the opinions of 
their staff. 
Table 6.10 The Percentage Of FD and NGO Employees Who Believed That There Was 
Freedom To Express Personal Opinion To Other Workers Within Their Organisations 
Never 
Free 
. # % 
9 9 
0 0 
9 
NB: * indicate significantly different at 95% confidence level (Z = 2.38) 
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NGO employees felt they have a considerable freedom to express their views, without 
fear of victimisation, on issues that affect their jobs within the organisation. This enables 
employers to continually develop ways to improve their working environment and the 
implementation process as a whole. A majority of those questioned also felt that there is 
always a cordial working relationship among staff. Most NGOs also provide welfare 
services for employees who encounter personal difficulties due to work-related 
problems. Good morale and adequate funds also helps to ensure that NGO staff are less 
susceptible to being corrupted by external actors. 
6.5.3 Internal Attenuation of Policy 
6.5.3.1 Attenuation Down the Chain o.fCummand 
In an ideal organisation that behaves in a perfectly efficient and homogeneous manner 
there is full compliance by employees at all levels of the organisational hierarchy with 
policy formulated at the top. But organisations do not behave so perfectly in the real 
world and the stark deviations between stated policy and policy as actually implemented 
reflect a cumulative lack of internal compliance, as well as influences by external actors, 
which results in an attenuation of policy as it passes down the chain of command. 
6.5.3.2 Perceptions of Compliance 
It is difficult to make an objective measure of degree of compliance, but it was striking 
that whereas 71 % of FD employees questioned believed that forest policy was seldom 
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implemented successfully, 73 % of NGO employees believed that the fo re t projecL f 
their organisations were fully implemented (Table 6.11 ). Of course, it co uld be aroued 
o 
that NGO projects are more limited in scope than government forestry programme and 
are therefore easier to implement. They do not have to respond to as many demand 
from a great diversity of interests, which is what FD employees must try to do with their 
meagre finances. Many of the FD employees questioned felt that the situation cou ld be 
improved, provided that employees were more involved in decision making in theu· 
organisations. 
Table 6.11 The opinions Of Employees Of The FD And NGOs About The Rate Of 
Successful Implementation Of Forest policies (FDs) And Projects (NGOs) Within Their 
Organisations Expressed In Percentages 
6.5.3.3 Discretionary Action at the Top of the Chain 
% 
9 
2 
Forty years of reliance on the 1946 Forest Policy, with its out of date clauses concerning 
levies, for example, created great ambiguity about forest policy and gave administrators 
considerable discretion in decision making. This allowed many dubious deal and 
contracts to be signed with various groups and individuals, so they could exploit fore t · 
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without paying hardly anything to the bO"overnment in return GI-eed 'lnd pe··o I . 
. ~ I" na gam 
took precedence even over the environmental concerns stated in the 1946 policy. 
While the 1988 Forest Act was supposedly more up-to-date, clauses inserted in it under 
pressure from senior politicians, civil servants and the business elite, allowed the Chief 
Conservator of Forests to retain considerable power and discretion. For example, he can 
grant licences for timber exploitation without any specific terms of reference. This gives 
great scope for abuse by timber firms. According to FAO (1988), the new Act needed to 
be accompanied by a corresponding set of forestry regulations to make the Forestry 
Division function better at regional and local levels. 
6.5.3.4 Attenuation Further Down the Chain 
Authority can decay as policy is transmitted from the top of the organisational hierarchy 
to the bottom, and this gives scope for policy to be modified. Detailed information about 
the mechanisms involved in this is difficult to obtain, but it is apparent in the way in 
which different parts of an organisation devise different policies, or employees cling to 
very out-of-date policies, so that forests are exploited at scarcely any cost. This means 
that exploitation of forests is perpetuated even if the stated policy has become more 
protectionist. 
In theory, the greater the distance from the top of the organisational hierarchy, the 
greater the chance that policy will be distorted and escape detection and monitoring 
(Down, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). This partly explains the poor 
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implementation of forest policy at grassroots level. Some measure of thi ' attenuat i n I. 
that almost 70% of FD employees believed that the success of policy implementat i n was 
related to frequent contacts with headquarters (Table 6.12) . This reflect the er 
centralised structure of the FDs. Oral interviews revealed that owing to the poor 
communication network and lack of information technology, instructions from 
headquarters are often badly distorted by the time they reach grassroots level. 
Table 6.12 The Percentage Of Employees Of The FD And NGOs Who Believed That 
The Success Of Policy Implementation.Was Associated With A High Frequency Of 
Contacts With Their Headquarters Offices 
Don't 
Know 
# % 
14 14 
0 0 
14 
This is in stark contrast to the perceptions of NGO employees, 77% of whom believed 
that successful implementation did not depend on frequency of contacts with 
headquarters. This probably reflects their better communication systems, so that 
information can be transmitted to distant areas without difficulty. However, because 
NGO structures are usually more decentralised, direct contract with the centre is of less 
significance. They normally have networks of well staffed and effective regional and local 
offices with adequate funds to ensure proper co-ordination of their act ivities. The FO 
also has regional and local offices, but too few resources to function adequately. 
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The greater the level of discretion in implementing policy on the part of employee - the 
greater the chance that policy will be attenuated in going down the chain of command. 
However, more than 70% of FD employees questioned stated they had no discretion in 
implementing policy. The corresponding figure for NGO employees, on the other hand , 
was only 40% (Table 6.13). This reflects the more decentralised Structure of NGOs, and 
the fact that they tend to focus on specific projects to which individual employees are 
likely to have a chance of making inputs at the design and implementation stage. The 
level of discretion is sometimes dependent on the source of funding. For example, if 
contingencies arise which demand a change in the initial plan, an NGO implementing a 
self-funded project might easily be able to make changes, but if it depends on 
government funds this may only be possible after detailed scrutiny by the government. 
One important caveat to the argument that physical and/or organisational distance plays a 
part in attenuating policy is that there is still considerable forest cover on the Freetown 
Peninsula, very close to the capital city, and yet it is as badly managed as forests in more 
distant parts of the country. 
Table 6.13 The Opinions Of FD And NGO Employees About The Level Of Discretion 
Granted To Them By Their Organisations In Implementing Forest Policy , Expressed In 
Percentages 
75 
21 
96 
% 
72 
4 1 
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6.6 SHARING OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
6.6.1 Structuring the Diversity of Implementing Organisations 
Although the Forestry Division has the major responsibility for implementing forest 
policy, it also cooperates with other governmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations who also have a share in implementation. Over four fifths of FD employees 
and all the NGO employees questioned were aware of this shared responsibility (Table 
6.14). The effectiveness of forest policy implementation therefore depends on the 
effectiveness of multiple organisations and the links between them. This section analyses 
these linkages in three main groups: those between the FD and other GOs; those between 
the FD and NGOs; and those between NGOs and NGOs. 
Table 6.14 The Percentage Of FD And NGO Employees Who Believed That The 
Implementation Of Forest Policy Is shared With Other Organisations 
NB: + indicate not significantly different at 95% confidence level (Z = 0.5 1) 
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6.6.2 Cooperation With Other GOs 
The Forestry Division cooperates with, and coordinates the work of other government 
departments in the forest sector, including the Ministry of Lands, Housing and the 
Environment (MLHE), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Rural Development 
(MIARD) and the Ministry of Development (MOD). 
Various consortia of ministries have been formed to coordinate the formulation and 
environmental and development policies. For example, the National Environmental 
Policy of 1992 was developed by the MLHE in close consultation with other government 
departments, such as MANR&F and MIARD. Development projects funded by the 
government must now conform with the conditions in the new policy. Senior ministers 
and officials have been requested to lend their support on a number of occasions to the 
implementation of projects undertaken by the Forestry Division, for example tree 
planting ceremonies undertaken during the National Tree Planting Drive. Another reason 
for collaboration between departments is to save costs. For example, the Forestry 
Division relies on the Department of Lands and Surveys to map forest reserves and 
develop structural plans because they have the necessary expertise and equipment. 
6.6.3 Working Relationships Between The FD and NGOs 
NGOs also contribute to the implementation of forest policy, by funding and/or 
coordinating forestry or forestry-related projects, which are mainly to do with 
afforestation or the provision of alternative sources of livelihoods for forest -edge 
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communities who would otherwise cause more deforestation. NGO activities in 
afforestation therefore complement the work of the Forestry Division 1I1 manaaina 
b b 
existing forests. 
Working relationships between the FD and NGOs have been close since the early 1980s. 
to the extent that now some government employees even consider NGOs as under an 
obligation to serve the government. According to administrative records in the Forestry 
Division, most forest management activities in recent decades have involved some 
support from an international donor organisation or the participation of a national NGO. 
Despite the common acceptance that forest policy implementation is a shared 
responsibility, Forestry Division employees at the grassroots level are sometimes 
unaware of such arrangements and believe that all forestry activity is the work of their 
own organisation. 
The growing role of NGOs has been partly dictated by external donor organisations. 
The Forestry Division and other GOs have been heavily dependent on grants and loans 
from external donor organisations for some time. This places it in a vulnerable position, 
so it has had to modify its activities to suit the wishes of these organisations. Thus, the 
new Forest Policy of 1988, and the decentralisation of forest management, were all 
essentially based on the recommendations of external donor organisations. Because of 
the poor performance of previous projects executed by the government, and the 
fraudulent conversion of project funds to personal use, donors have increasingly turned 
to organisations independent of the government to implement their programmes. 
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Close relationships between the FD and NGOs have also been fostered by the chronic 
lack of funds for the Forestry Division, compared with the adequate resources available 
for most NGOs. Besides undertaking their own specific projects, NGOs share 
information with other GOs and NGOs on possible projects and sources of funding, and 
provide expert advice on recent developments in forest management techniques and their 
potential application to Sierra Leone. There is also some sharing of equipment, although 
this is mainly restricted to obsolete survey and agricultural tools and office equipment. 
Sharing of personnel is common too, but mainly involves the use of expert and technical 
staff for consultancies. NGOs use Forestry Division staff and the Forestry Division uses 
NGO expert staff, as required. However, for actual implementation of their forestry 
projects, NGOs tend to recruit their own staff rather than using Forestry Division 
workers. 
6.6.4 Relationships between NGOs and Other NGOs 
There is a clear hierarchy of NGOs working in Sierra Leone. They can be divided into 
two broad types: (a) large NGOs, which support both GOs and other NGOs in forestry 
projects; and (b) smaller NGOs which mainly operate at the grassroots and rely on the 
larger NGOs for support. There is symbiosis between the two groups, since the larger 
ones have sufficient funds and expertise, but the smaller ones have national networks of 
staff and contacts. Groups of small NGOs also form coalitions to increase their 
effecti veness. 
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6.7 EXTERNAL ATTENUATION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
6.7.1 Attenuation Down the Chain of Command 
Like all open systems, organisations are influenced by a range of external factors that 
shape their operations (Burns and Stalker, 1961) and so a variety of external forces can 
attenuate policy as it is transmitted down the organisational hierarchy. Such influences 
can be either formal or informal (Grainger, 1996). 
Formal influences are those that result from the overt interventions of individuals or 
organisations who either lobby or have the power to demand change at specific levels in 
the change of command, e.g. regional civil servants, traditional rulers, political aspirants 
or even villagers exercising their property rights. Examples of such intervention are when 
traditional Paramount Chiefs take it upon themselves to determine what happens to 
forests within their personal jurisdiction, usually to satisfy their personal needs. Forest 
guards and rangers then get caught between implementing the stated policy of the Forest 
Division and meeting the needs of a traditional ruler who has the power to remove them 
from the Chiefdom - a dual allegiance problem which is a no-win situation for all 
concerned and which badly distorts forest policies. 
Informal interventions occur when very influential people in high places exert 
tremendous pressures and control over those implementing forest policy, and either 
convince or coerce them to ignore forestry regulations. These relationships are usually 
closely related to family or monetary ties. People with the right connections tw"ough such 
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informal ties are likely to recklessly exploit forest resources. They are regarded by people 
in local communities as alien invaders whose activities are inimical to the sustainabilitv of 
local forests. 
After the All Peoples Congress Party (APC) came to power, following the General 
Election of 1967, there was a noticeable increase in the illegal harvesting of the few 
remaining roadside forest reserves, due to the vested interests of some politicians and 
their local representatives. Professional foresters found it very difficult to operate under 
such conditions because bringing the culprits to justice would offend their political 
backers and could cost the foresters their jobs and even lead to serious injury. 
Such external pressures are a very sensitive subject among all employees. Over ninety 
percent of FD employees questioned acknowledged that such pressures were important. 
More than 70% of NGO employees said they were also influenced by external pressures 
(Table 6.15). Further questioning revealed that both FD and NGO employees faced 
external pressures of some kinds, although FD employees were obliged to respond to 
them, e.g. to keep their jobs, whereas NGO employees did not have to, and hardly ever 
did. The largest pressures were applied to employees at headquarters (e.g. from donor 
organisations, Ministers, and the general public) and local level (from traditional rulers 
and the general public). Officials in regional levels experienced fewer pressures. 
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Table 6.15 The Percentage Of FD And NGO Employees Who Believed That Their 
Organisations Were Influenced By External Forces 
Don't 
Know 
# % 
Total 
Responses 
2 2 104 
3 6 ~.··· 52 
5 ;;tt7$9 ... , 
NB: * indicate significantly different at 95% confidence level (Z = 3.64) 
6.7.2 Clashes Between Bureaucratic and Local Cultures 
Clashes can also occur between the culture of an organisation, such as the Forestry 
Division which is dominated by forest exploitation and quasi-military control of forest 
resources, and local cultures, which take a more protectionist stance in order to preserve 
the sustainability of the supplies of food, fuel and other forest products on which they 
depend. This can sour relationships between forestry personnel and local people and 
make the latter unwilling to support forest protection. In the 1970s rural people, 
especially those in the Southern and Eastern Provinces where forests and other natural 
resources are concentrated, became increasingly frustrated at being excluded from the 
forests by a corrupt government intent on exploiting forests for the benefit of a select 
few. So when rebels from Liberia invaded in 1992 they were welcomed as liberators by 
these marginalised people. 
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Bureaucratic cultures can also conflict with formalised local institutions. For example, 
the land tenure system, which allows families to have access to vast areas of land. 
Usually, the more influential a person is, the more access they have to land. Traditional 
rulers, in particular, have been known to convert community land to private uses and 
even prevent the government from having access to public land. But sometimes local 
institutions can exert a protective influence. For example, the emergence of village 
development committees has served as a real force to control the illegal forest 
exploitation which the government has been unable to prevent itself. 
6.7.3 Influence of Military Rule on Organisational Behaviour 
In 1992, two years before the field work was undertaken for this project, Sierra Leone 
changed from a one-party State to a military dictatorship. FD and NGO employees 
questioned - while the Junta was still in power - were evenly divided as to whether the 
change in government had had any effect on the efficiency of their organisation'S 
operations (Table 6.16). Informal discussions revealed that the new regime had reduced 
a lot of bureaucracy, especially within the Forestry Division, so forest management 
decisions could be reached much faster than before and appropriate actions taken. The 
Junta introduced National Social Mobilisation Squads all over the country that later 
provided a mechanism for it to gauge grassroots opinion. 
Table 6.16 The Percentage Of FD And NGO Employees Who Believed That Th ' . 
O 
. . ell 
rgal11SatlOns Was More Effective Under The NPRC Military Reg ime Than It a ' 
Before 1992 
Don't 
Know 
# 
23 
15 
38 
Total 
~ 
% 
::.:::~ 
22 <t04 
29 ,52 ~/ .~~~~:: .. ~:., '~;~. x 
·· 156 " 
.::.;: "..;:. 
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On the other hand, there were isolated instances of excessively harsh suspenslO n o r 
dismissal for minor offences. Even the Chief Conservator of Forests was once 
automatically suspended by the Deputy Chairman of the National Provi ional Ruling 
Council (NPRC) for reporting late to work. Some employees also complained of undue 
harassment or molestation. Others merely became more dedicated to their duties, out of 
fear , or respect for themselves and the military Junta. A terrified and demoralised 
forestry staff was left at the mercy of a ruthless and egotistical government of young 
adults making spontaneous decisions and expecting them to be obeyed without question. 
Under the Junta, government workers were obliged to respond to specific inst ructions 
from military men who were ready and willing to apply brute force to achieve their 
demands. What was stated on paper was only for official purposes. Most of the yo ung 
leaders sought to enrich themselves quickly and build lavish houses for which they used 
free timber from the forests. Vehicles belonging to the Forestry Division and other 
government departments were diverted to private use on the pretext of national securit y 
purposes. The stringent forest policies enunciated by the Junta were simply a de ice LO 
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prevent the public from exploiting forest resources so the Junta could exploit them 
instead. 
When a democratic government assumed power in March 1996 it reintroduced more 
civil codes of personnel management. However, the recent coup of 25 May 1997 has left 
the new military Junta still trying to establish any form of controL Sierra Leone is now in 
a state of chaos, as the army and rebels form an unlikely ruling coalition. 
6.7.4 Forest Policy Implementation in a Disordered Countryside 
Forestry departments in most developing countries have found it difficult to implement 
policy effectively in distant rural areas, but this is made even worse when there is 
widespread civil unrest there. Over the last six years Sierra Leone has been plagued by a 
rebel war which has claimed tens of thousands of lives, left millions displaced, 
dispossessed and maimed, and eroded government control over peripheral areas under 
rebel control. 
The war broke out because of a rebel insurgency from neighbouring Liberia (Richards, 
1996). The rebels quickly established control over the diamond-rich areas of the Eastern 
and Southern Provinces, and used the forests as a safe haven to hide from government 
soldiers. Since most of the war was fought in the forests, foresters had to flee for their 
lives and the whole forest management system was thrown into chaos. The rebels 
carried out extensive illegal logging to give them a source of income so they could 
continue their war. They were joined by marginal people from Sierra Leone, who now 
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had a chance to exploit forest resources without any interference from the government. 
The forests became no-go areas for the government and large areas of forests in the 
southern and eastern regions were destroyed by military bombardment. 
As a result of this disorder, regional forestry staff had to be redeployed to headquarters 
or to safer areas. There has also been a massive resettlement and rehabilitation of 
refugees which in some areas required clearing forest land for make-shift shelters. The 
war made it difficult for any new forest management plans to be developed without first 
removing the rebels. The rate of deforestation rose as migrants to safe areas cleared 
forest to earn income or provide land for farming. Peace and stability has therefore 
become a more important issue than environmental preservation, and a large proportion 
of the national budget has been devoted to trying to curb the rebels. Several attempts to 
negotiate with them failed, as they were unwilling to surrender their safe haven and 
source of income. In fact, their demands actually widened over time, and they even 
demanded to share power with the government. The instability caused by the rebel war 
resulted in the overthrow of the APC regime in 1992, and triggered the further coups in 
1996 and 1997. 
Implementation of forest policy has come to a standstill as most donor organisations and 
NGOs have temporarily suspended and/or reduced the scale of their operations. Even 
the vehicles ofNGOs have been impounded by rebels or sobels (a new term that refers to 
soldiers collaborating with the rebels). The overall result of the civil war has been to 
make forests inaccessible to state institutions, leaving those actors who control 
peripheral areas to abuse forests at will. 
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6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of forest policy implementation in Sierra Leone reveal that poor forest 
management in Sierra Leone could also be attributed to poor policy implementation. 
Even though this is often blamed on weak institutions, the real causes are more complex, 
as revealed by an organisational theory model by Grainger (1996) which was applied to 
the Sierra Leone forest management context. The effectiveness of forest policy 
implementation in Sierra Leone is constrained by poor organisational structure, strength, 
linkages and the internal and external conditioning of policy as it moves down the chain 
of command. 
Institutional arrangements for forest policy implementation in Sierra Leone are highly 
centralised, with professional and administrative staff and funds concentrated at the top 
or centre, leaving the lower levels even more grossly understaffed and underfunded. 
There is also great potential for intra-organisational conflicts, created by increasing 
differentiation as organisations grow in size, and as departments with different goals 
strive to maximise their share of a common pool of resources resulting in competition. 
For example, the amalgamation of the Forestry and Agriculture departments, first in 
1922 and then again in 1962, created antipathy between the two departments as they 
competed for the meagre resources. The Forestry Department usually ended up being 
the loser as the Sierra Leone government attached more importance to agriculture. The 
structure of the Forestry Division was changed in 1984 to provide for more 
decentralisation, but the long and awkward reporting lines served as a major impediment 
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to effective communication. The attempt by some employees to resort to the old 
reporting line resulted in dual allegiance and conflicts. 
There is a close link between constraints of organisational structure and strength. Lack 
of adequate personnel, fmancial and material resources are major constraints to forest 
policy implementation in Sierra Leone. Due to the chronic weakness of policy 
implementing organisations in Sierra Leone, they suffer from very poor conditions of 
service, job duties were unrelated to what was expected, inadequate training 
opportunities and a constant shortfall between income and expenditure which makes it 
very difficult for them to function effectively. Forest policy implementing organisations 
usually compensate for this lack of strength by relinquishing their rights to punish 
poachers, for example, to Traditional Rulers like Paramount Chiefs. 
Good linkages are essential for policy implementation. The better the linkages, the better 
the communication network, the higher the morale and the more effective the 
organisation in implementing forest policy. However, in Sierra Leone, poor information 
sharing and lack of freedom of expression seriously limit internal linkages. The weak 
external linkages over large physical and social distances separating the centre from the 
grassroots limit the ability of implementing organisations to properly transmit policy from 
the centre to the grassroots. This is symptomatic of the State's inability to exercise 
control over peripheral areas from the core. Structured and unstructured interviews 
carried out by this author revealed that employees compensate for this by keeping in 
contact with the centre to the best of their abilities, which is really not much. Various 
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linkages have been formed to coordinate implementation in a bid to reap the advantages 
'--
of collective strength. 
If organisations behave in a perfectly efficient and homogeneous ways, then policy 
formulated at the top should be successfully implemented at the grassroots as planned, 
but forest management organisations in Sierra Leone don't function like this. Stark 
deviations occur between stated policy and policy as implemented. As such, 
implementing organisations have not been able to stem the tide of forest depletion due to 
poor rate of successful forest policy implementation. This could be attributed to both the 
internal and external conditioning of policy as it moves down the chain of command. 
The interviews revealed a very low level of morale among employees of government 
organisations, unlike their NGO counterparts. They had little or no involvement 111 
making decisions that affected their work. All major decisions were made at 
headquarters, and district and local level staff only got involved when there was a crisis 
to be resolved. Consultative meetings for updating plans and evaluating progress were 
also restricted to a few senior employees at the top. There is no promotion system to 
ensure that the best qualified person rises to the top. Appointments and promotions are 
the prerogative of the better qualified that are already near the top. This system creates 
room for favouritism. So many discretionary powers are given to the administrators, 
such as the Chief Conservator of Forests, that these can be abused to distort policy. Due 
to poor institutional linkages and poor communication networks, instructions from 
headquarters become distorted as authority decays down the chain of command with 
distance from the top of the hierarchy. 
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Forest policy implementation is also subject to a number of other forces which tend to 
distort the course of implementation. Clashes between bureaucratic culture (which is 
officially protective) and local cultures (which depend on the forests for their sustenance) 
creates room for conflicts and distortion of policy at the grassroots, especially when local 
communities are not involved in developing such policies. Two coup d'etat, and the 
subsequent dismantling of democratic principles and State authority have created much 
confusion which has had a further detrimental effect on policy implementation. The rebel 
war which has resulted in a disordered countryside and led to the redeployment of 
forestry staff, has further compounded the government's inability to exercise control 
over forests in peripheral areas. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter summarises the major findings of this research into forest policy formulation 
and implementation in Sierra Leone, assesses the limitations of the study and makes 
recommendations for future research priorities and for policy changes by the government 
of Sierra Leone and international development agencies. 
7.2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
The aim of this research was to identify the reasons for inadequate forest policies and 
policy implementation in Sierra Leone, a country in which forests have been so heavily 
depleted that sustainable forest management would have been expected to have been 
introduced by now. Only three forest policies have been published by the government -
in 1912, 1946 and 1988. All of them have had protectionist goals, but these have heen 
formally contradicted by written directives in 1929 and 1969 that favoured a more 
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exploitative approach. Since 1922 the actual polic.y of the government seems to have 
been one of exploitation, not protection and sustainable management. Reliance on out-
of-date policies gave great scope for ambiguity, and allowed the government to pursue 
this hidden agenda. 
The reasons for changes in policies have been analysed usmg a balance of policy 
pressures model in a regulatory output sense that assesses changes in the relative 
influence of major policy actors. The dominant actors since 1912 have been the 
Executive and the Bureaucracy, subject to varying degrees of pressure from the 
country's Business Elite. The interests of the Executive and the local Business Elite 
became increasingly intertwined after Independence in 1961, and after a change in 
government in 1969, policy ambiguity enabled patronage and corruption to proliferate, 
and deforestation and forest degradation became far worse than in the colonial era. The 
need for a new forest policy was recognised by the government in 1981, but it took until 
1988 for one to be published. The main pressures for change came largely from overseas 
donor organisations. NGOs and other interest groups exerting protectionist pressures 
did not emerge until the 1980s and they still have insufficient influence to force a change 
to a more protectionist policy. This has not been helped by a general decline in the level 
of democracy and pluralism since Independence. 
Poor policy implementation is often blamed on weak institutions but the true cause is 
more complex, as revealed by an analysis using an organisation theory model. 
Effectiveness of forest policy implementation in Sierra Leone after Independence was 
constrained by poor organisational strength, an organisational structure with a clear 
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chain of command but long reporting lines, a high level of discretion allowed to senior 
staff of the Forestry Division, and external conditioning of policy down the chain of 
command, e.g. by Paramount Chiefs. Because the strength of all government institutions 
in Sierra Leone is poor, the influence of institutional constraints on forest policy 
implementation seems to be separate from policy inadequacy. The organisational 
structure was changed in 1984 to facilitate more decentralised forest management, but it 
has made lines of communication more indirect and the use of old reporting lines has led 
to confusion and dual allegiance. 
Efficiency of policy transmission down the chain of command is also reduced by poor 
compliance. A survey of Forestry Division personnel, using a questionnaire and informal 
interviews, found that morale is poor because of lack of freedom to express opinions, 
poor conditions of service, dilapidated working environments, a low level of equipment, 
low salaries, lack of opportunities for training and promotion, and lack of participation 
in policy formulation. As in other countries, the ability of government to manage forest 
resources in peripheral areas is limited by the long physical and social distance from the 
core, and this has been further eroded since 1991 by the rebel insurgency in the southern 
and eastern provinces which forced forestry staff to withdraw from these areas. But 
there is still extensive forest on the Freetown Peninsula adjacent to the core of the 
country, and this is poorly managed too. Although NGOs are still too weak to exert an 
influence on forest policy formulation they have taken action themselves to help 
implement national forest policy by undertaking afforestation projects, thereby 
complementing the role of the government in managing and protecting existing forests. 
Thus, the belief of some environmentalist groups that the probleI11 of . 
pOOl management 
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of tropical forests will be easily solved if governments committed themselves to 
introducing improved policies geared towards sustainable forest management would 
seem to be misplaced. Things are not quite as straightforward as originally anticipated. 
Few tropical countries have published forest policies and in those that do the policies are 
often out of date and do not correspond to what actually happens on the ground, and the 
government usually lacks the institutional capability to implement its policy by 
monitoring and regulating forest management. This is the current situation in Sierra 
Leone. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
7.3.1 Limitations of Field Study 
The execution of this research has not been without limitations. The major limitation of 
the study had to do with the fact that Sierra Leone was plunged into a rebel war during 
the field study, and this placed serious limitations on the researcher's freedom of 
movement. Most of the travel to these communities, was done under military escort. 
This arrangement greatly restricted the duration of stay within local forest communities 
for safety and other reasons. Some of the areas visited were already deserted and 
alternative arrangements had to be made to visit other areas not hitherto planned. Most 
of the highways had been ambushed by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
and the researcher had a number of near brushes with death which made data collection 
very difficult 
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The air of uncertainty hanging over the country during this period made it extremely 
difficult for the researcher to establish a good rapport with suspicious respondents. It 
therefore took a lot of confidence building before the required information could be 
elicited from them. The researcher had to be extremely careful in conductino the 
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unstructured interviews and observation skills in order to avoid being mistaken for a 
rebel on an information gathering assignment. This was one major reason for the 
recourse to military assistance with travelling arrangements, and the military presence 
even made the situation more difficult. Local communities had no confidence in them as 
they had been associated with earlier raids and looting on defenceless peaceful citizens. 
It took a lot of explaining for an uneasy calm to be maintained during the visits. 
Because of these constraints, not all of the proposed forest communities were visited. 
Some of the forest reserves like the Gola East and West were already declared as no-go 
areas. The Gori Hills were also under rebel control. The Nimini, Dodo and Gboi Hills 
fell to the rebels a few weeks after the researcher's second visit. However, most of the 
reserves in the North and Western areas of the country were relatively safe and posed 
little difficulty for data collection, while a good number of forest reserves in the South 
and Eastern parts of the country were quite unsafe. 
Data collection within government departments also proved extremely difficult, due to 
the paucity of information on actual forest policies in Sierra Leone even within the 
Forestry Division of MANR&F and the National Documentation Centre (NADOC). It 
was disappointing to discover that the Forestry Division could hardly provide any copy 
of the three formal forest policies published by the government so far. Most of the 
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information provided had to do with projects and programmes funded by international 
donor organisations. Even though some of these documents made reference to the 
stated policies, the stated policies themselves were nowhere to be found. Administerin o 
o 
the questionnaire and interviews also proved very difficult, as officials did not want to 
subject themselves to what they might have perceived as a gruesome grilling on policy 
issues, to which they actually hardly gave any thought. Some of the questionnaires were 
purportedly misplaced and had to be re-administered. Some government officials even 
asked to be paid to respond to questions. 
The restricted budget and time constraints as the fieldwork had to be completed within a 
certain time frame placed major limitations on the researcher. The fieldwork turned out 
to be far more expensive than anticipated due to the additional costs for security and 
safety. The researcher even had to request for additional funding during the fieldwork, 
which also proved inadequate. Therefore, some of the data which was not actually 
available in Sierra Leone had to be collected from the Oxford Forestry Institute (OFI), 
which holds even more information on forestry in Sierra Leone than the Forestry 
Division in Sierra Leone. 
7.3.2 Limitations of the Models 
Developing a modelling approach for the analysis of the institutional arrangement for 
forest policy formulation and implementation in Sierra Leone was not an easy task. This 
was due to the fact that the analysis of forest policy formulation and implementation is a 
relatively new area of research in forestry. Therefore, the author had to use state of the 
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art theories and models strictly outside forest SCIence. Even though some of the 
theories/models discussed in chapter 3 had been earlier applied in the analysis of natural 
resource management issues, their application to forest management posed some unique 
challenges especially in terms of their adaptability to a highly complex forest management 
system like the Sierra Leone situation. Unique insights and approaches therefore had to 
be developed in order to make the theories/models applicable and workable. 
Another umque dimension had to do with the fact that most (if not all) of the 
applications of policy and organisational theories and models to forestry research have 
not been based on the data collection strategy adopted in this study. Prior to this study, 
Malayang's balance of policy pressures model and Grainger's organisational theory had 
not actually been tested using a variety of raw field data. The development and testing of 
these theories of policy and organisational analysis were based on personal experiences in 
the Philipines and Thailand and a range of vicarious information gathered over a 
protracted period. The author therefore had to be as innovative as possible in the data 
collection, presentation and analyses procedures in order to elicit relevant information -
especially when this study is the first comprehensive analysis of policy and institutions 
from a hidden agenda perspective in Sierra Leone. 
Because this study addressed two subsystems of forest management (policy and 
institutions), it was not possible to rely on a single theory or model to analyse both 
subsystems. The author therefore had to critically determine which theories or models 
were most appropriate in analysing specific aspects of the study. The result was the 
adoption a hybrid model developed from existing models which constilUted a doublc-
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regulatory output sense in the analysis of forest policy, while Grainger's organisational 
theory was used in the analysis of institutional constraints on forest policy 
implementation. 
The application of Malayang's balance of policy pressures model to policy analysis in 
Sierra Leone was not without problems. Even though the model analyses the pressures 
on policy makers relative to the powers of exploitative and protectionist groups, and the 
balance of pressures which is the policy, it does not address the resulting implications in 
terms of the tensions between winners and losers. In order to fill this gap, the author had 
to adopt a double-barrelled approach to policy analysis by using the regulatory output 
model which addresses the issue of ultimate winners and losers. This theoretical 
approach made it possible for the author to analyse policy formulation from both an input 
and output perspective - the input being the pressures on policy makers, and the output 
being the balance of pressures on policy makers resulting in conflicts between winners 
and losers. 
Grainger's organisational theory model, even though much detailed in scope in terms of 
addressing the institutional constraints on forest policy implementing organisations, it 
does not adequately address the issue of forest policy implementation in turbulent and 
politically unstable environments like Sierra Leone. The ideal situation would havc been 
to develop another hybrid model by jointly applying the Grainger model and the rcsource 
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to develop another hybrid model by jointly applying the Grainger model and the resource 
dependence models of Aldrich and Pfeffer. This approach would ha\'c provided not only 
for the analysis of institutional constraints on forest policy implementation, but would 
have also shed new insights into policy implementation in disordered environments like 
war-torn Sierra Leone. However, the paucity of substantiating evidet1ce/data on the 
rapidly unfolding chaos in Sierra Leone did not make it possible for the resource 
dependence model of Aldrich and Pfeffer to be used to complement the Grainger model 
in this study. The Grainger model, however, provided a substantial analytical framework 
for the analysis of forestry-related organisations in Sierra Leone. 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Even though this research has identified two major reasons for poor forest management 
in Sierra Leone - lack of an up-to-date policy and poor and weak organisations for 
implementing forest policy, it is by no means fully exhaustive of the intriguing questions 
that could be answered by further research. Various aspects of policy analysis and 
organisational analysis have been unearthed which could constitute the basis of future 
research. 
7.4.1 Policy Research 
Research into policy issues could be geared towards a thorough analysis of what actually 
constitutes policy. This would involve an extended analysis of the various perceptions of 
policy by policy actors and those that are affected by such policy. and how it affects 
policy development. In the light of the fact that some developr'llo co t", l'k s· .. 
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Leone hardly distinguish between policy, legislation and regulation, there is need for 
clear distinctions to be developed. 
There is also need for further analysis of the concept of the hidden agenda, especially ~h 
it relates to an ambiguous policy situation and the development of actual policies, There 
is a need to assess whether the idea of the hidden agenda is premeditated or contingent 
upon developments within the policy process. Since such agendas are largely unwritten, 
skilful interview techniques have to be adopted to elicit the required information. 
Conclusions will then have to be inferred from discussions with policy makers and major 
policy actors. 
Various typologies of policy models have been applied to the analysis of the policy 
process, but most of these have been lacking in scope and could not provide for an 
adequate analysis of policy issues without being completed by another model. The need 
therefore is for the development of a comprehensive model of policy analysis which 
could be adapted to various policy situations. For example, the application of 
Malayang's model to the policy process in Sierra Leone had to be complemented by the 
regulatory output model to provide for the inclusion of the uitinlate winners and losers in 
the policy framework. The development of such a model would require the thorough 
examination of various models of policy making in different circumstances to serve as a 
basis for the development of this new approach. 
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In the light of the centralised policy making system in Sierra Leone, there is also a need 
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of centralised policy making, \\'ith a view 
to developing strategies for the involvement of grassroots communities and their 
representatives in policy making. Such an approach will enhance the development of 
appropriate strategies for tapping hidden potentials for policy development, and improve 
the commitment of local communities to the policy process. 
7.4.2 Organisational Analysis 
Even though various models of organisational analysis have been developed, most of 
them have concentrated on the analysis of intra-organisational relationships, with 
relatively fewer theories addressing inter-organisational relationships. Although this 
study makes reference to a good working relationship between governmental 
organisations, there is need for a further analysis of the nature, types and strength of such 
relationships. A similar approach could be adopted to assess the relationship between 
international NGOs and national NGOs in Sierra Leone. 
The role of international and multilateral donor organisations in forest management in the 
developing world needs to be thoroughly examined, with a view to assessing the degree 
of sustainability of their aid packages in promoting forestry development and self 
reliance. There is also need to assess the Structural Adjustment Programmes, Agriultural 
Sector Support Programme, and other forms of development aid and loans to determine 
how they actually aid forestry development in the long-term. 
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There is also need for a critical examination of decentralisation in forest management in 
the Third World, because if over-centralisation is considered as harmful, it follows that 
over- decentralisation might have similar effects. Inasmuch as there is a strong case for 
the inclusion of grassroots comn1unities in forest management, in order to enhance their 
commitment to the implementation process and increase the rate of successful 
implementation, it is extremely important to critically analyse the modalities for this in 
order to determine the required level of involvement and how this can be achieved. This 
could be done by interviewing all the major actors in the policy formulation and 
implementation process at all levels of the organisational hierarchy. 
Another interesting area of research could be to test the application of the resource 
dependence model of Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) to forest policy implementation in Sierra 
Leone's currently turbulent and uncertain environment. The intricacies involved in the 
struggle for control of the country's forest resources by the various actors, and the 
complex web of patrimonial linkages that are usually established to gain control 
constitute an innovative area for further research. 
7.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Forest policies and implementing organisations, both past and present, have failed to 
ensure proper forest management in Sierra Leone. A radical change in forest policy is 
therefore necessary. The future of forest policy should be geared towards achieving 
sustainable management by encompassing both the concepts of multiple use benefit and 
sustained yield resource management. It should go beyond focusing merely on wood 
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resources and yields to include the full range of services, values, uses, diversity, and 
continuity of ecosystems. Sustainable conservation strategies which promote the use of 
resources without exhausting the resource base should be encouraged, so that people can 
live in harnlOny with their environments and not in conflict, as in the past. There is an 
urgent need for conservation education geared primarily towards local communities 
living near forests. To achieve this, greater political conmutment to conservation issues 
is required. 
Forestry activities alone cannot reverse current trends in deforestation and poor forest 
management. A broad effort involving the public and private sectors, and including 
development agencies, government ministries and local community groups, is needed. 
Past expenences have shown that laws and regulations cannot inhibit people from 
continuing with forest destruction to meet their needs. People do better when motivated 
by common concern rather than when pushed by law. There is need to encourage 
community participation in forest resource management. Women should be particularly 
encouraged since they play vital roles in food and livestock production and in the use of 
trees. 
The training of foresters must change, so that instead of being policemen in conflict with 
forest users, they become facilitators of an improved way of life for people living around 
the forests. Local people will not participate in the management of forests as long as 
foresters act only as policemen. Foresters must be prepared to get out of the conflict of 
interest and provide good leadership in managing forest resources on an economically 
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effective and sustainable basis. There is need for Participatory Rural Appraisal teams 
cOinprising foresters, agriculturists, sociologists and development officers to mobilise 
local cOimnunities into formulating plans for forest management and asslgmng 
responsibilities. 
The present forestry management organisation cannot cope with forest management 
demands both now and in the future. The Forestry Division should be divorced from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and made a separate Forest Authority or 
Corporation. This will eliminate the current administrative red-tape and encourage 
greater productivity and effectiveness. The Forest Authority will not only focus 
attention on forest resources, but will lay a firm foundation for agroforestry development 
to help people living around protected areas to establish farming systems that do not 
destroy the forest resources. The Division should also create employment facilities for 
landless people who otherwise live on the forests. 
An immediate inventory/survey of forest resources in Sierra Leone should be undertaken 
to fill the critical gap in accurate forest resource data and determine which are the most 
threatened areas and what can be done to stem the tide of forest destruction. Areas set 
aside for protection must be well delineated and patrolled. Where necessary, hunting 
must be prevented in game reserves. The Military could also be involved in supporting 
conservation and sustainable development. Actions such as developing conservation 
oriented curricula for recruit training programmes should be encouraged. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
APC - All Peoples Party 
ASSP - Associated Agricultural Sector Support Programme 
ATC - Aureol Tobacco Company 
A VHRR - Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer 
CARE - Cooperation of American Relief Everywhere 
CCSL - Council of Churches in Sierra Leone 
CEC - Cation Exchange Capacity 
CHECSIL - Commonwealth Human Ecology Council Sierra Leone 
CSSL - Conservation Society of Sierra Leone 
DOS - Directorate of Overseas Surveys 
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States 
FAO - Food and Agricultural Organisation 
FD - Forestry Division 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GNP - Gross National Product 
GOs - Governmental Organisations 
GOSL - Government of Sierra Leone 
GTZ - German Technical Cooperation 
ha - Hectares 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
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ITO - Inter-Tropical Discontinuity 
MANR&F - Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Forestry 
MIARD - Ministry of Interior and Rural development 
MLHE - Ministry of Lands, Housing and the Environment 
MOD - Ministry of Development 
MRU - Mano River Union 
NADOC - National Documentation Centre 
nd - No date 
NGOs - Non-Governmental Organisations 
NPRC - National Provisional Ruling Council 
NRC - National Reformation Council 
OAU - Organisation of African Unity 
ODA - Overseas Development Administration 
ORIENT - Organisation of Research and Extension of Intermediate Technology 
RL TDC - Rokel Leaf Tobacco Development Company Limited 
RSPB - Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
RUF - Revolutionary United Front 
SLPP - Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
TF AP - Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
UN - United Nations 
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
US - United States (of America) 
WB - World Bank 
WWF - World Wild Fund for Nature 
